The Struggles for Land Demarcation by the Indigenous Peoples of Brazil

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This chapter focuses on the initiatives and struggles of the indigenous people in Brazil that have aimed at gaining official recognition of their lands and reclaiming control of their territories and of the natural resources within them.

"SELF-DEMARCATION"

The new federal constitution, which entered into effect in 1988, brought a new aspect to the native question, namely the issue of original rights to land. That is to say, the notion of "homeland" was no longer understood as an option of the state but as a right due to all native peoples. Previously, the state had recognized land, and, in truth, for Brazilian society as a whole this meant that the state would concede those lands to the Indians. After the constitution, given that the Indians had a right to land, it was up to the state to officially recognize and legalize that right. For the Indians, before the constitution, the question of land was perceived as a historical right to be claimed; with the constitution, it became a constitutional right in recognition of the historical right. It was the constitution that opened up the possibility of official recognition of Indian participation in the demarcation of their own territories. Previously, the Indians were considered to be a people in transition, a social group that was in the process of being integrated into the national fabric, of losing their "nationhood" in order to become "citizens." Article 231 of the new constitution granted the native peoples "the primitive and collective right to the lands that they occupy, while recognizing an individual, therefore public, right of property over those lands, handing over ownership to the Federal Union" (Marés, 2000: 14). As it is a "collective right," ownership of the homelands is not individualized. Thus, all the members of a native community are subject to the same rights
over the land to which they historically and constitutionally belong; all may dispose of the land but at the same time no one may dispose of it individually because to do so "would infringe the rights of all the others" (Marés, 2000: 7). As there was no possibility of relating the native lands "to a single title-holder, or person, in traditional terms, this is apparently not a right, but a simple interest" (Marés, 2000: 7), which means that, even today, the homelands are considered most of the time to be a "no man's land," both for the people concerned and for the politicians and authorities. This opens up the possibility that the demarcation of the homelands will be contested by outsiders and other parties with claims to ownership. It was this legal ambiguity that enabled the federal government in January 1996 to impose Decree No. 1775 from the Ministry of Justice, which "disposes of the administrative procedure of demarcation of the native lands," as well as FUNAI's statute No. 14, which "establishes norms for the elaboration of a circumstantial report on the identification and delimitation of the homelands." Thus, the political stalemate concerning territorial boundaries was transformed into a legal matter, according to which the occupation of land was perceived not as a historical right but as subject to a decree that could concede to the Indians the right to remain on the lands that had always been theirs (Neves, 1999: 120).

In a situation similar to that described by José Manuel Pureza (2000), the only argument that the Brazilian state could evoke to legitimize its claim of control over the Indian lands, and consequently over the demarcation process, was that of "effectively consummated facts." In the light of international principles defending the self-determination of all peoples, the native question in Brazil is a "clear black and white case of a manifesto that does not respect the basic principles of international law" (Pureza, 2000: 11). Through FUNAI and other state agencies set up to deal with native demands, the Brazilian state continues to claim the right to administer the lives of the indigenous populations by means of the control that it exercises over sectoral policy and, more incisively, through processes of legal recognition of the lands occupied by the indigenous peoples.

The land demarcation process involves a succession of sequenced and prioritized stages, from the situation in which the land does not have any official recognition, to the extreme situation in which its agrarian situation is regulated by means of a register in the Union Heritage Department and in real estate registry offices. For the objectives of this chapter, it is enough to mention four phases of this process: identification and delimitation; demarcation; legal ratification, and agrarian regulation. To simplify, the entire process of the official recognition of native lands is commonly called the "demarcation process."

After the wave of European colonization, which extended to all parts of Brazil, the "homelands" today cover less territory than they did before. The total number of indigenous lands varies in accordance with the criteria used by each agency to manipulate the data. According to figures provided by the Native People's Missionary Council (CIMI), updated in March 2000, Brazil contains 739 native homelands, of which 179 (more than 24 per cent of the total) are lands claimed by indigenous peoples but for which no provision has yet been made. Of the 560 lands recognized officially by FUNAI, only 231 (around 31 per cent) have their agrarian situation regulated according to official norms, while the other 220 (almost 40 per cent) have suffered invasions and pressures from non-indigenous interests (Reportagem, 1999).

Given the legal ambiguities and ineffectiveness of the state as regards the fulfilling of its constitutional obligation to undertake the demarcation of indigenous lands, the Indians took into their own hands the task of demarcating and protecting their lands. One of the first of these initiatives was carried out by the Kulina Indians of the Upper Purus river region in the state of Acre, on the frontier between Brazil and Peru. They undertook the physical demarcation of their land by opening up pathways in the forest and fixing improvised markers and wooden plaques that they had constructed themselves. Although these plaques and markers were totally unofficial, they served to assert the territorial rights of the Kulina within the region; as a result, the area was not subject to trespass as it had been before (Monteiro, 1999: 156).

To the Kulina Indians, their initiative constitutes a de facto demarcation, defining the boundaries of the lands that were historically and mythically identified as their "homeland," although the state does not recognize that procedure as a legal demarcation. In an assembly of the Kulina in 1990, the Indians of the Upper Purus river, used their own experience to encourage their relatives to open up tracks on the limits of the Kulina Homeland of the Middle Juruá river. This had been delimited in 1988 by FUNAI but had never been demarcated, and thus was constantly being invaded by lumberjacks, fishermen, rubber-tappers and, in particular, "servingas," who refused to accept that the land was native territory.

Having decided to take action themselves, "the Kulina, in the same assembly, planned to extend the rodados in order to sustain the arduous work of demarcation." (Monteiro, 1999: 156). As the time for the work to begin drew near, the population of the region reacted against the Kulina's initiative in the Middle Juruá river. In order to dissipate tensions, a seminar was held, in which members of the indigenous teams supporting the Kulina and representatives of UNI-Acre and South Amazonas explained to the population and local authorities the nature of and reasons for their activities. From that moment, it became clear to all that the initiative was designed exclusively to attend to native rights and that "the Kulina would undertake
this work with the aim of marking the limits of their homeland in order to put an end to conflicts, precisely because the federal government had omitted to do this and had not fulfilled their obligations" (Monteiro, 1999: 157).

In the first phase, the work followed a well-tested methodology developed in the short topography courses given at the villages for the training of the Indians. Based upon the use of compasses, boundary posts, and even fireworks and smoke signals in order to guide the direction of the tracks that were being opened up in the forest, there were at first many mistakes and a great deal of imprecision that was later corrected. In addition to technical matters, another obstacle that the Kulina confronted was the supply of food, because, as the paths advanced, the workers drew further and further away from the villages that supplied them with manioc flour, game, and salted fish, their staple diet. This situation persisted during the first two years of operations. In the second stage, the work scheme was modified on the basis of support from an international aid agency called “Bread for the World” (“Pão para o Mundo,” or PPM) and, mainly, because of an agreement between the Brazilian state and the Indians granting legal recognition of the demarcation carried out by the Kulina. Following the signing of the agreement, the orientation of the paths and the implantation of markers and plaques was done using sophisticated measuring equipment, such as theodolites and GPS, which permitted greater technical precision. However, the need to follow the standards and technical norms demanded by the accord meant that the work became even more laborious than it had been in the first phase. In addition, the dependence of the technical team on the administrative and bureaucratic procedures of the organs of government for funding not only reduced the efficiency of the work but also contributed to the “dejection and disappointment suffered by the Kulina” (Monteiro, 1999: 159).

The shift teams that carried out the work in the forest consisted essentially of adult men, generally accompanied by the village chief. The women made a decisive contribution by supplying the necessary food and, in some cases, helping their husbands to fell trees for the opening-up of the tracks. It is worth pointing out that all the villages situated in the Kulina Homeland of Middle Juruá took part in the demarcation, although some contributed more intensely than others.

The physical demarcation lasted from 1991 until the beginning of 1998, a period that brought great achievements for the Kulina. They saw the strengthening of their political organizations, got to know their lands in a more detailed way, and underwent a technical apprenticeship that enabled them to work with maps, geographical coordinates, boundary markers, satellite pictures, etc. (Monteiro, 1999: 163). As “the demarcation of an indigenous territory is carried out within a web of social relations, both internal to the community and external, with the surrounding population, it requires more than the simple application of technical and legal know-how to be long-lasting” (Monteiro, 1999: 163); consequently, the Kulina demarcation functioned at the same time as a procedure, as an assertion of rights over the occupied lands, and as a process of affirmation of Kulina self-esteem in the context of inter-ethnic relations. Undoubtedly, “respect for the indigenous people grew significantly among the urban and rural population of the region as a result of the Kulina’s courage and skill in taking the responsibility to demarcate their own lands” (Monteiro, 1999: 162).

Therefore, “self-demarcation” began to be seen as an important issue within the indigenous struggle. It was taken the furthest by the Kulina, who not only asserted their territorial rights but also generated and consolidated a methodology of demarcation involving the effective participation of local groups in the work of the physical demarcation of the lands that they occupied in the Middle Juruá river region in Amazonas, which came to be legally recognized as indigenous land through the agreement between FUNAI and the Indians.

The “self-demarcation” model, as a strategy for forcing the Brazilian state to officially recognize the lands, spread throughout the country and was adopted by many indigenous peoples. On the same River Juruá, for example, two neighbors of the Kulina, the Kanamari and the Deni, used the system of placing wooden markers and opening paths in the forest to mark the divisions of the lands they had traditionally occupied, having waited many years for official recognition. Although devoid of any formal legality, the Kanamari initiative, carried out in 1991, was very important as an assertion of the right of this people over its lands, and it helped to put an end to trespassing on their territory. While the move was initially contested by regional estate-owners, the precarious and improvised system of markers was adopted by a technical work group that identified and delimited the Mawetek Homeland, the anthropological report of which (Neves, 1998) recognized indigenous rights and validated the boundaries that had been established using the “self-demarcation” process practiced by the Kanamari.

As regards the Deni, their lands had been identified and delimited in 1985, but they had waited sixteen years for the demarcation process to pass through the interminable administrative bureaucracies of FUNAI. Tired of waiting for solutions that never appeared, the Deni Indians themselves, supported by native organizations and environmentalists recently began (in September 2001) the process of demarcating their own lands following the Kulina model. It is interesting that, after an initial negative reaction, in which the president of FUNAI demanded that the Deni’s work of opening and marking boundaries in the forest be stopped, a government decree granted the Deni rights of possession of their lands and established a short period for the beginning of the technical work of demarcation.
Through FUNAI and other agents dealing with native questions, the Brazilian state made use of the actions and procedures generated by the indigenous peoples, incorporating them into their public policies. The Kulina “self-demarcation” was no exception. On the basis of initiatives taken between the state, indigenous NGOs, and native organizations, the methodology and organizational form of “self-demarcation” lost its emancipatory dimension and was subjected to an “abbreviating interpretation” (Santos, 1998), reduced by PPTAL/FUNAI/GTZ to a model of physical land demarcation. As a model, the strategies and systems created and refined by the Kulina Indians during the “self-demarcation” process were isolated from the political, historical, geographical, and inter-ethnic contexts of the region of Middle Juruá river, and instead were converted into a new type of institutional knowledge, renamed “participative demarcation” and extended by the PPTAL, as a demarcation model, to the 119 native lands located in Brazilian Amazonia. In accordance with its initial proposal, the PPTAL “proposed the identification of 55 areas, the demarcation and regulation of 58, and the revision of six more” (Arruda, 1998: 6). Thus, the PPTAL assumed the role of the regulator of a successful counter-hegemonic experiment by replicating it in different indigenous contexts, while what was really required were different procedures and treatments adequate for the different realities involved.

Following this replicated institutional dynamic, the PPTAL promoted two experimental demarcation processes aimed at technically refining the “participative demarcation” model, after which the demarcation of the Javari Valley homeland (the largest in Brazil and located on the border between Brazil and Peru) got under way. The Vale do Javari homeland was demarcated during 2000 and ratified in April 2001. Demarcation was carried out by a topography company (SETAG) contracted by FUNAI via public bid. FUNAI, through PPTAL, contracted CIVAJA, which mobilized the Indians to accompany the demarcation process, divulge it and present a plan for the security of the border after the demarcation was concluded (Mendes, 2001).

The anthropologist Gilberto Azanha, an employee of FUNAI, who accompanied the work in the Javari Valley, stated in a personal interview that the demarcation of this homeland was indeed limited to “bureaucratic self-demarcation” (Azanha, 2000). The Indians were little more than observers, with no active role to play in the process of demarcation of their own land, which was nevertheless presented as a “self-demarcation” based on the model created by the Kulina. Although PPTAL recognized that “partnerships” with indigenous NGOs and Indians had been functionally quite successful in the demarcation of the homelands of the Waínaipi of the Upper Negro river and the Javari Valley, their analysis of the development of the regulation process indicated that, both qualitatively and quantitatively, their commitment “left something to be desired” (Arruda, 1998: 7).

According to the description given by the coordinator of PPTAL, “participative demarcation” carried out in partnership consisted basically in contracting with a topography firm for the geodesic survey, the opening of tracks, and placement of markers, while the Indians were mobilized “directly by the local indigenous organization or indirectly by some NGO indicated by them to accompany the work on all fronts, place signposts, and divulge to their villages and surrounding areas what this implied in terms of territorial rights (Mendes, 1999: 19).

Explained in this way, the difference between “participative demarcation” and “self-demarcation” becomes obvious. The latter becomes the process by which the Indians who reside in the homeland take upon themselves all the activities directly or indirectly related with the physical construction and legal consolidation of their territory according to the norms of the Brazilian state.

While, “demarcation,” as an external initiative undertaken by the state, has connotations of outlining spaces for the confinement, reduction, social enclosure, and exclusion from relations with the world outside, “self-demarcation,” as an indigenous movement for the construction of territory, suggests the exercise of internal organization that extends the political possibilities of native organization, thus strengthening the ethnic group in its relations with the state and the surrounding society. Although “self-demarcation” and “participative demarcation” have the same goal of achieving the agrarian regulation of indigenous lands and often make use of similar methods and procedures, they are substantially different as regards native participation. While “self-demarcation” is the means par excellence of exercising political mobilization for the formulation of proposals and ethnic emancipation, in “participative demarcation” the indigenous presence is no more than an accessory or support for the fieldwork, and is regulated by technical rules, schedules, and administrative plans that are totally alien to the indigenous universe.

As regards the “participative demarcation” model diffused by PPTAL, we may even question whether there are really any differences in relation to the inefficient model of “demarcations by bid,” the model traditionally used by FUNAI, since the dynamics involved are very similar. We could also ask to what extent “partnerships” of this type ensure the long-term sustainability of counter-hegemonic indigenous initiatives, given the risks of the institutionalization of the indigenous movement and of the administrative bureaucratization of its organizations and formalization of its actions and
movements. Indications of this loss of counter-hegemonic sustainability may be detected in the "bureaucratization" of the demarcation of the Javari Valley as well as in the growing process of institutionalization and formalism that the Federation of Indigenous Organizations of the Negro River (FOIRN) and CIVAJA have imprinted onto the indigenous movements of the Negro river and Javari Valley respectively. The most frightening aspect is the way in which the counter-hegemonic dimension of the indigenous organizations has been weakened by the incorporation of the "abbreviation interpretation" by the native movement itself, which sanitizes the process and leads to the stagnation of indigenous initiatives, reducing their efficiency as "emerging realities." The drawing-up of agreements in order to form "partnerships" represents the incorporation of the indigenous "mobilization routine" by the state, to be then sanitized and converted by state rationale into "routine mobilization," which is transferred back to the organized indigenous movement or indigenous organizations as a way of doing politics.

"Participative demarcation," formulated by the PPTAL on the basis of the Kulina "self-demarcation," is a new institutional idea that adapts the indigenous creativity of "self-demarcation" to the obsolescent institutional bureaucracy of Brazil's native question. It is a model in which the participation of the Indians is once more relegated to the work of accompanying and regulating technical work, and is taken as cooperation in the process of the political construction of indigenous territory through demarcation.

The analysis of the emancipatory dimension of the new dynamics of demarcation inspired in the "self-demarcation" invented by the Kulina during their mobilization in defense of their lands means that participative demarcations are not a possible utopia, nor are they the artificial products of undefined routes that need to be measured to be displayed in showcases. They do not correspond to façades of government policy but rather are experiments with great density and social consistency. They are not the invention of PPTAL, nor do they result from the pure and simple application of a model of social engineering; they are constructions of the natives themselves, culturally distinct with distinct historical backgrounds and heterogeneous political projects (Oliveira, 2001: 32).

The demarcation of indigenous lands should not be seen as a simple application of measurement techniques for the delimitation of terrains, or as an exercise in environmental division; the demarcation of the native lands is a much more complex political fact than the construction of a new socio-political reality, in which a historical subject, an ethnic group that perceives itself as descendents of the original occupiers of that land, becomes involved in a process of territorialization and becomes recognized under a model of citizenship as an effective participant in the Brazilian nation (Oliveira, 2001: 34).

For this reason, "self-demarcation" may not be seen merely as the Indians doing the work that the state should have done. If it were this, "self-demarcation" would have been stripped of its myth of having an innovative political potential. It is much more than the Indians merely taking on the job is the state's absence; it is the safest way for an indigenous people to establish the base for the reinforcement of their ethnic identity. It is the beginning of the process of reorientation of inter-ethnic relations, a step in the direction of a "process of social construction by the inhabitants of a territory, which impels them to search for solutions to their problems and needs through the self-diagnosis of their own world" (Fundación Gaia Amazonas, 2000: 236). Undertold in this way, "self-demarcation" becomes similar to the process of "territorial planning" conceived by the indigenous communities of Colombian Amazonia as a cluster of relations that have implications for the life of the population of a given territory, as the "backbone that regulates the principles of the governments themselves, and of all cultural, political, economic, and social relations, both internally and externally" (Sánchez, 2000: 102).

The Kulina "self-demarcation" was not an institutional idea; on the contrary; it was a concrete practice constructed with indigenous protagonists within the whole process of political construction of territory, an initiative that revolutionized the institutional way of demarcating indigenous lands, taking on the shape of an "emerging reality." "Self-demarcation" rapidly spread throughout the country, less as a method of demarcation developed empirically by the Kulina than as a way of asserting rights over occupied lands, and today it forms a part of the political agenda of all the indigenous peoples.

With the demarcation of the Kulina homeland of the Middle Juruá river, officially recognized by the agreement between FUNAI and the Kulina, "self-demarcation" asserted itself definitively as the most important and innovative political mobilization of the indigenous peoples, revolutionizing the whole process and system of land demarcation. These three examples of "self-demarcation" in Amazonas—the case of the Kulina, whose technical work was recognized by an accord between FUNAI and the Indians; that of the Kanamari, whose limits on the land were validated as the limits of the native land; and that of the Deni, which obliged the state to take the attitude that it had long delayed—demonstrate the emancipatory dimension of "self-demarcation." This does not reside only in its capacity to mobilize local populations with the objective of achieving one-off conquests, but also in its ability to construct a new system of relations between the indigenous peoples and the state.
administer its agrarian and environmental resources, but which also modernizes its own culture, enriching it with new experiences, without harming the reproduction of its cognitive heritage or the maintenance of those values considered central by the present members (Oliveira, 2001: 34).

These teachings are dictated by the model of “self-demarcation” invented by the Indians in the historical process of defending their lands. “Self-demarcation” opened up the way, traced the outline, taught the steps, indicated the direction in which the construction of a multi-ethnic, multicultural social system ought to head, in which equality and difference are the orienting principles of relations between peoples.

However, despite representing processes of assertion of distinct sociocultural particularities in the scenario of inter-ethnic relations, some initiatives may not realize their emancipatory potential and may lose their counter-hegemonic dimension, becoming “globalized localisms,” in the process of “hegemonic globalization.” In the case of indigenous groups, the true counter-hegemonic dimension of the initiatives, originating in local groups or indigenous organizations, rests in the distinction between ethnic affirmation and subordination to nation-states.

For the Brazilian state, only two possibilities were reserved for the Indians: 1) “isolation from civilization,” like societies paralyzed in time; or 2) “integration into civilization,” as societies on the margins of national society. It is against this limitation that the Indians are mobilizing. The indigenous initiatives, whether they are labeled as “emerging,” “counter-hegemonic,” or something else, demonstrate that another possibility exists, namely that the indigenous peoples assume themselves as active subjects in the process of inter-ethnic relations.

Indian mobilization has not been impelled by the international solidarity of NGO networks; rather, it is “emancipatory commonsense,” a “subversive order” (Santos, 2000: 254), a multiple proposal of a multi-ethnic and multicultural society (Patzi Paco, 1999: 13), which subverts democracy, constructing a plural democracy. The indigenous movement is not only “anti”; it is above all a movement that proposes a model of society different from the Western model and which manifests itself as anti-Western by its refusal of western thought in accepting diversity, the possibility of the coexistence of difference. In this, the power of indigenous mobilizations “reveals itself to be non-accepting of the democratic character” (Almeida, 1994: 531).

In the field of the indigenous struggles in Brazil, self-determination is focused on the historical right to the land and its natural resources, based on an autonomous social organization compatible with the principles of national sovereignty reclaimed by the Brazilian state; an “internal self-determination”
that claims ethnic equality as an alternative to homogenization (Santos, 1995:321). “Self-determination” and “emancipation,” understood as the reconquest of immemorial rights, bring together a group of local issues and specific problems experienced by the different indigenous peoples, while “land demarcation” represents the immediate mechanism for the access of rights and the basic presupposition for achieving the required self-determination and emancipation, that is, autonomy.

The proposal for “autonomy” put forward by the indigenous movement of Brazil is a way of overcoming exclusion, which, in the field of inter-ethnic relations, shaped the “exclusive/defensive communities” closed in upon themselves in defense against the domination (social, cultural, environmental, agrarian, political, epistemological, etc.) of the state as an “exclusive-aggressive community” (Santos, 2000:314). With its objective of constructing a plural, multicultural, and multi-ethnic country, the indigenous movement is close to the paradigm of the “amoeba communities” associated with the “principle of internal self-determination” that is a component of the new emerging paradigm of “democratic sustainability and dispersed sovereignty” (Santos, 2000:317).

For the indigenous movement in Brazil, “emancipation” expresses a meaning close to “autonomy” without, however, containing the connotations of “national liberation” or “regional autonomy” so frequently employed by other indigenous movements of Latin America. The key word for the indigenous peoples of Brazil has always been “self-determination.” Recently, as a result of the involvement of indigenous movements and the state in activities and programs designed to attend to immediate demands, “self-determination” has given way in political discourse to other terms such as “partnership,” “alliance,” and “collaboration,” which, though not new, have gained a force that they previously had only in the field of Brazilian native politics. From the theoretical point of view, the question is whether it is possible to reconcile the “emancipatory” interest of the indigenous movement with the western bureaucratic paradigm into which the indigenous organizations are inserted, by means of such “partnerships,” “alliances,” and “collaborations.”

A careful assessment of the state of the indigenous movement in Brazil suggests that today the Indians have lost some of the political force and power that they had in the 1980s for the winning of support and solidarity from other segments of society. However, the native question continues to be a potential source of social emancipation. This resides in two facts. First, it lies in the inheritance of a recent past in which the indigenous movement represented a great, organized force (maybe the only organized force) of resistance to the military dictatorship’s “project of national integration” that unleashed a process of cultural and social homogenization imposed upon the country. Second, and more importantly, the indigenous movement, given its intrinsic nature, opposes the national model of society, and from this “rivalry” of different forms of knowledge, values, principles, political systems, and social organization, there emerges a “social rivalry.”

Despite the anticipated risks and alternatives already confronted, the struggles of the indigenous peoples of Brazil cannot be called a failure. Counter-hegemonic initiatives and the capacity of the indigenous peoples to generate counter-hegemonic initiatives demonstrate that the struggles of the 1970s have not been forgotten, only that they are sometimes put on hold in a “sundouro” in order to be resumed at the most opportune moment. Thus, this may be seen as a strategic maneuver on the part of the movement, local organizations, or indigenous peoples in their constantly renewed counter-hegemonic struggle against colonization, subordination, and the exclusion of 500 years.

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Reportagem (1999). I: 1


Notes

1 An argument used by Indonesia to impose its sovereignty upon East Timor.

2 CGMQ, the indigenous organ of the Catholic Church, set up in 1972, is connected to the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops (CNBB), which is oriented towards liberation theology.

3 Not recognizing this initiative as legal, FUNAI refused to supply the official markers and plaques used to indicate the limits of the indigenous lands.

4 "Seringalista": "owners" of rubber plantations, which control the commercialization of natural rubber of Amazonia.

5 "Racado": fields of manioc/cassava, the staple vegetable of all the indigenous peoples of Amazonia. In the region of the River Juruá, manioc is eaten mainly in the form of flour.

6 Seminar held in Einunepê, the small city that acts as the political center of the River Juruá region.

7 At first, UNI-Acre was a representative of UNI for the state of Acre. With the disappearance of UNI as a national organization, UNI-Acre asserted itself as the local organization, extending its action to South Amazonas and taking over the historic initials of UNI (National Union of Indigenous Peoples).

8 "Bread for the World" (PPM) is a cooperative project of the Evangelical/Lutheran churches. In supporting the Madjii project, PPM implements its principle of 'helping to self-help,' that is, by helping the Indians to become responsible for their own development” (Merz, 1997: 9). The word "Madjii" is the auto-denomination of the Kulina people.

9 Accord No. 004/93, between FUNAI, as the representative of the Brazilian state, UNI-Acre, and South Amazonas, and the Kulina Indigenous Community of Middle Juruá, which represented Kulina interests.

10 Theodolites are precision surveying equipment. GPS: global positioning system for the scanning of geodetic points by satellite.

11 The physical demarcation of the Mawetek Homeland was carried out during the year 2000, in accordance with boundaries initially defined by the Kanamari.

12 The Deni “self-demarcation” had the support of CIMI, the Native Amazonia Operation (OPAN), the Coordination of the Indigenous Organizations of the Amazon Basin (COIAB), and of Greenpeace.

13 The Integrated Project for the Protection of Indigenous Populations of Legal Amazonia (PPTAL) is a sub-project of the Pilot Program for the Protection of Tropical Forests in Brazil (PPGT), implemented by FUNAI with the technical cooperation of Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ). Hereafter, the abbreviation PPTAL will be used when referring to this partnership.

14 The PPTAL action affected 81 different indigenous peoples, of which eight were groups that did not have regular contact with Brazilian society (Schröder, 1999: 235).

15 The first, with the demarcation of the Waikí Homeland on the Brazil–Guyana border, was carried out between January 1994 and February 1996; the second, involving the demarcation of five indigenous homelands located in the region of Upper River Negro, on the Brazil–Colombia–Venezuela border, was undertaken between April 1997 and April 1998.

16 CIJAVJA: the Indigenous Council of the Javary Valley, an organization representing the peoples of the Javary Valley.

17 In addition to these, the PPTAL has promoted other "demarcation operations through bidding, the traditional model used by FUNAI" (Mendes, 1999: 18). This chapter is limited to these three indigenous homelands, where the "participative demarcation" model was put into practice.

18 "It is necessary to remember that the indigenous peoples have had a long experience of following winding trails. While it might appear to the Western mind that they are losing their way, this may in truth represent the shortest path between two points, which could teach us some unexpected lessons about productivity" (Ramos, 1997: 53).

15 "As a product of the Empire, the South is the house where the South does not feel at home," so "seeing itself only through the lens of the imperial North, the periphery cannot but recognize itself in the imperial South" (Santos, 2000: 345).

20 Whatever it may be, the issue of “autonomy” has not until now been raised by the Indians of Brazil, at least not in the form in which it appears with other peoples in Latin America and Canada.

21 “Vandouru”: a secondary path opened in the forest to shorten distances.