Modes of Democratic Deliberation: Participatory Budgeting in Brazil

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In the last one hundred years, democracy has become the standard form of organization of political rule within Western modernity. At the beginning of modernity, in the seventeenth century, Leibniz summarized the skepticism about democracy that dominated the previous historical period in the following sentence: “[T]oday there is no prince so bad that it would not be better to live under him than in a democracy” (Dunn, 1979: 4). Leibniz’s remark reveals a critical assessment of democracy as a form of political organization that rapidly changed in the following two hundred years. In the middle of the nineteenth century, Alexis de Tocqueville summarized the new mood in relation to democracy:

[A] gradual development of the democratic principle must follow from the irresistible march of events. Daily some further privilege of the aristocracy comes under attack; it is a slow war waged about details, but infallibly in time it will bring the whole edifice down (Tocqueville, 1958: 67–8).

At that point, democracy was about to become the hegemonic form of organization of political rule in the United States and in some parts of Europe. Yet the whole world was still struggling over whether or not to adopt democratic forms of political organization. In 1897, Liang Ch’i Ch’ao, a Chinese Mandarin, published an article in a Shanghai newspaper that shows the growing influence of democracy outside the West. For this author, the expansion of democracy was inevitable:

[When the cycles of the world are about to move […] this is not something restricted to the West, nor something that China can avoid. I know that in less than a hundred years all five continents will be under the rule of the people, and our China will not be able to continue unchanged (Dunn, 1979: 11).]
Liang Ch'i Cha'o was right. By the end of the twentieth century democracy had become the hegemonic form of organization of political rule.

The belief that democracy has become a hegemonic form of organization of political rule is quite widespread. However, an assessment of what has been gained and what has been lost in this process is yet to be made. In the one hundred years that mediate between Liang Ch'i Cha'o's prediction and the realization of democratic hegemony, the meanings and practices of democracy have undergone important changes. These include the significant restriction of the concept of sovereignty, the growing consensus about the desirability of non-participatory forms of administration, and the rejection of participatory political models due to their non-institutional impact. All of these new conceptual positions are connected to the inter-war events in Europe and to the consolidation of democracy on the European continent at the end of the so-called "second wave of democratization."

Still, at the end of the eighteenth century, the democratic idea was associated with a strong conception of sovereignty. Jean Jacques Rousseau clearly expressed this association in a remark on the organization of the British parliament. For Rousseau,

sovereignty cannot be represented for the same reason that it cannot be alienated. [...] The people's deputies are not and could not be their representatives; they are merely their agents. [...] Any law which the people have not ratified in person is void; it is not a law at all. The English people believe themselves to be free. [...] In fact, they are seriously mistaken; they are only free on the day of the election of their representatives (Rousseau, 1968: 141).

Rousseau's analysis of the nature of sovereignty has not become the hegemonic conception of sovereignty within Western modernity. His conception did not prevail due to the emergence of complex forms of state administration that have led to the consolidation of specialized bureaucracies in most of the arenas of the modern state. The modern individual has lost control over the political, administrative, military, and scientific spheres, as well as many others, as Max Weber had already observed at the beginning of the twentieth century. In each of these spheres of activity, the modern individual came under the control of a hierarchical and specialized bureaucracy, no longer wielding the means of producing material goods, political decisions, scientific knowledge, and legal justice. The reason for this process of "disappropriation" of the control of the individuals over their own lives is to be found in the enormous expansion of the arenas in which decisions are made, in the issues that were made political (among others, health, education, and social welfare). According to the Weberian perspective, which is part of the hegemonic conception of democracy, a specialized bureaucracy is more prepared than the common individual to be in charge of these decisions. Complex decisions require the capacity of actors to have a previous knowledge of the issues dealt with and to pursue aims in a systematic manner (Kronman, 1983: 131). For Weber, only a specialized bureaucracy could handle this dimension of the modern polity. This constituted the first source of the restriction of the concept of sovereignty in modern democracies.

A second source of this restriction is related to the debates on rationality and mobilization that took place in the inter-war period in Europe. Democratic theory emerged in association with the idea of the rationality of the homo politicus. Since the Enlightenment (Kant, 1781 [1959]; Rousseau, 1968), the prevalence of rationality at the political level has been associated with the rejection of illegitimate forms of government, a view based on the perception that rationality is the basis of individuals' primary act of authorizing government.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, however, and particularly in the inter-war period, the link between democracy and rationality was undermined by what has been called "the emergence of particularistic interests." Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century democratic theory understood free public debate as an intrinsic part of the formation of the general will. Yet it failed to perceive that the path that leads from Rousseau to Marx admits the entrance of particular interests into public debate, and thus to the triumph of particular interests and manipulation over political rationality. Authors such as Ortega y Gasset, Karl Mannheim, Erich Fromm, and Max Horkheimer argued against the possibility of rational participation in politics. For them, non-differentiation within the polity caused by the end of the insulation of elites (Ortega y Gasset, 1930; Kornhauser, 1959), as well as by the rise of forms of cultural domination at the private level (Horkheimer, 1947; Arendt, 1951) transformed the nature of politics at the beginning of the twentieth century. This diagnosis led to a critique of democracy according to which the preservation of values critical to democratic politics requires the insulation of those social groups that best embody such values (Kornhauser, 1959: 22)—that is, the insulation of the elites from the masses. The mass society argument breaks the association between democracy and political participation because it sees broader political participation leading not to the enlargement of actors and issues in the political sphere, but rather to the irrational pressure of the masses on the political system. The consequence of this argument is rule by elites, since this is the only guarantee that cultural values not shared by the masses will be preserved. The mass society critique of popular sovereignty also involved the effects of mass society on political institutions, in particular the risk that mass mobilization would bypass the institutions in charge of the formation of the general will. Thus, the preservation of the values of democracy was made dependent on the insulation of elites from the political pressure of the masses.

Weber's positions on the loss of sovereignty and mass society theorists' positions on the irrationality of mass participation in politics were integrated
An analysis of the sources of the breakdown of democracy in Latin America reveals two facts, each equally problematic for the theory of democratic elitism: either the most important democratic elitist assumptions, such as the analysis of mass society and the rationality of elites, were clearly contradicted, or they were at least unable to explain the so-called “second reverse wave of democratization.” What seems to be at the root of the failure of the establishment of democracy in Latin America between 1964 and 1973 are the contradictions intrinsic to the model of inter-elite competition, a model that led to a broadened exercise of sovereignty by the elites themselves (Avritzer, 2001). Thus, two characteristics of democratic elitist theory seem from the very beginning not to have operated in Latin America.

First, the elites’ presumed adherence to democratic values, an ad hoc assumption derived from the conservative version of mass society theory (Kornhauser, 1959), was unable to explain the instability caused by inter-elite disputes in Latin American democracies. Elite attempts to reverse the results of democratic elections were responsible for the breakdown of democracy in Argentina in 1966, Brazil in 1964, and Chile in 1973, among other cases. Second, the role of mass mobilization in this period must also be readdressed. Mass mobilizations sought in most cases to secure the rules of the game for inter-elite competition. No democratic breakdown in Latin America was coordinated with large-scale mass mobilizations. On the contrary, most of them were coordinated with some form of elite support triggered by the attempt to reverse political elections ex-post. Thus, there seem to be two gaps in democratic elitism’s approach to democracy: first, its failure to differentiate between democratic and non-democratic elites, a gap bridged in a structural and quite problematic form in the work of Almond and Verba at the end of this period, and, second, its inability to understand mass mobilization. There are two different types of mass mobilization: the first type, studied in depth within the democratic elitist tradition, is an anti-institutional mobilization that can eventually disrupt the political process. The second type, however, consists in forms of collective action within voluntary associations, social movements, and other forums of participation. In this latter case, collective action draws on pre-existing networks of association and is fully compatible with democratic life. Much of the political activity in Latin America fits into the second category, anticipating an approach developed later by social movement theorists about the possibility of democratic collective action (Tilly, 1986; Cohen, 1985; Melucci and Avritzer, 1995). By assuming a priori a direct relationship between mass mobilization and democratic breakdown, democratic elitism missed the possibility of collective action in favor of the maintenance of democracy.

This chapter will seek to challenge three assumptions of the hegemonic conception of democracy, which will be called the democratic elitist conception: first, the widespread conception that, in order to be consolidated, democracy
should restrict the forms of participation; second, the idea that rational, hierarchal forms of administration can only be pursued by an insulated bureaucracy; and third, that all forms of collective action are alike and that they generate a contradiction between mobilization and institutionalization. In opposition to this, it will be shown, for the case of Brazil, that most forms of collective action are democratic and that they are able to produce new institutional designs that are participatory and incorporate new cultural elements into the polity. I will discuss these three elements with reference to one case of participatory democracy in Brazil: the case of the participatory budgeting process.

Democratization in Brazil and the emergence of innovation at the societal level

Brazil’s political system throughout the twentieth century has been highly unstable due to inter–elite political disputes. Between 1930 and 1945, the dominant political system was corporatist authoritarianism. In its first phase, this regime sought to introduce regular elections. However, after 1937, the conflict between agrarian and modernizing elites led to a shift from democratic to authoritarian corporatism, with the suspension of both elections and individual liberties. Between 1945 and 1964, the dominant regime was an unstable form of democratic populism, where all presidential mandates were subject to some kind of anti-democratic challenge. Vargas (1950–54) faced a rebellion and did not complete his mandate; Kubitschek (1956–60) needed the support of the army to seize office; Jânio Quadros resigned the presidency after the failure of an anti-congressional coup he had sponsored; and finally, João Goulart (1960–64) was overthrown by a military coup. Between 1964 and 1985 the country suffered its worst authoritarian experience. Congress was closed twice by the regime, once in 1968 and again in 1977. Presidential elections were suspended, and, after 1968, most individual guarantees, such as habeas corpus, were suspended as well. Thus, in contrast to the assumption of the hegemonic conception of democracy, the Brazilian political process shows, above all, that elites are not necessarily the guarantors of democratic political values. In the Brazilian case, most of the anti-democratic attempts between the 1930s and the 1980s involved inter–elite conflicts over the role of the state.

Redemocratization in Brazil took place through a restricted pact between the opposition party, the PMDB, and a faction within the party that had supported the regime, the PDS, in 1985. A new constitution has been in place since 1988 and regular presidential elections have been held since 1989.

Throughout the twentieth century, Brazilian elites had one principal political project: modernization. They led a modernizing project that transformed a predominantly rural country into the world’s tenth largest industrialized nation. The share of the population working in the industrial sector increased from 10.4 per cent in 1940 to 24.3 per cent in 1980, while that working in agriculture decreased from 65.8 per cent to 29.9 per cent (Santos, 1987: 137). Far from being simply a success story of economic modernization, this process has revealed a number of social drawbacks: in the twentieth century Brazil became one of the world’s most socially unequal countries. In 1984, the last year of authoritarianism in Brazil, more than 35 per cent of Brazilians were poor or very poor; in the northeast, this was true for more than half the population. Brazil’s economic modernization created sharp political and economic inequalities at the local level. The largest Brazilian cities grew at an unbelievable rate between 1950 and 1980: the population of São Paulo increased from 2,198 million to 8,493 million; Belo Horizonte grew from 352,000 to 1,780 million; and Porto Alegre, from 394,000 to 1,125 million (IBGE, 1983). The increase of the urban population and the creation and expansion of a rationalized public administration were not followed by a proportional increase in urban services. On the contrary, most of the services required by an urban population were very poorly provided in the 1980s. In 1984, only 80.2 per cent of city-dwellers in the southeast—Brazil’s wealthiest region—and only 59.6 per cent in the south had access to treated water. Access to sewerage was even lower: only 55 per cent of the urban population in the southeast and 11.8 per cent in the south had access to it in 1984 (Santos, 1987: 161–2). Thus, Brazil’s process of modernization, which implied the creation of a specialized bureaucracy according to Weberian prescriptions, was not able to address the country’s most pressing social needs.

Two factors might explain the low level of public infrastructure and services in most Brazilian cities in this period: the limited organization of the urban population and the country’s strong tradition of clientelism. The level of organization of the Brazilian population was traditionally very low. Some Brazilian cities had some very limited forms of neighborhood associations during the democratic populist period (1946–64): only 124 neighborhood associations were created in Rio de Janeiro during the whole period (Boschi, 1987), and only 71 were created in Belo Horizonte between the 1920s and the 1970s (Avritzer, 2000a). Thus, in general, it is possible to say that the Brazilian population was relatively unorganized when the democratic regime collapsed in 1964. In addition, state violence prevented organization throughout the authoritarian period. Afonso and Azvedo (1988) found fear to be the main reason the urban poor did not resist urban relocation in Belo Horizonte in the early 1970s; Gay (1994) found the same to be true for the Vidigal population in Rio de Janeiro during this period.

The second reason for the poor provision of urban services is the reliance on clientelism, the main political tradition at the local level in Brazil (Nunes Leal, 1946; Cannuch, 1990; Mainwaring, 1990; Avritzer, 1998). Brazilian political life, since the nineteenth century, has been characterized by the
presence of political mediators in charge of delivering public goods (Graham, 1990). Only in the late 1970s, as part of the reaction against authoritarianism and the break between Church and state, did this process begin to change with the formation of independent neighborhood associations. These associations blossomed as part of a general associative movement in reaction to authoritarianism. In Rio de Janeiro, 166 neighborhood associations were formed between 1979 and 1981 (Boschi, 1987). In Belo Horizonte, 80 per cent of the existing neighborhood associations date from after 1980. In all cases these associations were an expression of a change in patterns of association. They claimed organizational autonomy from the state; they challenged the presence of political mediators; and they challenged the tradition of considering urban services as a favor to be delivered by the state (Avritzer, 2000a). Thus an analysis of the Brazilian process of societal reorganization shows a second important departure from the hegemonic conception of democracy. New forms of collective action emerged during the Brazilian process of democratization. At the urban level, new associations emerged, challenging the existing pattern of relations between the State and society, and introducing new cultural elements such as democratic forms of organization at the local level. Hence cultural innovation introduced by social actors, an element not tackled by the hegemonic conception of democracy, was a central aspect of the Brazilian process of democratization.

Social innovation and the emergence of participatory budgeting

Brazilian democratization involved large doses of political continuity mixed with smaller doses of social innovation. At the political level, in spite of early signs of forms of social organization, the hegemonic forces of the modernization process retained control of the political system. The first civilian president, José Sarney (1985–90), had led the party that supported the authoritarian regime during its final period. Within the Constituent Assembly, there were more MPs who belonged to the authoritarian regime’s party (Arena) than to the opposition (PMDB) (Rodrigues, 1987). There was continuity not only in the political actors but also in their policies. One of the most important institutional leftovers of authoritarianism was the clientelist system built in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and strengthened by the authoritarian regime. Clientelism increased after 1986 through the creation of what can be called a “patrimonial budget.” The Ministry of Planning—the institution in charge of elaborating the federal budget—was transformed into a mechanism for organizing patrimonial exchanges. Every year when Congress votes on the federal budget, MPs present amendments involving public works in the regions where their electorate is concentrated. The total amount of the patrimonial budget—the portion of the budget to be allocated to local public works—is, however, preset by the federal government, resulting in a tendency to divide the resources. Thus two elements of authoritarian Brazil continue to show their presence in democratic Brazil: first, the lack of prerogatives of a disempowered Congress that votes on legislation on a non-political basis; and second, clientelism, which is still strong and constitutes the dominant currency inside the Brazilian Congress, disempowering local forms of organization and leading to widespread administrative inefficiency.

However, the Brazilian democratization process was not informed solely by processes of political continuity. Inside the Constituent Assembly, proposals for the empowerment of social actors showed their strength. Article 14 of the new Constitution guaranteed “popular initiative” in the process of the exercise of peoples’ sovereignty. Article 29, on the organization of cities, required the participation of association representatives in the process of city planning. Other articles establish the participation of civic associations in the implementation of health and social welfare policies. Thus, the Constitution incorporated the new cultural changes that occurred in the eighties into the emerging institutional framework. The acknowledgement of the importance of the participation of voluntary associations in the process of city planning, as well as in the decision-making process on social policies, was one of the long-term legacies of the 1988 Constitution. It led to new forms of organization at the local level such as councils with the participation of social actors in the areas of health care, education, social welfare, and the environment (Raichelli, 1999; Tabagiba, 2000). In the case of the city of Porto Alegre, the first article of the city’s master plan asserts the need for a “democratic, participatory, and decentralized” management. Yet participatory budgeting does not have an exclusively institutional origin. On the contrary, it was a proposal made by neighborhood associations in the 1980s and incorporated by a left-wing party, which then led to the creation of a new form of participatory institution.

The idea of participatory budgeting emerged for the first time in the response of neighborhood associations in the city of Porto Alegre—the capital of Rio Grande do Sul, a city with 1.3 million inhabitants—to a proposal of participation made by the Alceu Collares administration in March 1986. Collares, the first democratically elected mayor of the city after the authoritarian period, belonged to a populist party (PDT) and proposed the participation of the population in his administration through neighborhood monitors (Baiersle, 1998). In a meeting in March 1986, UAMPA, the umbrella organization for neighborhood associations, made a counterproposal that contained the first elements of the idea of participatory budgeting: “The most important element in city politics is the definition of where the resources will be applied. […] That is the reason why neighborhood associations should seek to directly influence the elaboration of the city’s budget” (UAMPA, 1986). The document also stated that “UAMPA’s aim is to find out the investment priorities of each neighborhood, each area,
and the city in general." This is the first available document in which the concept of the centrality of the budget in the democratization of local politics emerges.

The Workers’ Party (PT), which won the mayoral elections in Porto Alegre in 1988, was part of the movement for the organizational autonomy of labor unions from the state and, at the same time, advocated an idea of participatory democracy inspired more by the Marxian conception of labor councils than by the trajectory of social movements in Brazil. Its program upheld the idea of local councils, which would generate city councils and furnish a worker-based form of parallel administration (Abers, 1996: 38). The party had its first important victories in the local elections of 1988, when it elected the mayors of São Paulo and Porto Alegre, among other cities; in some cases, like that of São Paulo, it decided to practice something very similar to its workers’ councils proposal. Even in Porto Alegre, the conception that prevailed during the first year of the Workers’ Party administration was deeply influenced by the idea that politics always involves the representation of particular interests; the Workers’ Party would only change those particular interests that prevailed within the local administration (Utzig, 1996: 211). Thus, the Workers’ Party did not have at that point in its program the idea of participatory budgeting, but only a general idea of participatory government.

The political decisions on participatory budgeting were taken in an overlapping way during the first two years of the Workers’ Party rule in Porto Alegre. From its inauguration, the Olivio Dutra administration tried to increase participation at large. In the first year, most of the secretaries introduced some participatory elements into their health, education, and planning proposals. At the same time, in its first thirty days the Olivio Dutra administration took the crucial decision of making the CRC (Coordenação de Relações com a Comunidade / Coordinating Committee of Relations with the Community) responsible for centralizing all of the community’s claims. The CRC thus became central to the PB process. Although it had existed prior to 1989 (Lima, 1999), the CRC’s role had been to provide city associations with tax exemption certificates (atestado de utilidade pública). Thus, four steps toward participatory budgeting overlapped in the beginning of the Dutra administration: the concern of urban social movements with budgetary control and with direct participation at the local level; the emphasis the Workers’ Party placed on participation and councils; the decentralized initiative of several secretaries, including the planning secretary, to encourage popular participation; and the idea, which emerged in the first 30 days, to centralize participation in the CRC.

The process of creation of participatory budgeting, as a form of decision-making on the budget, is linked to the action of multiple actors and the overlapping of two factors: the presence of new cultural elements at the neighborhood level and the formation and development of neighborhood movements in the city of Porto Alegre. It was not by chance that these movements were able to identify, for the first time, the budget issue as a contentious issue. On the other hand, we should also highlight the fact that civil society in Brazil was able to recover the idea of citizenship and to incorporate it into the Constitution in the form of hybrid institutions with the participation of social actors.

Thus, it is important to point out that the Brazilian process of democratization and the emergence of participatory budgeting are processes that contradict important elements of the hegemonic conception of democracy: first of all, the political forms that are characteristic of a democratic elitist conception, and which resemble the institutions created in Europe during the second wave of democratization; in the Brazilian case, surprising continuities with the practices that were dominant during the authoritarian period. They were taken over by clientelism, they were unable to produce administrative efficiency, and, last but not least, they are unable to produce democratic legitimacy. Second, the forms of collective action that emerged during the democratization process, in spite of an initial anti-institutional stand, found institutionalization in articles 14, 29, 204, and 227 of the 1988 Constitution, as well as in the charters of several cities, including Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte. In this sense, the opposition between collective action and institutionalization postulated by the hegemonic theory of democracy does not apply to the Brazilian case. Third, the format of the new Brazilian democracy was not simply the reproduction of the format produced by the second wave of democratization; there were innovations introduced by the cultural debates of the democratization process that produced new institutions in which participation was broadened rather than restricted. Allow me to describe the participatory budgeting process in order to show how it innovates vis-à-vis the institutional format proposed by the hegemonic conception of democracy.

Participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte

Participatory budgeting (PB) is a local participatory policy that responds to the plight of the poor in major Brazilian cities. It includes social actors, neighborhood association members, and common citizens in a process of negotiation and deliberation that takes place in two stages: a participatory stage, in which participation is direct, and a representative stage, in which participation takes place through the election of delegates and/or councilors. Since the process is different in Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte, I shall describe its operation in these two cities.
The PB in Porto Alegre

The PB in Porto Alegre involves two rounds of regional assemblies, one round of intermediary meetings, and the yearlong operation of a councilors body called the PB Council. The process begins every year in April when the first round of district assemblies takes place. In this first stage, the population attends an assembly in each of the regions. Every first-round regional assembly is attended by the mayor, and a short account-setting process begins with a description of the administrative implementation of the decisions taken in the previous year. The floor is open for about an hour, during which citizens voice possible points of disagreement with the administration, and express their opinions about what has been taking place and what should be done in the region in the coming year. Participation in these meetings is crucial because they constitute the basis for participating in the remaining parts of the process. Although participation is on an individual basis, throughout the registration process individuals are required to demonstrate membership in voluntary associations. In 1999, about two-thirds of the participants were involved in regional associations. At the end of the first round of regional assemblies, delegates are elected from the total number of people attending the assembly. The formula to determine the number of delegates in Porto Alegre is as follows: for “up to 100 people attending, 1 delegate for every 10 people; from 101 to 250, 1 for every 20; from 251 to 400, 1 for every 30; over 401, 1 for every 40” (Poa, 1999: 6). For instance, in 1999, the first-round regional assemblies in the center of Porto Alegre were attended by 520 people; thus, the region elected 26 delegates (ten for the first 100, eight for the next 150, five for the next 150, and three for the remaining 126 people who attended the meeting).

The second stage of the PB involves the so-called intermediary meetings. They have two responsibilities: ranking priorities and deliberating about which public works the region will claim. Ranking is a process through which five out of twelve types of public goods (paving of streets, sewerage, legalization of urban property, organization of the city, housing, education, health and social welfare, transportation and circulation, leisure, sports, economic development, and culture) are selected as priorities. It involves two processes carried out earlier by the public administration: the evaluation of the population’s previous access to public goods and the classification of each of the city’s regions according to its population. Thus three criteria are used in the ranking: the first is previous access (and therefore present need); Priorities are graded in inverse relation to the region’s previous access to a particular public good. According to the 1999 criteria, up to 80 per cent of previous access to a public good leads to grade 1, up to 60 per cent of previous access, grade 2, and up to 20 per cent, grade 5. The second criterion is the population of the region and the third the community’s own ranking of its priorities, again on a scale of 5 to 1. At the end of this process, a region can attain up to 15 points if it previously had less than 20 per cent of access to a public good, if it chooses this good as a top priority, and if it has more than 120,000 inhabitants.

In the second round of regional assemblies, the region elects delegates to the PB council. This process, which takes place annually in June, leads to the formation of a council composed as follows: two councilors from each of the 16 regions (32), two from each of the five thematic assemblies (ten), one from the UAMPA—the umbrella organization of neighborhood communities—and one from the municipal workers’ trade union (two). The PB council thus has 44 members.

Thematic meetings. The second Workers’ Party administration (1993–96) introduced so-called “thematic oriented meetings.” They grew out of a process called “the constituent city,” which aimed to incorporate into the PB social sectors that still stood outside of the process (Navarro, 1998). The result was the introduction of five thematic assemblies on the following issues: city organization and development, health and social welfare, economic development and tax systems, transport and circulation, and education, culture and leisure (Navarro, 1998). The cycle of the thematic meetings is parallel to that of regional meetings, and they are entitled to elect ten delegates to the PB Council.

The PB Council. The PB council is inaugurated each July. It creates a budget proposal based on the rankings and decisions that took place in the intermediary meetings. The Council then revises the final budget proposal elaborated by the GAPLAN (City Planner’s Office) and the mayor’s cabinet. By September, a final budget proposal is in place. The Council also monitors the implementation of its decisions by the city’s administrative agencies during the year.

The PB in Belo Horizonte

The PB has been in practice in Belo Horizonte since 1993. It involves a process of regional assemblies leading to the definition of investment priorities in a similar fashion to the Porto Alegre process. Budget decisions take place in the so-called “regional forum of priorities.”

The first round of regional assemblies is similar to its counterpart in Porto Alegre, although it is more an argumentative process than a decision-making one. The administration opens each assembly with a statement on what was decided in the previous year and the current state of implementation of previous decisions. Still in the first round of regional assemblies, the administration points out the resources available for public works in the areas of street pavement, sewage, and housing. The decision-making process is also different from that used in Porto Alegre. The administration announces the resources available for each region using a formula that
assigns resources in direct proportion to population and inverse proportion to average income:

\[
PVR = \frac{\text{popR}}{e^{1/\sqrt{Y}}}.
\]

50 per cent of the PB's resources are evenly divided among the regions and 50 per cent are allocated according to this formula. Also in the second round, the main proposals for public works in each sub-region (37 in Belo Horizonte) are presented, initiating a process of negotiation among the communities.

The second round of regional assemblies involves the election of delegates who will vote on the public works to be included in the city budget. Delegates were elected in 1998 according to the following criteria: from one to 200 participants, one delegate for every ten people attending the assembly; from 201 to 410 participants, one for every 15; above 410, one for every 20. In addition, each region is entitled to one delegate per legally constituted voluntary association within its boundaries. Once the delegates are elected for the forum on regional priorities, negotiation begins.

_Priorities caravans._ "Priorities caravans" are a stage within the region in which members of the sub-regions negotiate their different proposals among themselves. Each community that has proposed a public work to be included in the city budget visits other communities in order to evaluate their level of need. At the same time, different communities start to support one another's claims, forming coalitions that will be decisive in the decision-making process.

_The Forum of Regional Priorities._ At this stage, the delegates from each sub-region, having already visited other sub-regions, negotiate on the final format of the budget. Unlike the situation in Porto Alegre, the final decision in Belo Horizonte takes place through the formation of coalitions that present platforms that include proposals from various sub-regions. Also in contrast to Porto Alegre, the decisions of the regional forums are final. The public works approved by the delegates will be integrated into the budget proposal. Twenty percent of the delegates present at the regional forums become members of the Comforça, a monitoring body that follows the process of bidding for public works and can negotiate substitutions in cases of technical problems. One element of the PB in its relation to the democratization discussion should be singled out: the fact that the regional assemblies, the common element of the PB in Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte, draw on pre-existing practices introduced by neighborhood movements in the 1970s and the 1980s. Community actors know how the process of organization works at the local level. They are also well practiced in discussing the needs of their communities. In this sense, if the PB is an institutional invention, it is an institutional invention based on pre-existing practices. It should also be pointed out that the new forms of collective action that emerged at the local level during the democratization process in Brazil have found a form of institutionalization within a specific institutional framework. Thus the PB shows that the broadened forms of participation that are characteristic of the Brazilian process of democratization have not vanished, as many authors have argued (Stepan, 1988; Azevedo and Prates, 1991; Santos, 1993). On the contrary, these new practices have generated forms of participatory democracy that, as I show in the rest of this chapter, have produced more legitimacy and more administrative efficiency, dealing with the problem of complexity in a more democratic manner.

_The PB and the amplification of sovereignty at the local level._

Participatory budgeting connects in a singular way the amplification of participation to the establishment of criteria of justice. Participation in the PB in Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte takes place, mainly, at the regional level in the local or intermediary assemblies. An evaluation of the participatory characteristics of the PB shows that, in both Belo Horizonte and Porto Alegre, participation is directly linked to the credibility of the process and the existence of public rules for action. Participation in the PB plays the role of assuring a form of deliberation that is public and that makes information about the access to public goods available. Table 12.1 below shows the levels of participation in Porto Alegre.

Some characteristics of participation in the PB should be stressed. First of all, initial participation in Porto Alegre's PB was low; in the first year, it was low in most regions and very low in those without any previous tradition of social organization, such as Restinga, Glória, Ilhas, and Humanitários (where, respectively, only 36, 20, 80, and ten people participated in the second round of regional assemblies). The low level of participation in almost all regions was probably linked to doubts about the capacity of the process to deliver public goods. Beginning in the second year, however, there was a huge change in the pattern of participation. On the one hand, the effectiveness of the first year's deliberations was a strong incentive in those regions that already had a tradition of community organization, such as the Leste (eastern region), where 705 attended the second regional assembly, or Parthenon, where 264 people attended the second regional assembly. On the other hand, participation remained very low in regions without a tradition of participation or community organization. These regions, which are among the poorest, had low levels of political participation for some years. Thus, we can again note the importance of pre-existing practices at the societal level pre-determining the effectiveness of the
In the first years of the PB in Porto Alegre, the feasibility of a form of broadened participation depended on those actors who already shared a tradition of local assemblies at the regional level. It was only after such a tradition became an acknowledged form of claiming public goods that it generalized itself to the city as a whole.

A second element worth noting is how participation is directly linked to deliberation. If we look into the pattern of participation during the first five years, participation in the second regional assembly was larger than in the first (in 1992, for instance, 1,442 people participated in the first round of regional assemblies and 6,168 in the second round). Throughout this period, the most relevant deliberative moment was the second round of regional assemblies in which the election of the councilors took place. Beginning in 1996, delegates were elected in the first round of regional assemblies, which made them more deliberative. Since then, attendance in the first round has become higher than in the second (in 1996, 6,855 people attended the first round of regional assemblies and 4,966 people attended the second round). This tendency of greater participation in the first round persists to this day, showing the ability of the population to identify the deliberative moment and to participate in a rational way.

The most important aspect of the participatory process in Porto Alegre is the continuous increase in participation in spite of the fact that the forums of participation have changed. Participation increased from year to year with very few exceptions (1994 and 1996). This increase can be attributed to the confidence that the deliberative process would continue, due to the political hegemony of the Workers’ Party in the city. In this sense, the pattern of participation in Porto Alegre can be contrasted with that in Belo Horizonte, where city politics has been more contentious. Table 12.2 below shows the variations in participation in Belo Horizonte.

Participation in Belo Horizonte shows more variation due to stronger doubts about the continuation of the process. In the first year, participation in Belo Horizonte was already high due to the precedent of the Porto Alegre experience—the population had good reason to assume that it was participating in an effective process. Participation increased still more once the effectiveness of the process at the city level became clear. In its second year of the PB, participation grew more than 50 per cent compared to the previous year, but then decreased in 1996 with the emergence of doubts regarding the PB’s future. In that year’s city elections, there were serious doubts about whether the Workers’ Party candidate would win and, thus, whether the PB’s decisions would be implemented. Participation decreased again in 1997 because, despite the fact that the new Brazilian Socialist Party administration promised to continue the PB process, social actors doubted that it would implement the decisions. However, once it became clear that it would keep its promise, participation grew again. Therefore, one can argue that participation
in the PB varies according to two factors: the existence of an associative tradition and the perceived effectiveness of the process. Thus participation shows rational characteristics, particularly in relation to the willingness of social actors to participate in collective and public forms of deliberation.

A second important element to be discussed is that both in Belo Horizonte and Porto Alegre the participatory process is connected to the existence of criteria of justice. In the case of Porto Alegre, the criteria of justice are determined by the table of previous access to public goods, which has to be made compatible with the participatory process. In the case of Belo Horizonte, the criteria of justice are determined by the formula that distributes resources to the regions (see discussion above). In Porto Alegre, in each of the twelve areas in which decisions are going to be taken in the intermediary meetings, a table of previous access to public goods by the population of the city predetermines the deliberative process. Table 12.3, below, shows how this process works in what concerns the paving of streets in Porto Alegre.

Table 12.3 allows us to see why the participatory process involved in the PB does not become a particularistic process, as some of the literature on democratic theory argues (Arendt, 1959; Schumpeter, 1942; Sartori, 1987). Participation in the PB is connected with the establishment of rules for the access to public goods. In the case of Porto Alegre, the 16 regions of the city are differentiated according to previous access to the goods in question. For example, some regions have had a high level of previous access to paving—such as the Central region, with more than 99 per cent of paved streets. In other regions of Porto Alegre, such as Extremo-Sul or Lomba do Pinheiro, almost 80 per cent or 55 per cent of the streets, respectively, are not paved. In contrast to the forms of decision-making by a bureaucracy pressured by particular interests, the PB incorporates criteria of justice in the process through a combination of three factors: previous access to a public good, the population of the region, and deliberation by the population in the intermediary assemblies. In each of these factors, a region is evaluated and is given a grade from 1 to 5. Thus a region that has 80 per cent of need for one public good, whose population is more than 120,000, and has chosen that particular public good may attain the total number of points (15). On the other hand, a region that has had more access to this good, or a region with a small population, is not going to make as many points according to the same criteria.

Participatory budgeting is, thus, capable of integrating forms of broadening popular sovereignty with forms of dealing with issues of justice. This combination, again, poses problems for the hegemonic conception of democracy. The hegemonic conception of democracy works within a narrow and individualistic conception of representation of interests, which is used to justify the reduction of the scope of sovereignty. According to authors such
as Schumpeter (1942), Downs (1957), and Elster (1988), among others, the problem with forms of broadened participation is that they are supposed to operate in individualistic settings in which it is very difficult to define the common good. As an alternative to such a problem, the hegemonic conception of democracy proposes decentralized forms of representation of interests within a competitive political supply in which it is up to the electorate to choose which will be the dominant articulation of interests. Though the literature in general argues that this form of representation reinforces particular interests (Lowi, 1969), it does not point out participatory democracy as an alternative.

The case of the PB is quite useful for seeing how broadened forms of sovereignty are able to shed new light on this problem. In spite of being a broadened form of sovereignty, the PB does not leave to the participatory institutions the whole decision-making process on the allocation of public goods. It introduces rules that pre-determine the decision-making process. By doing this, it innovates in terms of democratic practices in two ways: first, it establishes limits for particularism—limits that have been historically lacking in the practice of both representative and participatory democracy, thus changing the terms of the democratic debate. Second, interests that are considered legitimate in the PB process are required to be justified, and have to overlap with the criteria of justice outlined above. Thus, the connection established by the PB between participation and rules introduces new elements into the discussion of the role of broadened forms of participation within democratic theory. It shows that the Weberian solution for increasing levels of participation—which implies an increase in bureaucratic control—is not the only possible solution. Another possibility might be available: a solution according to which “in internally differentiated societies, the stronger the bond between democracy and distributive justice, the more complex the methodology which guarantees such bonds” (Santos, 1998: 484). In this sense, the PB represents a new way of making participation and institutionalization compatible, a way in which democratic practices and social complexity—which are the result of new forms of collective action within a differentiated society—are connected with rules for participatory decision-making, thus offsetting the enhancement of the power of the administrative personnel.

Participation, complexity, and monitoring in the PB

A second area in which the PB innovates is in the control the population has over the implementation of the deliberations on city investments. The PB has produced very significant results in terms of the control of the administrative personnel through the establishment of monitoring institutions. Two different forms of monitoring are used: in Porto Alegre, the PB Council is responsible for monitoring budget implementation. This is accomplished through the tension established between the PB Council and two administrative bodies—GAPLAN and CRC. Thus administrative officials are in charge of implementation, but their access to decision-making is not exclusive: they are required to explain choices to a body of representative delegates. In Belo Horizonte, there is a special monitoring body, the COMFORÇAS. According to Faria (1996), its aims are the following: 1) to check and supervise the budget's execution and the schedule of works (timetable, expenses, and accountability); 2) to supervise substitutions or re-dimensionings in cases where choices made by the community face technical problems; 3) to present the community's point of view before a technical decision is made; 4) to demand explanations on controversial issues in the implementation of the PB; 5) to organize meetings with the community to explain the administration's point of view on certain issues; 6) to appoint two representatives to follow the bidding of PB public works; 7) to participate in the organization of the regional forum; and 8) to investigate abuses of power and the appearance of special interests in the deliberative process (Faria, 1996: 103-104). Thus, in the establishment of a system of monitoring at the local level, the PB incorporates forms of an autonomous organization of the population, which allows it to control the internal operation of the administration. In this way, there is a connection between the decisions taken by the popular assemblies and the way in which these decisions are translated into administrative orders.

The PB also introduces a new conception of administrative accountability by transforming monitoring into a permanent feature of its administrative process. Forms of monitoring instituted by the PB Council in Porto Alegre or by the COMFORÇAS in Belo Horizonte represent the integration of structures of participation at the local level with the administrative structures. Thus the PB presents a participatory solution to a central problem in Latin American democracies—the lack of control by the population over an autonomous bureaucracy unused to public forms of accountability. This reduces the level of irregularities in public bidding—an endemic problem in Brazil—and at the same time forces administrative organs to adapt to the participation of the population on technical questions.

The monitoring institutions introduced by the PB show how deliberation can be separated from implementation without giving technical bodies exclusive access to administrative arenas, a feature of the hegemonic conception of democracy presented above. The PB has instituted a public body in charge of presenting and representing the community's point of view within the administration. This solution overcomes the disadvantages of elitist models by giving a more democratic, less particularistic solution to the link between technical knowledge and exclusive access to administrative arenas. Monitoring bodies generate groups of active participants who acquire a considerable
understanding of technical issues. These groups can convey technical details to the general population and also debate technical issues with administrative bodies. In seven years of the PB in Belo Horizonte, 1,428 people have participated in the PB monitoring body. Asked if participating in COMFORÇAS had led them to a better understanding of the problems of their sub-regions, 88.5 per cent of COMFORÇAS members in the South Central region of the city and 76.9 per cent in the Barreiros region answered affirmatively (Faria, 1996: 126). Thus, an attractive aspect of monitoring institutions is that they differentiate between deliberation and implementation and at the same time make technical bodies more accountable to the population.

The experience of monitoring bodies also suggests that administrative decision-making becomes more efficient under the pressure of participatory bodies. In an interview, the president of Sudecap (the state company in charge of public works in Belo Horizonte) acknowledged that the presence of monitoring bodies with the ability to pose questions about timetables and implementation details increased the need for both accountability and efficiency within the company. The more the population knows about technical details, the less the usual explanations for inefficiency and delays are accepted.

The operation of monitoring bodies challenges a second aspect of the hegemonic conception of democracy, namely, that the central aspect of complex decisions is expert knowledge on the issues involved and the ability of a specialized body to deal with such issues in a systematic and routine way (Weber, 1919). The PB challenges the universal application of these rules in two different ways: first of all, it shows that the role of experts in decision-making bodies should not lead to exclusive prerogatives in the decision-making process (Melucci and Avritzer, 2000). In the Brazilian case, the access of the population to decision-making bodies reduces corruption in bidding processes and speeds up the implementation process. Second, the PB also shows that the problem of knowledge can be addressed in a more democratic form. Though in Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte the population knew very little about the administrative process of their cities, at the end of a period of one or two years of monitoring bodies their knowledge was significantly enhanced. This shows that the possibility of transferring complex knowledge from technical experts to bodies of representatives of the population is not a closed path, as the hegemonic conception of democracy has argued. In addition, the presence of a monitoring body makes it easier to address conflictual issues between experts and the population. Thus the PB opens up space for the defense of an intermediary conception between the Weberian position on the exclusive access of experts to decision-making bodies and the participatory conceptions of democracy that defend the increase of participation in the administrative process itself. It proposes an intermediary position in which a sphere of control of administrative decision-making and a process of tension between experts and monitoring bodies leads to the control of processes previously considered off limits. In this case, the extension of sovereignty is made compatible with rational administration.

Social innovation and counter-hegemonic forms of participatory democracy

The example of the PB in Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte indicates that the institutional forms of democracy are not fixed and that new experiments are needed in order to deal adequately with contentious issues. It also shows that the issues with which democracy is concerned change according to different political settings. In the Brazilian case, clientelism, disempowerment of the population, and the unequal distribution of public goods at the local level have been some of the issues that the fixed forms of the democracy generated by the second wave of democratization could not solve. The elitist conception of democracy, which evaluates the success or failure of democracy according to elite practices (O'Donnell, 1996; 1998), is quite pessimistic about the future of Brazil. In the Brazilian case, old practices have, in fact, only led to clientelism, administrative inefficiency, and intra–elite rivalry.

Yet there is a second way of evaluating democracy, a way that requires our departing from the hegemonic conception of democracy outlined above and our taking into account the emergence of new societal practices. The PB in the cases of Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte indicates the virtue of broadened forms of sovereignty at the local level. It shows that some of the drawbacks of recent democracies are based on their inability to incorporate social innovation. In the case of the PB, innovation, understood as a societal practice of openly negotiating the access to public goods, becomes incorporated into a deliberative model. Such a model substitutes elite practices and their drawbacks for broadened forms of discussion and decision-making. In addition to this, the PB gives a different response to the issue of justice and particularism. Instead of being seduced by the siren song of the inevitability of particularism, the PB introduces rules for its limitation. And, last but not least, the PB also provides a different answer to the issue of control over decision-making bodies by technical experts, a problem not yet resolved by the hegemonic conception of democracy.

The different answers provided by the PB to the issues enumerated above all point in one direction, namely, that the contradiction between collective action, broadened forms of political participation, and de-institutionalization, such as it has been addressed by the hegemonic theory of democracy based on the European experience in the inter-war period, cannot be generalized. Democracy in the countries of the so-called third wave of democratization has not been threatened by undifferentiated forms of political mobilization,
as it was in Europe during the inter-war period. The major problem faced by democracy in these countries is a limited stock of democratic practices. Thus, in these cases, institutionalization ceases to be the opposite of mobilization, which becomes a form of collective action in the public space. Under such conditions, institutionalization also assumes a different meaning, namely the connection between new societal practices and new institutional designs. As a broadened form of political participation, the PB shows precisely this fact.

Liang Chi Cha'o and Alexis de Tocqueville were both right when they pointed out the inevitability of democracy as a hegemonic form of political rule. Yet they did not perceive that the forms of democracy outside the West are not fixed and do not necessarily reproduce the hegemonic forms. A difference seems to be crucial between Western and non-Western forms of democracy: the availability of a stock of democratic practices and the role of social actors in the process of broadening this stock through the integration of different experiences (Santos, 2000). The Brazilian case, which has been approached in this chapter, is a good example of the limited stock of democratic practices on the part of elites, a drawback only recently offset by the emergence of new societal practices. Thus, the fact that both Tocqueville and Liang Chi Cha'o were right should not lead us to think that in the extension of democracy the same cultural forms dominant in the West will prevail. In the case of Brazil, the integration of the country into a democratic tide has been slow and contradictory, involving moves in contrary directions. As a matter of fact, Liang Chi Cha'o's definition of the expansion of democracy as a cycle, or Tocqueville's image of a democratic tide, both ignore the fact that those who are losing new privileges every day might adhere to democratic values in an incomplete way. In contrast, the Brazilian experience shows that the democratic tide might be connected to the stocks of practices of those who are not losing privileges, but, on the contrary, have something to gain from the expansion of democracy. These are the social actors whose innovations are creating counter-hegemonic forms of democracy.

Notes

1 I am drawing on Huntington's definition of “wave of democratization”; “[A] group of transitions from non-democratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period of time” (Huntington, 1991: 15).

2 Within contemporary political science Norberto Bobbio is the author who has best defended the Weberian perspective. In his essay ‘The Future of Democracy’, he comments: “As societies gradually change from a family economy to a market economy and from a market economy to an economy which is protected, regulated and planned, there is an increase in the number of political problems whose solutions require technical expertise. Technical problems require experts, an expanding team of specialized personnel. […] Technocracy and democracy are antithetical: if the expert plays a leading role in industrial society he cannot be considered as just any citizen” (Bobbio, 1987: 37).

3 A good example of administrative inefficiency involves the distribution of resources through MP’s amendments. In 1996, a year in which there were local elections, 600 million reais were set aside for the patrimonial budget, reaching an average of about 1.0 to 1.5 million in amendments per MP. Most MPs opted in 1996 to pulverize the resources under their control. Thus, for a public work that is budgeted at 2 or 3 million reais, an MP could present an amendment allocating 200,000 reais, which means that the forecast for its conclusion could be 15 years or more. In June 1996, 2,214 public works involving resources above 15 billion were paralyzed because the resources needed for their completion had not been budgeted. See Faria, 1996.

4 It is beyond the aims of this chapter to analyze the emergence and consolidation of the Workers’ Party in Brazil. Yet it is important to point out that neighborhood associations, which were linked to the activities of the Catholic Church in Brazil in the seventies and eighties, were akin to labor’s claim for social autonomy. For an analysis of the movements that demanded labor autonomy in Brazil during democratization, see Sader, 1988; Doino, 1995; and Avritzer, 1988. For an analysis of the formation of the Workers’ Party, see Keck, 1992.

5 Although the early formation of neighborhood associations in Porto Alegre is well known, one author (Raimundo, 1999) insists on the lack of an associative tradition in the city. Using an incomplete list of associations created in the city, the author commits two mistakes: he argues for a very low density of associations in the city before the creation of participatory budgeting, and later he defends an exponential growth of associations after its creation. For a critique, see Avritzer, 2006.

Bibliography


