Chapter 1

A New Vision of Europe
Learning from the Global South

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Introduction

A sense of historical and political exhaustion haunts Europe. After five centuries of providing the solutions for the world, Europe seems incapable of solving its own problems. There pervades a feeling that there are no alternatives to the current critical state of affairs, that the fabric of social cohesion and post-WWII social contract that linked gains in productivity to gains in salaries and social protection is gone forever, and that the resulting increase in social inequality, rather than delivering higher economic growth, is indeed plunging Europe into stagnation. European social cohesion is degenerating before our eyes, sliding into European civil war by some *Fatum* (overpowering necessity) from which Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) saw modern European reason being liberated.

This is all the more puzzling if we consider that at least some of these seemingly intractable problems are somewhat similar to problems that non-European countries have confronted in recent years with some measure of success. More puzzling yet is that these countries, in addressing their problems, have drawn on European ideas and experiences. But they have reinterpreted them in new ways, by twisting and reconfiguring some of their components and mixing them with other components derived from non-European sources, while engaging in a kind of intellectual and institutional bricolage focused on concrete results rather than on orthodox models and dogmas.

The sense of exhaustion is compounded with a sense of miniaturization. Europe seems to be shrinking, while the non-European world seems to be expanding. New actors have emerged on the global scene, such as China, post-Soviet Russia, India, Brazil and South Africa, while Europe appears less and less relevant. Moreover, in a rather paradoxical way, as the European Union (EU) expanded the distinctiveness of Europe’s presence and profile in world affairs became diluted. When the Western European countries were less dependent on Brussels’s directives and were viewed as independent actors, they projected a vision of Europe as a benevolent and
peace-loving actor in international affairs, a profile clearly contrasting with the one projected by the United States. In contrast, when in our time the president of France, following slavishly on the steps of the United States, enthusiastically embraces the decision to bomb Libya and Syria, he is not only inducing the suicide of the French left but also wrapping up the soul of Europe in the diploma of the Peace Nobel prize awarded to the EU in 2012 and setting it on fire.

In addressing this epochal Geist, I start from two ideas that are far from being consensual. First, Europe, no matter how extraordinary its accomplishments in the past, has little, if anything, to teach the world. Second, Europe has extreme difficulty in learning from non-European experiences, namely from the global South.

This chapter is organized in three parts. First, I analyze the above-mentioned assumptions, historically contextualizing the decline of Europe. Second, I develop the conditions for mutual learning, including the readiness to learn from the global South and the acceptance that the future world will be a post-European one. Finally, I present the world as a global school and illustrate some of the classes of unlearning and learning that might be taken.

Europe in the World

Europe’s period as an imperial and global power ended in 1945. Devastated by the war, it benefited from the helping hand of the United States, then the overwhelming world power. Once the latter started to decline in the 1970s, instead of trying to carve out a new autonomous trajectory, Europe tied its fate to that of the United States by developing a partnership with it which over the years has become more and more unequal. In the meantime, the peripheral countries of the global South, many of which were European colonies at the end of WWII, became independent and, in one way or another, tried to find their own ways of making history in a post-European world. Progress took the form of a bumpy road, since Europe and its superior ally, the United States, questioned and challenged any attempt at delinking from the capitalist world system; meanwhile, the Soviet Union (and its allies) refused to accept any alternative to capitalism other than the one it was itself trying to develop. The Non-Aligned Movement (starting with the Bandung Conference in 1955, convened by Presidents Jawaharlal Nehru (India), Sukarno (Indonesia), Gamal Abdel Nasser (Egypt), Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana) and Josip Broz Tito (former Yugoslavia)), was the first manifestation of a historical intent to carve out a path beyond the double and self-contradictory vision Europe offered of itself to the world, now liberal and capitalist, now Marxist and socialist, both of them highly exclusionary and demanding unconditional loyalty. This dichotomization of global affairs, dramatically illustrated by the Cold War (at times very hot
indeed, as in the Korean War or the wars in Southern Africa\(^7\), posed intractable political dilemmas to the new political elites of the global South, both at the national and regional level and at the level of the United Nations, even if for those most distanced from the Western culture capitalism and communism were two twin traps laid out by the same “white man’s” supremacy.

Several attempts at making history with some measure of autonomy followed in the subsequent decades, from the Tricontinental Conference of African, Asian and Latin American Peoples held in Havana in 1966\(^8\) to the BRICS alliance mentioned above. Interestingly enough, the political and social innovations that came with it were based for the most part on European ideas, but they were processed in different ways; they were, in a sense, re-appropriated and hybridized, mixed with non-Western ideas, in a bricolage of ideas and practices. A lot can be learned from this historical experience.

But here enters the second premise I am putting forward: the idea that Europe has extreme difficulty in learning from the non-European experiences, namely those from the global South. Even if such experiences bear witness to the immensely rich historical diversity of the world, Europe is seemingly incapable of reflecting productively upon it and of using it to solve its own problems. The main reason for this difficulty lies in an entrenched colonialist prejudice that has outlived historical colonialism for many decades. For five centuries Europe saw itself as holding the key to the problems of an ever-expanding and inherently problematical world. Colonialism, evangelization, neocolonialism, imperialism, development, globalization, foreign aid, human rights, rule of law and humanitarian assistance have been some of the keys to the Eurocentric solutions for the problems of the world. Being dependent on such solutions, the non-European world was bound to adopt them, either voluntarily or by force, in this lying its subalternity vis-à-vis Europe. But, in the process, it also gave rise to much economic, social and political innovation, some of which consisted in new ways of rendering European conceptions and of combining them with non-European ones in response to specific contexts. There is therefore room for much global learning. However, the colonialist prejudice writ large is making it extremely difficult for Europe to learn from the experiences of the world.

How could Europe possibly benefit from world experiences that relate to the problems that Europe is facing, some of them supposedly solved long ago? There is one window of opportunity which has emerged in recent decades, and to which the 2008 financial, economic, political and ecological crisis has given a new visibility. What if Europe, rather than being the solution for the problems of the world, were itself the problem? Is Europe so unique as having to rely solely on its own experience to solve its problems? Or is Europe, on the contrary, part of a much wider world
from whose experience it could benefit? The question does not imply that Europe needs to take lessons but rather engage in a new conversation with the world, a process of reciprocal learning based on more horizontal relations and mutual respect for differences. For better or worse, for a long time Europe did teach lessons to the world, as I mentioned above. One might be tempted to think that now it is time for the non-European world, the global South, to teach lessons to Europe. Then Europe teaching the world; now the world teaching Europe. I think, however, that an invalid metaphor does not get better by being inverted. In my view it is rather the time for a post-colonial, post-imperial conversation between Europe and the vast non-European world. Rather than inverted teaching, we need mutual learning. Since no one has a magical solution for the problems of the world, no absolute knowledge from which such a solution could derive, a new conversation of the world is the only alternative to the continuation of imperial domination and global civil war we seem to be entering. However, for Europe to engage in a new relationship with non-European countries and its “inner South,” it is imperative that other histories are brought into the world conversation, histories and memories of the peoples subjected to Eurocentric modern domination which were silenced made invisible or irrelevant by the Eurocentric historical meta-narrative which granted itself the false designation of “world history.” As Trouillot has rightly emphasized, what we know about the global South are references produced by “North Atlantic universals.” North Atlantic universals are particulars that have gained a degree of universality, chunks of human history that have become historical standards (2002: 221–222). North Atlantic universals so defined are not merely descriptive or referential. They do not describe the world; they merely offer situated visions of the world, which I have called localized globalisms.

Before I develop these ideas, it should be noted that the formulation of these questions presupposes that a new vision of Europe is both possible and necessary. Why do we need a new vision? What should it look like? By asking these questions we are assuming, as a hypothesis, at least, that the old vision is not valid anymore, nor is it working as it should. Of course, we are also assuming that we have a clear and consensual idea of what the old vision looked like. None of these assumptions can be taken for granted. It seems to me that the sense of uneasiness that haunts Europe today derives from this radical uncertainty. Europeans are being led to aspire to a new vision of Europe, even if they don’t exactly know why, nor how exactly such a vision will differ from the old vision whose profile they at best only vaguely grasp.

There are other uncertainties and paradoxes which I am not going to address here except for a brief reference to one of them. It concerns the question of what counts as Europe. How many Europes are there? Is it made up of 51 countries or of the 27 EU countries? What does it mean to
be European? We should bear in mind that there is no official definition of what “European” means, at least for cultural policies. The break-up of the Soviet Union, of Yugoslavia, the reunification of Germany, and the large-scale movement of migrants, workers and refugees throughout Europe have added complexity to the very idea of Europe and European identity, as new identities and new borderlands are juxtaposed and multiple layers of “insider” or “outsider” statuses develop. Immigration offices and customs commissions may also develop their own ideas about Europe and European identity. For this reason, some authors (e.g., Shore, 1993) claim that talk about “the European identity” is premature. Just as there is not “one Europe” but instead a plurality of historically specific and competing definitions of Europe (Seton-Watson, 1985; Wallace, 1990), so there are rival and contrasting “European identities,” depending on where the boundaries of Europe are drawn and how the nature of “European-ness” is perceived, a problem identified very early on (Kundera, 1984; Dahrendorf et al., 1989). In mentioning these complexities and uncertainties, I want draw attention both to the fact that the idea of a new vision of Europe is intimately linked with the idea of the multiple and often contradictory boundaries of Europe and to a global South that is present inside Europe, much of which is part of the non-occidentalist West I have been referring to it (Santos, 2009).

Learning from the Global South

In this section I will try to answer two questions. Under what conditions would such mutual learning be possible? What would be the main areas of such global learning?

Given Europe’s imperial and historical past, the first condition for mutual learning is the readiness to learn from the global South, from the experiences of the immense regions of the world that were once subjected to European rule. Learning from the South invokes geography(ies) and cartography(ies). However, in the sense used here, the South is a metaphor for the systematic suffering inflicted upon large populations by Western-centric colonialism, capitalism and patriarchy (Santos, 1995: 506–519; 2014: 215). As should be clear, this suffering is not exclusively Europe’s doing. On the other hand, historically, Europeans have also fought against colonialism, capitalism and patriarchy. The metaphor is about measures, scales and weights, about dominant and subaltern, majority and minority movements and trends. They tell us that Europe was for centuries a very strong center that ruled the world by creating subordinate peripheries or margins. Continuing with the metaphor, there is a South because there was and still is a North. Learning from the South means learning from the peripheries, from the margins. It is not easy because, viewed from the center, the South is either too closely dependent on the North to be able to be different in any
relevant way or, on the contrary, so far apart that its reality is incommensurable with that of the center. In either case, the periphery has nothing to teach the center.

The first condition of learning from the South is to clarify what kind of South or Souths are to be engaged in the conversation. This clarification presupposes the willingness to consider a new cartography of Europe. We are reminded of the famous phrase used by the Austrian statesman Klemens von Metternich (1773–1859) in the first decades of the nineteenth century: “Asien beginnt an der Landstraße”, that is to say, Asia begins on the Landstraße. In the nineteenth century, the area around the Landstraße (the name of the street\(^{11}\)) located on the outskirts of Vienna was occupied by immigrants from the Balkans. Then as now, the distinction between the Balkans and Europe was clear, as if the Balkan countries were not part of Europe.

The specification of what the South means is particularly complex in the case of Europe. The South that confronts Europe as the other is both outside and inside Europe. The South outside Europe comprises the countries which are the source of raw materials to be explored by North-based multinational corporations; countries whose natural disasters elicit European humanitarian aid; countries which are unable to sustain their populations, thus giving rise to the problem of immigration that afflicts Europe; countries which breed terrorists that must be fought with the utmost severity. The South inside Europe bespeaks the immigrants, the Roma people, the children of immigrants, some of whom have lived in Europe for generations and even hold European passports but nevertheless are not viewed as “Europeans like the others.” They become particularly visible during riots and their protests highlight their otherness.

There is, however, another South inside Europe. It is a geographical South, though partaking of the metaphorical South as well. In this instance, I mean the countries in southern Europe – Greece, Portugal and Spain in particular.\(^{12}\) In the present circumstances, it is hard to imagine Europe learning from its more southerly countries. The more cynical ones will even say that from them only what is not to be done is to be learned. In the way that this sounds true and justifies how the economic and financial crisis is being managed has deeper historical roots than people may think. In order to understand it, we need to go back a few centuries and observe the historical oscillation between centers and peripheries inside Europe. A Mediterranean center that did not last more than a century and a half (i.e., the sixteenth century and the first half of the seventeenth century) was superseded by another one that ended up lasting much longer and having far more structural impact. The latter center was a center with roots in the twelfth- and thirteenth-century Hanseatic League, a center oriented to the North Atlantic, the North Sea and the Baltic Sea, and embracing the cities of northern Italy, France, the Netherlands and, in the nineteenth century, Germany. This center has always been surrounded by peripheries: in the north, the Nordic
countries; in the south, the Iberian Peninsula; in the southeast, the Balkans; in the east, the feudal territories, the Ottoman Empire and semi-Europeized Russia since the eighteenth century under Peter the Great. Over the course of five centuries, only the northern peripheries had access to the center, the same center that is still the core of the EU. The truth is that, as Hobsbawm puts it (1997), there have always been two Europes, and often two Europes inside each country (such as Catalonia and Castile in Spain, northern and southern Italy, the tensions between Northern Ireland and England, etc.). This duality is more entrenched in the European culture than we might think, which may explain some of the difficulties in addressing the last financial crisis. What on the surface seems to be a financial or economic problem is, at a deeper level, also a cultural and socio-psychological problem. I suggest that this deeper layer may be more present in the financial or economic solutions than we might be willing to imagine.

An illustration may clarify what I mean. From the fifteenth century onwards and up to the eighteenth century there are many narratives by travelers and merchants of northern Europe focusing on the Portuguese, the Spanish, and the living conditions of southern Europe.13 What is striking about these narratives is that they ascribe to the Portuguese and the Spanish exactly the same features that the Portuguese and Spanish colonizers ascribed to the primitive and savage peoples of their colonies. Such features ranged from precarious living conditions to laziness and lasciviousness, from violence to friendliness, from a disregard for cleanliness to ignorance, from superstition to irrationality. This is reflected in a few quotations from the eighteenth century: “The Portuguese are slothful, not industrious at all, they don’t take advantage of the riches of their land, nor do they know how to sell those of their colonies” (Chaves, 1983: 20). The Portuguese are “tall, handsome and sturdy, generally quite dark, which results from the clime and their intermixing with Negroes” (ibid.: 24).14 In other words, the miscegenation, which the Portuguese viewed as one of the benevolent aspects of their colonialism, was turned against them to substantiate a colonial prejudice. When one read in some German popular press about the PIIGS15 one wondered if the underground (and even overground) colonial prejudice was not still at work.

The second condition of learning from the South is the acceptance that the world of the future will be a post-European world. The future will not be dictated to the world by Europe as it has been in the past. This vision of the future will, however, not come about before Europe settles its account with the past. The colonial enterprise meant that the peoples and nations subjected to European rule, albeit that they were the heirs to pasts that were immensely different from those of the Europeans, were condemned to aspire to a future dictated by Europe, a future linked to the European one as the master’s future is linked to the slave’s. Thus, Europe’s future became hostage to the bonds imposed on others. How many ideas and projects were
discarded, discredited, abandoned and demonized inside Europe merely because they didn’t fit the colonial enterprise? To what extent has the colonial past been overcome?

Once the cycle of historical colonialism was closed, neocolonialism has proved to be a resilient burden for many countries, reproduced through a wide range of policies, some more benevolent than others, from military intervention to development programs, from special rights of access to natural resources, to humanitarian and military assistance. The illusion of a post-colonial interruption prevents European governments from closely scrutinizing the global operations of European corporations, be they promoting baby formulas in hunger-ridden regions, land grabbing, speculating with food commodities, claiming patent rights over medicines, thereby making them unaffordable to the majorities of people that need them, restricting peasants’ access to seeds, causing environmental disasters and massive displacements of people due to mining projects of unprecedented scale, etc.

But the colonial world, far from merely being an immense domain of victimhood, was also a multifaceted site of resistance and survival ingenuity. Herein lies the immensely diverse experience of the world which indeed might have been even greater if it were not for the massive destruction of subordinated knowledges and experiences (epistemicide)\textsuperscript{16} once deemed unfit for the service of the colonial enterprise (Santos, 2014: 236). Of course, the past cannot be undone, but the way in which it conditions our present should be the object of deep reflection and political transformation. Historical colonialism may be (almost) over, but it goes on under new guises in our cities, minds and textbooks, as racism, sexism, ethnic profiling, xenophobia, intolerance, arrogant multiculturalism, punitive immigration laws, inhuman refugee camps, etc.

The World School of Unlearning and Learning

Europe has to go back to school, the school of the world and of its infinite diversity, and be willing to unlearn many self-evident ideas that were truthful and useful in the past but that are not so anymore. Furthermore, it needs to be willing to learn about new ideas, some of which are altogether unfamiliar. However, others seem strange as if reflected from a mirror of surprising European ideas that were discarded and forgotten long ago, having been excluded and suppressed from a vast European family of ideas. When going back to school, Europe should also entertain the possibility that some of the old, most vibrant European traditions may today be found outside Europe after being appropriated and creatively transformed by the peoples subjected to European colonialism and neocolonialism. As strong examples, I offer four classes of unlearning followed by learning.
Human Rights and Interculturality

Especially since WWII, Europe has been facing an intercultural challenge to its legal and political cohesion, due not only to migratory processes, but also to the recognition of Europe’s subnational diversity. Again, the outside-inside divide is increasingly becoming an inside-inside divide. As cultural difference becomes a dimension of cultural citizenship, human rights issues and citizenship rights issues become more intertwined than ever, even if conservative forces tend to pull them apart. The quest for a broader notion of European citizenship, moving from the traditional national scope of citizenship to a broader European scale, is inherent in the idea of a cosmopolitan conception of humanity and human rights.

It seems to me that the defense of interculturality and human rights will become more and more one and the same struggle. However, in a post 9/11 world, the call for interculturality has become both more difficult and more necessary. On the one hand, there is the danger that a short-sighted conception of security will repress interculturality for fear of seeing control escape; on the other, it is increasingly obvious that the victim of such a conception will not just be interculturality but core human rights as they have been conventionally understood in Europe.17

There is no question today about the hegemony of human rights as a discourse of human dignity (Santos, 2002b: 44–46, 2015a: 1–10). To be sure, this must be considered a European contribution to the struggle of humankind for dignity and emancipation. Nonetheless, such a hegemony faces a disturbing reality. A large majority of the world’s inhabitants are not the subjects of human rights. Rather, they are the objects of human rights discourses. The question is, then, whether human rights are efficacious in helping the struggles of the excluded, the exploited and the discriminated against, or whether, on the contrary, they make those struggles more difficult.18 In other words, is the hegemony claimed by human rights today the outcome of a historical victory, or rather of a historical defeat?

We must begin by acknowledging that human rights have a double genealogy in European modernity: an imperial genealogy and a revolutionary genealogy. In their name, countless atrocities have been committed against defenseless populations for no other reason than their being in the way of European plundering of their riches. However, human rights have been at times a powerful tool in fighting for democracy and decency and against tyranny and oppression caused by state and non-state agents. Europe has always found it difficult to grasp that other grammars of human dignity, besides human rights, have always been available to people, and are still today. Suffice it to say that twentieth-century national liberation movements against colonialism did not invoke the human rights grammar to justify their causes and struggles. They fought in the name of national liberation and self-determination. Today, two other grammars of human dignity are calling for
an active European engagement. The first one is not as foreign to European roots as many may think, but it is nonetheless viewed today as un-European. I am referring to Islamic conceptions of human dignity and their emphasis on duties, rather than on rights, and on the value of the community (the *umma*) as the ultimate root of dignity and human worthiness. The rampant Islamophobia that plagues Europe is preventing Europe from engaging in a productive conversation with one-fifth of the world’s population and with an increasing proportion of its citizenry. For how long can this obstinate refusal go on before civil conversation yields to civil war? In this regard, the integration of Turkey in the EU would have been a welcome development. It would build a bridge between Europe and the closest Muslim world, after, of course, the Muslim European world.

Moreover, it should be mentioned that there is another platform for a new conversation with the world involving unlearning followed by learning. I am referring to the issue of secularism. Secularism is an entrenched paradigm in the European way of life, and rightly so. The tragic experience of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries left Europe with no other positive alternative than the separation of state and church, the idea that freedom of religion can only be accomplished in a society whose public sphere is free from religion. I will not discuss here the complexities of the European solution to the religious question. I just want to emphasize that, for complex reasons, we seem to be entering a post-secular age, as Charles Taylor (2007) calls it. Habermas (2009) has likewise spoken of post-secularity as one of the defining characteristics of our time. In my view, we are heading towards difficult times in this regard; European participation in the world conversation would recommend that a distinction between secularism and secularity enter the public debate as soon as possible. Secularity is a philosophical and political stance that defends the separation of state and religion but admits the presence of non-secular stances in the public sphere, whereas secularism is the embodiment of the public sphere itself and the sole authoritative source of public reason, thus leaving no room for non-secular stances in the public space. In this regard, the European movement is uneven and we should consider, for instance, the UK to be more advanced than France.

The other grammar calling for unlearning/learning on the part of Europe are the rights of nature. I am referring to a luminous constitutional innovation brought about by the Constitution of Ecuador in 2008. Article 71 states that:

Nature, or *pachamama*, where life is reproduced and occurs, has the right to integral respect for its existence and for the maintenance and regeneration of its life cycles, structure, functions and evolutionary processes. All persons, communities, peoples and nations can call upon public authorities to enforce the rights of nature. To enforce and
interpret these rights, the principles set forth in the Constitution shall be observed, as appropriate. The State shall give incentives to natural persons and legal entities and to communities to protect nature and to promote respect for all the elements comprising an ecosystem.

In cultural terms, the idea of rights of nature is a hybrid entity. It appropriates the European idea of human rights and mixes it with non-Western, indigenous cosmovisions of nature (Orbe, 2010). Nature, however, for the dominant European cosmovision, at least since René Descartes (1596–1650), is a *res extensa* (an extended thing, a corporeal substance without a soul) and, as such, is deprived of the dignity granted to human beings. Given the deep ecological crisis we are entering, I suggest we learn from such conceptions of nature and rights through what I call intercultural translation in order to address the problems caused by the crisis (Santos, 2014: 212–235).

As I see it, intercultural translation involves searching for isomorphic concerns and underlying assumptions among cultures, identifying differences and similarities, and developing, whenever appropriate, new hybrid forms of cultural understanding and intercommunication that may be useful in favoring interactions and strengthening alliances among social movements fighting, in different cultural contexts, capitalism, colonialism and sexism, and for social justice, human dignity or human decency. Intercultural translation questions both the reified dichotomies among alternative knowledges (e.g., indigenous knowledge versus scientific knowledge) and the unequal abstract status of different knowledges (e.g., indigenous knowledge as a valid claim of identity versus scientific knowledge as a valid claim of truth).\(^{21}\) If this could be achieved, we would be witnessing a fascinating instance of a cultural boomerang: human rights would leave Europe, setting humans against nature, fly over the world, and return to Europe to bring humans and nature together again.

In light of this diversity concerning conceptions of dignity both inside and outside Europe, I propose, against traditional conceptions of universalism, intercultural dialogues on isomorphic concerns, for instance between Western human rights, Hindu *dharma*, Islamic *umma*, Latin American indigenous peoples’ *pachamama* or *buen vivir* or African sage wisdom and *ubuntu*. As a result, a new hypothetical human rights may become widely accepted in Europe: we have the right to be equal when difference makes us inferior, and we have the right to be different when equality decharacterizes us.\(^{22}\)

**Alternatives to Development or the Other Economies**

In this regard, the first unlearn/learn exercise involves revisiting the world as a field of very unequal exchanges. Europe’s prosperity was achieved through
huge transfers of wealth from the global South, first from its colonies and then through neocolonial conditions and restrictions. In light of recent commercial controversies setting apart Europe and the global South, a good focal point for unlearning/learning in this regard would be the consideration that what is good for European corporations is not necessarily good for Europe. Given the disturbingly massive investment in lobbying by European and non-European corporations in Brussels and Strasbourg, this will be a difficult lesson to learn. Short of it, the proclamations by European leaders of the need for more inclusive horizontal relationships based on cooperation and mutual respect will be viewed by their non-European partners as mystifying window dressing.

The second unlearn/learn exercise concerns alternatives to development and the role of non-capitalist economic relations within capitalist societies. The financial and economic crisis has underscored current impasses confronting global decisions on climate change and sustainable development, and the disheartening marginalization of Europe in this field in spite of its leadership in environment-friendly energy policies. On the other hand, many initiatives are taking place in other parts of the world to which Europe, in general, pays little attention, if it knows them at all. Peasants’ claims to land that seemed historically condemned have re-emerged with great strength and political clout throughout Latin America, Africa and India (Moyo and Yeros, 2005). Non-capitalistic economic organizations – often called a social solidaristic economy, an economy of care or “the other economy” – are mushrooming in countries as diverse as Brazil, South Africa, Mozambique and India. Recent political changes in some countries have declared a moratorium on the conventional concept of economic development and framed the economic policies by resorting to non-Western conceptions, such as Sumak Kawsay or Sumak Qamaña (buen vivir/good life, in Quechua and Aymara, respectively) (Santos, 2010). However, involved in heated internal and international controversies, these initiatives point to post-capitalistic and post-developmentalist futures and paradigms in non-utopian terms, that is, to the extent that they translate these visions into concrete political agendas (Santos, 2010, 2014: 30–32).

A new social and economic common sense seems to be emerging to which the current financial, economic, energy and environmental crises could lend a new credibility. In spite of significant progress in energy policy, Europe has not been able to affirm leadership in the global debate on sustainable development and on alternative development. Well-organized economic interests and their political leverage do their best to block these movements and the paradigmatic changes they point to. However, the trend seems irreversible and only needs a broader scope and international outlook and the political opportunity for social experimentation in order to become a central factor in the political agenda at the European level.
Democratizing Democracy

Specifically concerning democracy, Europe faces two problems. As a union, there is the problem of the European demos, its conditions of possibility, its two deficits, the deficit that derives from what Jürgen Habermas (2012) has called “post-democratic executive federalism” and the deficit, more notable in recent years, deriving from the coexistence of strong countries and weak countries dealing with each other in ways that contradict their formal equality as member states. This latter deficit is giving rise to an ideological divorce between North and South concerning political trust and democratic legitimacy. Systematic analysis of opinion surveys show that democracies in the North have recovered and even surpassed the levels of political trust and satisfaction with the political system that they enjoyed ten years ago, while democracies in the South are suffering levels of political trust and satisfaction that are in free fall. At first glance, this may be surprising since across Europe, from North to South, governments are pursuing some kind of austerity policy. What brings the citizens of the North closer to their governments is the fact that those policies applied at home are incomparably softer than those applied by their governments upon the citizens of other countries, the countries of the South. An insidious process of political legitimation is thereby set in motion, a process that consists in setting Europeans against Europeans. Is it possible to build a European demos on such a basis?

Already too many European countries are facing the problem of the possible exhaustion of the national democratic framework in light of the financial crisis or of the rise of extremist populism. A sense of disaffection, distrust and dissatisfaction with the representative democratic regime is becoming so deep (Tormey, 2014) that, rather than having a positive impact on democratic politics by activating new and denser forms of political engagement, it is in fact leading to phenomena that we might consider pathological in effectively functioning democracies: massive resignation and apathy, increasing distance between citizens and elected politicians, and deep distrust vis-à-vis the actually existing democracy, particularly visible in southern Europe, as the disturbing growth of populisms of different kinds, including extreme-right parties that are hostile to the very idea of Europe. In countries undergoing structural adjustment, people are so concerned with survival, with feeding their families, that the freedom of choice and individual autonomy and responsibility promised by neoliberalism are becoming cruel nightmares anticipating successive days of half-fed stomachs and privatized education and health much above one’s means. The number of suicides rises as the horror of life seems to surpass the horror of death.

Fortunately, this is not the whole story. The youth and citizens in general have been filling the streets and squares of the southern European cities in
protest against what they view as the most scandalous transfer of wealth from the poor and middle classes to the rich and super-rich ever to be carried out in a democratic regime (Santos, 2015b: 115–116). But, rather than being an acephalous desperate protest against an unjust state of affairs, it is a peaceful protest carried out in the name of a noble idea: the idea of real democracy. Why real? Because the current one is not real anymore. It is rather an institutional ghost, an empty shell within which powerful interests operate freely and unaccountably to manipulate political rule and public opinion. Moreover, more and more domains of political deliberation are being dried out and becoming empty parking lots waiting for lucrative entrepreneurial venture, be they in education, health or social security. Otherwise, how could we imagine that democratically elected politicians pay more attention to rating agencies’ demands than to citizens’ demands? It is becoming more and more evident to European citizens that integration was all along a process conducted by political and economic elites with the intended or unintended objective of insulating them from the pressures and aspirations of the citizenry, the most dramatic evidence being given by the crisis of the euro. The euro crisis shows the extent to which democracy as we know it has been historically defeated by capitalism, and indeed by its most anti-social version: global and unregulated financial capitalism. The current crisis shows a troubling asymmetry: representative democracy may impose limits on capitalism, but it may be absorbed or circumvented by capitalism. However, the reverse is not true: capitalism may impose limits on democracy which the latter cannot absorb or circumvent because it risks losing its meaning to citizens. In other words, democracy is not able to replace capitalism with socialism, but capitalism is able to replace democracy with dictatorship. Examples abound in European history.

In this context, an exercise of unlearning/learning in the world as a school is required. The citizens of Europe are feeling the need for denser forms of democratic rule, but they find it difficult to propose credible alternatives. This, in my view, is another field for expanding our conversation with the world through exercises of unlearning/learning. Europe has to unlearn that representative democracy, however precious, is less and less capable of defending itself from enemies that use it with the sole purpose of undermining it and ultimately do away with it. Representative democracy must be complemented and energized by participatory democracy, that is, forms and fields of democratic deliberation in which citizens, rather than electing the decision makers, take themselves decisions within the limits and according to the rules agreed upon. This virtuous articulation between representative and participatory democracy has been trialled with great success in Latin America and particularly in Brazil (Santos, 1998b, 2005). It has been such a success that some European cities have been trying to copy the Latin American experience, albeit timidly (Allegretti and Sintomer, 2009). It seems to me that this learning process
must be intensified under the premise that the struggle for a more cohesive Europe and a more internally cohesive set of nations can only be brought about by expanding the domains in which the market rationale of profitability is replaced by political deliberation and that such a replacement is better protected from the backdoor return of market rationale when common citizens take decisions on issues that directly affect their lives. I am not talking about far-afield utopias. I am talking about participatory budgeting, popular councils of health and education, and councils of economic and social development in operation in Brazil. If they are utopias, they are realistic ones.

In this regard, a second unlearning/learning exercise is recommended, another enterprise in which Europe should be engaged. Europe is the motherland of social democracy, a social regime based on the following premises: capitalist societies, if they want to succeed in the competition with socialist models of society that go on seducing the popular classes, must be ready to reduce social inequality to a level at which all citizens will have a stake in maintaining the current status quo. This can only be achieved through relatively high levels of taxation; state involvement in the production of public goods such as education and health and transportation; regulation of capitalist activities to protect workers and the environment; and some kind of indexation of productivity gains to gains in social protection. We know how this model has been dismantled over the past thirty years at a pace that increased dramatically after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The speeches of European leaders, as well the brilliantly crafted reports by Brussels’ bureaucracy, lead us to a unanimous conclusion: social democracy is gone forever and there is no alternative to neoliberalism and austeritarianism.

If, however, we are brave enough to exercise some commonsensical doubt and look to the world experience, we will be surprised to realize that several countries outside Europe, including Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador and Bolivia, have claimed to be inspired by European social democracy, and have appropriated it creatively in order to adapt it to local and international conditions. This they have done through democratic politics that have in fact been ratified by populations in successive elections. In so doing, they have managed to accomplish a significant measure of social redistribution of wealth without embarking on massive nationalization or claiming to be building socialism and, indeed, without closing their countries to transnational economic flows. The only act of disobedience all of them have committed has been in relation to the neoliberal International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank recipe that Europe sees as inescapable. It is as if the outside world has found a Europe that has lost herself. Under these circumstances, could we still recognize ourselves?

Democratizing democracy is the quest for “high intensity democracy” (Santos, 2005, 2006b: 40–41): the conjunction of participatory and deliberative
forms of democracy with representative democracy. Such a conjunction may provide major tools for new configurations of democratic government and citizenship, of representation and participation. The implication thereof is that new forms of participation and deliberation will sooner or later lead to new, more demanding forms of representation and accountability to citizens. The recognition of the rich diversity of democratic experiences arising in different parts of the world – what I call demodiversity (ibid., 2005) – may well prove to be a key step towards the necessary renewal or reinvention of democracy in contexts of increasing cultural, ethnic and religious diversity, as is the case in Europe.\textsuperscript{31} It will highlight possible ways of solving the current tensions or even conflicting purposes between locally based and theme-specific forms of citizen consultation and deliberation proliferating in Europe and the construction of policy through representative or delegation democracy at the national and EU level.

Learning from the South may provide new approaches to a range of experiences in Europe, including the expansion of citizenship rights to non-nationals and immigrants, the tension between representative or delegative democracy and collective action by citizens, communities and groups affected by public policies, the experiences of urban and regional governments based on participatory procedures, including participatory budgeting and participatory planning, and the experiments in public debate and the government of scientific and technological innovation involving the biosciences, biotechnologies and emerging technologies.

\textbf{Healing}

This is probably the most surprising domain of unlearning/learning to be undertaken by Europe in the world school. Throughout European history there abound conflicts, wars, rivalries and competitions among nations that were eventually resolved or overcome only after much suffering. In WWII between 60 and 80 million people died; it was the deadliest conflict in human history. In spite of this, there have rarely been attempts to heal the wounds of the past by other means than political arrangements that have left untouched the underlying resentments, hurt feelings and painful emotions. No sustained attempts have ever been made at non-economic reparation and reconciliation. Reparation and reconciliation at the level of the soul. European inter-politics has always been the focus, not European inter-subjectivity. The immediate period after WWII is particularly illustrative in this respect. Shortly after the war, the European priority tirelessly pursued by Winston Churchill, as British prime minister (1874–1965), was organizing a defense against the new enemy, Yosef Stalin, then the leader of the Soviet Union (1878–1953), an artificial EU built upon ruins, a Cold War zealot, delivering its security to the United States’ global interests. It
was all about politics and economics; culture and the soul were left to each country to deal with.

The current crisis, no matter how it is resolved, and even assuming that it will be resolved in the most auspicious way, will leave behind a cultural trauma of great magnitude, a trauma caused by a sudden transformation: the friendly neighborhood that the EU once seemed to be turned, in a matter of months, into a prison filled with the ghosts of the past, a rapid transition from a political model based on equal partners to a model of master states and client states, from commonly agreed rules to imposed conditionalities and double standards, from the glorification of European values to an exclusionary rhetoric that at times has racist undertones. This trauma is not just economic or political. It is cultural and will last for generations to come. In order to minimize its repercussions, Europe should engage in another instance of unlearning/learning with the world, in this case, by taking seriously the experience of the Truth Commissions that have sought to heal the wounds caused by an authoritarian recent past in several African and Latin American countries. The European situation is different but not completely unrelated. It will be incumbent on a new Europe-wide pedagogy to convince the youth of southern Europe, half of it unemployed and unemployable in the near future, that they are not a lost generation and that they are as European as the other youth of the rest of Europe. Economic solidarity is, of course, crucial to overcome the current crisis, but even more crucial and far-reaching is non-economic solidarity. If, once the crisis is over, European politics is reduced to budgetary policing and monitoring, it may well succeed in preserving the EU, but the soul of Europe will be lost for a very long time.

Conclusion

I have argued in this chapter that Europe must either engage in a vast process of unlearning/learning with the global South or it will be condemned to fall back into its highly problematical internal dissention and rivalry which, in the not so distant past, led to the most tragic consequences. It will be a difficult endeavor, given the centuries-old inclination of Europe to look at the outside world as an object of domination rather than as a partner for mutually enriching cooperation. While this is difficult, it is not totally impossible, if the conditions put forward in this chapter are taken into consideration. I do not defend a Eurocentric institutional reconstruction of Europe along the lines proposed by Habermas (2012). Magnificent as he is as a scholar, Habermas cannot conceive of the possibility of learning from the global South. On the contrary, for my part I submit that it is in such learning, in the intercultural possibilities it opens for a vast process of democratizing democracy in Europe, that the key for the only new vision of Europe worth fighting for lies.
Notes

1 The first version of this paper was presented at the 3rd Herrenhausen Conference (“Europe in a Non-European World”) of the Volkswagen Foundation in Hannover on 29 September 2013. In preparing this version I benefited from the invaluable comments and support of Maria Irene Ramalho, Maria Paula Meneses, Bruno Sena Martins and Sara Araújo.

2 Throughout this chapter “Europe” is understood as the official Europe, the Europe as conceived by the dominant political and social forces and reproduced by hegemonic narratives. Probably more than ever Europe is today a multicultural continent and comprises many subaltern Europes that do not fit the official script. But, as mentioned below, even what counts as “official Europe” is not unproblematic.

3 These countries took the initiative of building an economic alliance, known as BRICS (the acronym of the countries involved), which by its ambit and ambition might pose some threats to the so far unquestioned rule of the multilateral financial institutions (e.g., the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization) and US imperialism over the global economy. Not surprisingly, some attempts have been made in recent years to control such threat, be it the neutralization of Russia, the isolation of China and the political destabilization of Brazil and South Africa.

4 I develop these ideas in Santos (2014).

5 The most recent manifestation of this unequal partnership is the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) being negotiated between the United States and the EU.

6 On this topic see Wright (1956); Young (2005); and Lee (2010).

7 On this topic see Westad (2007); Oppenheim (2008); Onslow (2009); Meneses and Martins (2013).

8 Shortly after the Tricontinental Conference took place, in 1966, the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate published a ‘staff study’. The study starts by emphasizing the international significance of the Conference: “An event of outstanding importance to the Free World took place in Havana on January 3 of this year. The Cuban capital was the site of what was probably the most powerful gathering of pro-Communist, anti-American forces in the history of the Western Hemisphere. The first Tricontinental Conference of African, Asian, and Latin American Peoples, as it was called, was convened in the Hall of the Ambassadors at the once-swank Habana Libre Hotel (formerly the Havana Hilton Hotel) in Havana, Cuba.” After enumerating some of the salient aspects of the Conference it cited, with approval, a study by the Organization of American States, in which it was stated: “That the so-called first Afro-Asian-Latin American Peoples’ Solidarity Conference constitutes a positive threat to the free peoples of the world, and, on the hemisphere level, represents the most dangerous and serious threat that international communism has yet made against the inter-American system.

It is necessary and urgent, for the purpose of adequately defending democracy:

a. That the [proven] intervention of communism in the internal affairs of the American Republics be considered as aggression, since it constitutes a threat to the security of the hemisphere.

b. That the American governments define their position regarding the present treatment of every kind to be given to communism, and that they consequently adopt coordinated measures that will lead to the common goals” (US Government Printing Office, 1966: 2).
9 Irrespective of the answers that may be given to them, these questions call for provincializing Europe, to paraphrase Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000).
10 The EU is a confederate politico-economic union of 27 member states located primarily in Europe. However, in June 2016, the UK voted in a referendum to leave the EU (known as Brexit), leading to a complex separation process implying political and economic changes for the UK and other countries.
11 The royal highway leading from the capital of the empire eastwards into Hungary had its starting point from this part of Vienna. On this topic see Halecki (1952).
12 I have written about the subaltern position of Portugal in Europe, even when Portugal held a significant colonial empire. See, for example, Santos (2011: 53–64).
15 PIIGS is a jargonistic, and offensive, acronym used in economics and finance. This derogatory term refers to the economies of Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain, five EU member states that were unable to refinance their government debt or to bail out over-indebted banks on their own during the debt crisis.
16 I have addressed the footprint of Western colonial heritage – cultural imperialism and epistemicide – in various works. See, for example, Santos (1998a: 103 and 2001: 266).
17 See, on this, Santos (2007: 3–40).
18 It should be underlined that the African liberation movements of the second half of the twentieth century did not claim to struggle for “their” human rights to justify their struggles for national and political self-determination (Moyn, 2010; Santos, 2015a).
19 Among others see, for example, An-Na`im (1990, 1992).
20 I deal with this topic in Santos (2015a).
22 I have developed these ideas in previous works, See, for example, Santos (2002b, 2007: 3–40 and 2014: 63).
23 See, on this, Hart et al. (2010).
24 For example, until very recently, Ecuador has provided a most remarkable example by advancing the most innovative proposal in a post-Kyoto world: to leave unexplored in the subsoil the immense oil reserves in the National Park Yasuni-ITT – considered by UNESCO as the world’s richest biodiversity region – on the condition that the developed countries compensate it for its losses with half of the revenue it will fail to obtain by renouncing oil exploration.
25 These include, among others, the far-right party National Front in France, some of the political forces behind Brexit (some members of the UK’s Conservative party and UKIP), the far-right Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs) in Austria, the Finns Party (Perussuomalaiset – known as the “True Finns”), the Golden Dawn party in Greece and the Dutch Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid).
26 On the evaluation of the privatizing trend in health and education in Europe see Slantcheva and Levy (2007); Custers et al. (2007); Albreht (2009) and Santos (2016).
27 On similar protests throughout the world see Wignaraja (1993); Bayat (2010); Thompson and Tapscott (2010); Lubin (2011); Yee (2011); Taibo (2013); Khosrokhavar (2012); Vainer et al. (2013); Aguiló (2014); Branch and Mampilly (2015).
28. See, for example, the analysis of participatory democracy in health in southern Europe in Serapioni and Matos (2014).

29. For more insightful studies on the health councils see Coelho (2004); Shankland and Cornwall (2007); Cornwall et al. (2008); Kohler and Martinez (2015).

30. In recent times, some of these countries, most notably Argentina and Brazil, have undergone serious political crises and most of the redistributive policies of the recent past are being rapidly undone. It has yet to be discovered the extent to which such crises were produced by internal factors or by a combination of internal and external factors.

31. A good example is provided by the Bolivian Constitution of 2009 which recognizes, in equal terms, three types of democracy. Art. 11 states: “The Republic of Bolivia adopts a participatory democratic, representative and communal form of government, with equal conditions for men and women. Democracy is exercised in the following forms, which shall be developed by law:

1. Direct and participatory, through referendum, citizen legislative initiative, revocation of terms of office, assembly, councils and prior consultation. The assemblies and councils shall have a deliberative character in accordance with the law

2. Representative, by means of the election of representatives by universal, direct and secret vote, in accordance with the law.

3. Communal, by means of the election, designation or nomination of the authorities and representatives pursuant to the norms and procedures of the native indigenous nations and peoples, among others, in accordance with the law” (author’s translation).

32. See Chapman and Ball (2001); Mamdani (2006); Fombad (2008); and Hayner (2011).

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