Portugal: Tales of Being and not Being

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The Problem of the Past as Excess of Diagnosis

How much does the past weigh in on the present and future of Portugal? This is not a specifically Portuguese problem. It concerns every peripheral and semiperipheral country in the world system. The linear conception of time that prevails in Western Modernity, that is, the idea that history has a single direction, allows core or developed countries, which are for that reason located at the tip of the arrow of time, to define as backward all that is out of symmetry with them (Santos, “A Critique of the Lazy Reason”; Wallerstein, The Politics of the World-Economy). This is why only in core countries is the past not problematic, for it justifies and ratifies the success of the present.

The problem of the past can, therefore, be defined as the set of representations of the historical conditions that in a given society explain the deficiencies of the present, formulated as backwardness vis-à-vis the present of the more developed countries. Given the historical duration of said conditions, difficulties in overcoming such deficiencies in the near future are to be expected. In the conditions of the modern world system, as conceived by Western social sciences, the problem of the past tends to be more serious given: a) the more widespread the social perception of the distance between the country in question and the more developed countries that serve as models; b) the more hegemonic the representation that such distance could and should be smaller; c) the more credible the idea that this has not been possible for internal causes or conditions.

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In light of this, the problem of the past in Portugal cannot but be serious. Since Portugal was one of the first protagonists of the process—European expansion—that led to the development of developed countries today, it is not surprising that the distance that has separated her from these countries for the past three centuries is considered excessive, that people argue that it could be much smaller, and that, if it is not, this is mainly due to internal causes.

The problem of the past manifests itself as excess of diagnosis (Santos, *Pela mão de Alice* 49-67; Santos, “Entre Próspero e Caliban”). The excess of diagnosis consists in the reiteration of the same reasons to explain backwardness in many and different times and contexts. Let us look at a few examples.

### On emigration:

Many move on to foreign countries, mainly Castile, because of easy adjustment where before the Acclamation there were so many Portuguese that many affirmed that a fourth of the inhabitants of Seville were Portuguese born […] and throughout Old Castile and Estremadura it is well known that most of the workers came from this country, having moved there and making a living there by getting the work they couldn’t find here. (Faria, “Dos remédios para a falta de gente” 129)

### On commercial deficit (i.e., importation exceeds exportation) due to the country’s insufficient production:

Which one of us wears anything that is made in Portugal? We might say (and not for all of us) that only the linen and shoes are made by us. (Macedo, “Discurso sobre a introdução das artes” 174)

### On the distance between the official and the real country:

The country of reality, the country of hamlets, villages, towns, cities, provinces, must eliminate the nominal country, invented in offices, barracks, clubs, periodicals, and made up of the several layers of functionaries it is and wants to and will be. (Herculano, “Carta aos eleitores do círculo de Sintra” 320)

### On the inefficiency of public administration and the arbitrary manner of dealing with appointments for public office:
It is unfortunate that more efforts and experiments go into choosing a good melon than a counselor or a minister. (Melo, *Apólogos Dialogais* 104)

On the construction of means of transportation with no project for strengthening national production:

When in Portugal we woke up for economic life, the locomotive’s sharp whistle rose us from our historical slumber; by it stunned, we thought that all economic progress consisted in building roads and railway tracks. We forgot everything else. We didn’t take into account that better highways might favor the outward current of indigenous products, but they would also favor the inward current of foreigners, thus internationally determining the conditions of competition for which we were not prepared and could not prepare ourselves. (Oliveira Martins, *Fomento Rural e Emigração* 89)

On public opinion and its relation with democracy:

If democracy […] is the control of the government by public opinion—the first, essential condition for democracy to exist is the existence of a conscious, well-organized public opinion—something nowhere to be found in Portugal. (Sérgio, *Ensaios I* 252)

After thirty years of democracy, how does the public space in Portugal work? The first observation is that it does not exist. Still to come is the history of that which, in this regard, opened up and almost constituted itself during the “revolutionary” years after the 25th of April, only to close down again, disappear and be replaced by the space of the media, which, in Portugal, constitutes no public space at all. (Gil, *Portugal Hoje: o Medo de Existir* 25)

On the political elites:

In every field of human activity, the elites in Portugal are small; in no other realm, however, are we as poor as in politics. Actually, it is easily understood. The various parties never had any concern for mental values, any interest in our youth. Thus, what is most lucid about Portuguese thinking, the most wholesome and idealistic about the people’s aspirations, is dispersed, vague and impotent, as mere
nebula without a body, without influencing the facts, falling short of acting. (Sérgio, *Ensaio III* 27)

And if everything unfolds without conflicts bursting, without consciousnesses screaming, it is because everything enters into the impunity of time—as if time brought along, immediately, in the present, the forgetfulness of what is there to be seen, present. How is this possible? It is possible because consciousnesses live in fog. (Gil, *Portugal, Hoje: o Medo de Existir* 18)

What is astonishing in these passages is that the different diagnoses offered in the course of five hundred years are curiously appropriate for Portuguese society today. But, of course, they don’t tell the whole story. It stands to reason that Portuguese society today is very different from what it was five hundred years ago, or one hundred years ago, for that matter. Hence, either the diagnoses provided in every epoch by the Portuguese cultural elites have been systematically wrong, or biased, perhaps saying more about the elites than about the country; or else Portuguese society has changed by virtue, or in spite of the conditions identified in the diagnoses. This disjunctive becomes clearer when we consider the diagnoses provided throughout the centuries by foreign observers, who now contradict, now corroborate the prognoses of the Portuguese.

I suspect we are in no condition to assert which alternative is the correct one. This much is certain: the possible correction of some of the diagnoses prevents the possible correction of some others. For instance, if it is true that the elites are, in general, distant from the people, hence incapable of imagining or formulating a coherent idea about the country, there is no reason to think that the cultural elites that make such an analysis are closer to the people than the ones that are the object of their analysis.

Under these circumstances, the diagnosis of the problem easily becomes the problem of the diagnosis. The problem of the diagnosis is not that it may be true or false, but that it is made at all, thus informing the dominant representations of a given society. The problem of the tradition is the tradition that gets created upon it. The more it asserts itself as longue durée, the more it will tend to convert itself in excess of diagnosis. In the Portuguese case, the problem of the diagnosis is particularly important because it involves other societies that shared with it, under unequal conditions, a vast, multisecular contact zone—the colonial zone (Santos, “Entre Próspero e Caliban”; Santos
and Meneses, *Identidades, Colonizadores e Colonizados*; Santos, *A Gramática do Tempo*). To what extent were these societies incorporated in the diagnoses? What were the consequences of such incorporation? Were they more affected by the consequences of the problems that were diagnosed, or by the consequences of the problem of the diagnosis? How did they interfere with one another? To what extent did the incorporation and the diagnosis, which were heteronymous for centuries, get accommodated in the realities of those societies? To what extent did they affect the latter’s self-representation in the period right after the liberation from Portuguese colonialism? In other words, what is the postcolonial meaning of the diagnosed problems and of the problem of the diagnosis?³

I do not presume to answer these questions. I propose, rather, in this article, to reflect on the problems that give rise to them. I shall argue that the problem of diagnosis manifests itself through the coexistence of contradictory representations of very fast change and frozen immobilism. Such coexistence is the result of the specific insertion of Portugal in the modern world system—a semiperipheral country—and it also affects the societies that were subjected to Portuguese colonialism (Santos, *Pela Mão de Alice*; Santos, “Between Prospero and Caliban”). Due to its long duration, such insertion created a complex palimpsest of temporalities and inter-identities involving both the European zone and the colonial zone. There are, however, certain historical moments in which the contradictions inhabiting this palimpsest surface with particular intensity and become a political question. In the last hundred years I distinguish two such moments which I call the great moment of rejection and the great moment of acceptance.

**Unruful Representations:**
**Portugal in a Broad Sense and Portugal in a Restricted Sense**
Since the fifteenth century, Portugal has existed, as a bundle of social representations, in two zones or time-spaces simultaneously: the European zone and the colonial zone.⁴ The notion of zone here aims to signify that, for five centuries Portugal inhabited physically and symbolically much broader spaces than those of its territorial Iberian limits. Further, these spaces were very different from the realities that could be observed from within those limits. Therefore, we can speak of Portugal in a broad sense and Portugal in a restricted sense.⁵ This discrepancy is at the origin of the excess of diagnosis:
Portugal in a restricted sense was always diagnosed from the standpoint of Portugal in a broad sense.

Through Portugal and Spain, the European zone created the colonial zone, but these two countries were central in Europe for only a very short period, and only in the nineteenth century did Europe fully realize the importance of the colonial zone, when Portugal and Spain had become quite peripheral in the European zone. The result is that Portugal lived most of the Modern age (the second Western Modernity) in a peripheral way, ever outside the center, whether of the European zone (because Portugal was present in the colonial zone when the colonial zone was peripheral for Europe) or of the colonial zone (because Portugal failed to keep a strong presence in the colonial zone when the colonial zone became central for Europe as a whole).6 In the case of the colonial zone, not only did Portugal live in it outside the center, but also much longer than Europe. The colonial zone in which Portugal lived, besides being very large, lasted a long time. It allowed for the consolidation of a wide variety of relations, many of which can hardly be included in what after the nineteenth century, and until today, has been designated as European colonialism. Because it inhabited those zones in a peripheral way, however, Portugal could never fully assume the monoculture of linear time typical of the European zone referred to above. This conception has two important consequences. First, only in the more developed countries does the present ratify the past and render it unproblematic, which leads to the past being as unproblematic as the future, since all the conditions are met for success to continue: whoever goes ahead, precisely for that reason has in principle the capacity to avoid being replaced by the belated ones. The second consequence consists in the asynchrony between events and rhythms in core and peripheral or semiperipheral countries. By reason of such asynchronies, simultaneous events may well be noncontemporaneous. In the case of Portugal, not to be in the center meant lagging behind, and lagging behind, in turn, meant having a problematic past. And as a problem, the past became an inescapable part of the present. Under such conditions, historical evolution took the form of a palimpsest (Santos “Os Processos da Globalização”), in which the different periods accommodated themselves in different and unpredictable forms, but never disappearing. The palimpsest offers itself to superficial readings of both ruptures and continuities.
The Palimpsest Woven of a Crazy Dance of Ruptures and Continuities

Societies are complex webs of communicating vessels where everything is connected to everything else. The myriad and often chaotic interactions among the different dynamics, rhythms, impulses and resistances in the multiple social fields go on defining relations and articulations among one another which, as they get stabilized, confer a logic—a measure—to the society as a whole. This is the measure that allows us to speak of developed, dynamic or progressive societies on the one hand, or, underdeveloped, stagnated or conservative ones, on the other. In all these types of societies, there are movements and changes; what varies is the rhythm and the direction. While in some all the movements converge with some coherence into a pattern, in others there are movements and counter-movements that neutralize one another, rapid changes together with strong resistances to change.

In the last three decades, Portuguese society underwent several rapid and turbulent processes of social change that had a strong, selective, and contradictory impact on different fields of social life. This impact has not yet consolidated into a new measure, that is, a new and coherent image of society, in which the Portuguese may recognize themselves in a consensual manner. The said processes were almost always processes of rupture, from the Carnation Revolution to decolonization, from fascism to democracy, from the transition to socialism to the transition to capitalism, from the intervention of the International Monetary Fund to integration in the European Union. In sociological terms, the image of change is even stronger after the entrance in the European Union. Here is a possible list of the main changes in no order of precedence: from sending out migrant workers to receiving them (African immigrants,7 and later, Eastern Europeans) with the corresponding changes in the social and cultural outlook of the population; emergence of new forms of organization of civil society; increase of regional asymmetries and intensification of the process of territorial metropolitanization (Lisbon and Oporto) and, at the same time, intense development of urban areas in small and medium cities (for example, increases in services available and patterns of consumption); explosion in the purchase and use of micro-electronic products (in 1998, only the Scandinavians beat the Portuguese in cell phone use); increased access to higher education, particularly through inordinate proliferation of private universities; consolidation of public social security, followed almost immediately by deterioration; creation of a national system of science and technology; improved indicators of poverty, with a decrease from
24% to 21% in relative poverty (percentage of resident population with income less than 60% of the national income); increased job precariousness (short-term contracts and career destructuring); increased unemployment of graduates; higher discrepancy between income and patterns of consumption, followed by the dramatic amount of debt taken on by families; paternity leave for fathers; culture as an increasingly significant area used by the State for political intervention, particularly in the municipalities; development of cultural industries, media production, and publicity, in part related to the privatization of television; emergence of new (or old, but not yet denounced) types of criminality, from organized economic crime to criminal associations, corruption, drug and weapons traffic, and pedophilia; increased participation of women in many sectors of (nonpolitical) social life, namely in the administration of justice; the impunity of the powerful apparently coming to its end; a wider gap between the citizens and the political system with the rise of abstention and poor referendum participation; increased mediatization of politics; and the emergence and consolidation of a new political force—Bloco de Esquerda, in which reproductive rights, racial and sexual discrimination and immigrants’ rights become part of political discourse.

The conclusion may, therefore, be drawn that Portuguese society is a society in fast movement and transformation. But what is the rhythm, the measure and the direction of this movement and transformation? It is not easy to answer this question, for two reasons. On the one hand, the great changes implied processes of rupture, but such ruptures had distinct, if not opposite, political orientations. They created expectations that often remained unfulfilled and set in motion transformations that were often blocked. Thus, the ruptures co-existed surreptitiously with continuities, some of them centuries old. On the other hand, Portuguese society lives in the presence of a past time, however recent, of immobility and stagnation; hence, decadence, against which we imagine the emergence of a rival presence of a time of rupture and change. In the representation of the Portuguese, the time of immobilism is the time of fascism: Estado Novo,8 dictatorship,9 Salazar,10 Cardinal Cerejeira,11 PIDE,12 overseas provinces,13 censorship,14 União Nacional,15 colonial war,16 saudade,17 fado, futebol and Fátima,18 “a Bem da Nação,”19 Marcelo Caetano,20 the National Feminine Movement (Movimento Nacional Feminino),21 mild manners (brandos costumes),22 proudly alone (orgulhosamente sós),23 the most Portuguese village (a aldeia mais portuguesa),24 peasant agriculture (agricultura camponesa), God, Fatherland and
Family (*Deus, Pátria e Família*), Portuguese Youth (*Mocidade Portuguesa*), Angola is ours (*Angola é nossa*), woman-mother-and-wife (*mulher-mãe-e-esposa*), family talks (*conversa em família*), *Avril au Portugal*, “People who wash (laundry) by the river” (*Povo que lavas no rio*), copying and dictation (*cópia e ditado*), serving maids (*criadas de servir*), war godmothers (*madrinhos de guerra*).

The time of change is, in turn, the time of the 25th of April, liberty, democracy, decolonization, political parties, rallies, European Union, Zeca Afonso, strikes, Coca-Cola, new school (*escola nova*), Mário Soares, democratic governance, Xico Fininho, nationalizations, privatizations, short-term contracts, computers, video, cell phones, working and professional women, drugs, indebtedness, Maria de Lurdes Pintasilgo, Expo 98, Siza Vieira, discotheques, rural turism (*turismo rural*), Attorney General (Procuradoria Geral da República), Eduardo Lourenço, José Saramago, the euro, local radio stations, internet, and *disk jockeys*.

Accordingly, Portuguese society could reasonably be seen as a society craving change or, on the contrary, as a society resisting change; as a society in vertiginous movement or, on the contrary, as a society frozen by vertigo. These two perceptions are deeply rooted in the Portuguese imaginary. And, to a certain extent, they are both illusory. That is, the time of Salazarism was not mere immobilism, nor was the time of the 25th of April mere change. If in the former time change occurred under the guise of immobilism, in the latter period immobilism may be occurring in the form of change. In the former time, change was socially devalued and occurred only anonymously and subterraneanly. Hence, the reason why the 25th of April caught the great majority of the Portuguese by surprise. In the latter time, it is immobilism that is so socially devalued that it becomes unnamable and unrepresentable. Disavowal of immobilism is a disavowal as well as a breaking with it. The fact that the 25th of April is devalued and not taught in most schools does not mean that the rupture with the immobilism of the previous society is undervalued. Rather, what is devalued is the idea that the previous society ever existed in a different form that may be relevant for today’s society.

Therefore, the conclusion may be drawn that for these reasons, distinct and even contradictory images of social change coexist in Portuguese society today. Where now is confirmed the atavist immobilism produced by the resistance of the “materials,” now flourishes the extraordinary plasticity and lightness of collective existence. This is the political and vital constellation typical
of a time of transition, a time-between-times, which is as well a time of transi-
tion between places, between the European zone and the colonial zone. The
crossing of perceptions makes it difficult to formulate a judgment or define a
measure about the ongoing changes. What is more significant? That in less
than twenty years Portuguese society made a profound demographic transi-
tion or in less than ten years a revolution in the consumption of micro-elec-
tronics? Or that it continues, like in centuries past, to train the least qualified
labor force in Europe or prizing easy greed to the detriment of work and pro-
ductive investment? Or that, as decades ago, the Portuguese State and partic-
ularly the Portuguese corporations allocate to research and development the
lowest percentages of GDP in Europe? Is it more significant that Portugal
went from a country of out-migration (including a strong component of
“internal” migration to the colonial regions) to a country of incoming
migrants (including a strong component of former colonial subjects)? Or that
it continues to pay the lowest salaries in Europe?

By the same token, if some think that the changes will eventually drag
along the continuities, others think that the continuities will end up boy-
cotting the changes, or rendering them irrelevant. Curiously enough, and
contrary to what one might think, these divergences do not intensify the
emergence of strong political or cultural cleavages. The truth is that no
Portuguese person or social group values change or continuity in every area
of social life. If in some areas they value change, in others they value conti-
nuity. And since, in the great majority of the cases, both changes and conti-
nuities may have their positive and their negative aspects, some choose to see
the negative facets while others focus on the positive ones.

To understand this palimpsest and grasp its meaning—as a problem of
the past that asserts itself in the present as a specific way of seeing the
future—we must analyze the relationship between the European and the
colonial zone in the imaginary of the Portuguese society and in the imaginary
of the societies colonized by it. As I mentioned above, the problem of the past
emerges in Western Modernity as a result of the linear conception of time
and the asynchronies it establishes between the countries that go ahead and
those that lag behind history. If, for Portugal, the problem of the past is above
all a problem of excess of diagnosis resulting from a structural belatedness vis-
à-vis the central countries of the European zone, for the colonies and now
former colonies, the problem of the past results from deviation from the colo-
nial norm and manifests itself through the apparently contradictory coexis-
tence of a deficit and an excess of colonization. The deficit manifests itself in a contradictory way as well, whether being a burden resulting from being colonized by a backward country in the European context, or an opportunity for autonomous development, created precisely by the inefficiency of Portuguese colonialism. The excess resides in the fact that, given the near colonial subordination of Portugal to the central countries of Europe, England in particular, the colonies ended up suffering the impact of a double colonization, Portugal’s and that of other European countries (again, England in particular). But even in this regard, this excess may have contributed to create opportunities for autonomous development. Since two long-durée time-spaces are in question, one must choose the moments when they can best clarify the problem of the past in this Portuguese-speaking time-space.

I believe the best moments are those in which the semiperipheral condition of Portugal was most contested, that is, when the semiperipheral socio-economic condition became a political question. This change occurred in two opposite contexts. The first one were the moments of rejection, when the country felt rejected by the core European countries and hence apparently demoted in the world-system; the second one were the moments of acceptance, when the country felt accepted by the core countries and hence, apparently, promoted in the world-system. The most dramatic moment of rejection occurred at the end of the nineteenth century, with the Berlin Conference (1884-85) and the British Ultimatum (1890). The most dramatic moment of acceptance occurred at the end of the twentieth century with the April Revolution and integration in the then European Economic Community (1986).

At both moments, the relations between the European and the colonial zone were crucial. I shall designate the first moment, the moment of rejection, as the European colonial moment and the second, the moment of acceptance, as the European neocolonial moment. Portugal’s performance at these moments will be of crucial importance, not only for Portuguese society but also for societies subjected to Portuguese colonialism. At the moment of rejection, the relations between the European and the colonial zone were particularly tense and dense. This was the moment when the central countries of the European zone turned the colonial zone into a privileged zone for the development of European capitalism. Portugal was seen then as an obstacle: since the country played no relevant role in the said project, the juridical control it held over vast African territories was a hindrance to having them avail-
able as colonial resources. At the moment of acceptance, the relations between the European and the colonial zone had deeply changed. For the core European countries, the colonial zone had ceased to exist as such, having turned into a group of formally independent countries, integrated in transnational communities controlled by the former colonial powers (neo-colonial integration). The anachronism of the Estado Novo in the European zone was double: as a dictatorship in a democratic Western Europe and as a peripheral European country that insisted on using violence to keep control over a colonial zone deemed obsolete. I will analyze both moments and identify disturbing parallelisms between them.

The European Colonial Moment (1890-1930)

There were other moments in previous centuries when Portugal experienced being rejected by developed Europe, but this was the great moment of rejection. Since the fifteenth century, practically all accounts of Portugal’s historical existence and its becoming take as the starting point expansion (often also, referred to as the point of arrival) followed by colonialism. Expansion is the founding myth of modern Portugal. That is to say, Portugal founds its presence in the European zone on its pioneering role in the constitution of the modern colonial zone. The colonial zone warranted Portugal’s political independence in the European zone, while at the same time it prevented the formation of a national bourgeoisie and a national development project capable of securing a central presence in the European zone. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the diagnoses made in previous centuries focus, directly or indirectly, on the colonial zone.

The initial moment of expansion was a highly creative moment. It brought about a wide range of diverse possibilities—as vulnerable to fulguration as to all kinds of adventurism, as exhilarating as mediocre, vindicating Os Lusíadas but also O Soldado Prático. Such creativity allowed Portugal to be one of the protagonists of the first European modernity, the Iberian Modernity (Dussel, Ética de la Liberación; Santos, A Gramática do Tempo). It will suffice to mention the Modernity of Pedro da Fonseca, the Portuguese Aristotle, and Suarez, as well as the Modernity of the Conimbricences, as they were known at the time. The works of these two authors were taught throughout Europe. One of Pedro da Fonseca’s works ran 36 editions and was read by Descartes and Leibniz (Fonseca). In other words, what came to be known as the first European Modernity, with Descartes and Kant, was in fact
a second Modernity, the Modernity of Central Europe, which drew heavily on Iberian Modernity. Iberian Modernity, because it featured countries that quickly went into decay, was not even considered as such in later centuries. To a large extent, Portugal lost this second Modernity through a long period of dependent insertion, which gave rise to what above I designated as a problem of the past.

One of the most dramatic proofs of this loss and subsequent subalternization of Portugal in the European zone was the Berlin Conference or “the scramble for Africa” (1884-85) and the British Ultimatum (1890), which denied Portugal’s claim to keep under its jurisdiction the vast territories stretching between Angola and Mozambique in sub-Saharan Africa. The best place from which to analyze this moment are the colonies, considered to be the least important in the Portuguese colonial zone and which might even be considered for sale. In fact, in the course of the nineteenth century, there were suggestions of selling Mozambique and other colonies in the East to solve the country’s serious financial crisis. (Oliveira Martins, *O Brasil e as Colónias Portuguesas*; Queiroz, *Uma campanha alegre*). In this article, I focus specifically on Mozambique.49

The division of Africa agreed upon at the Berlin Conference is eloquent proof of the subalternization of Portugal in the European zone.50 The criterion for the division was no longer the historical right of discovery, claimed by Portugal, but that of effective occupation, favoring the colonial pretensions of the central European countries. The subalternization of Portugal reached its paroxysm with the Ultimatum, the ultimate moment of rejection. Portugal could not expect any effective solidarity on the part of the other European countries and was forced to surrender abjectly to England’s imposition. On the eve of the Ultimatum, António Ennes writes in his journal:

> England is going to settle herself inside our possessions. Surely, if we don’t take special care, she will push us into the sea. To count on Europe, meaning Germany, to defend us is sheer absurdity. They would not raise a finger on our behalf. (*O 'Ultimatum’*xlilx)

Right after the Ultimatum, he writes:

> In the past couple of days, England has precipitated her diplomatic action and made it absolutely mandatory. She aimed her gun at our chest and counted the
minutes. She would not give us time to take advantage of the good offices of the other powers, all of them having shown sympathy towards our claims. She planned matters in such a way that the mediation of some of them, at least, would find her sailors already in control of Lourenço Marques, Quelimane, S. Vicente, where from no one would expel them by force. In view of impending occupation, the government, afraid of having the country plundered, not only as regards the contested territories but also as regards Portugal’s best overseas possessions, gave in to brutal force, protesting before the law and Europe’s opinion. (O ‘Ultimatum’ 199)

The Ultimatum generated a vast wave of nationalism and debates over national identity, and provoked a political turmoil that led to the resignation of several governments. On 11 June 1891, the Treaty with England was finally signed with all of England’s pretensions met. Soon after, António Ennes was appointed Royal Commissioner of Mozambique (Comissário Régio de Moçambique).

I argue that António Ennes is unquestionably the most consequent colonial strategist at this European colonial moment; his colonial political philosophy and the vicissitudes of his actions are the best illustration of the dilemmas of Portugal’s decentered position both in the European and in the colonial zone. Through him, Portugal tries fully to assume the European colonial enterprise in the space left available by England. Ennes sails to Mozambique charged with the European colonial mission of establishing the frontiers and promoting the effective occupation of the territory, including its economic exploitation. His arrival in Mozambique marks the beginning of a new historical moment of Portuguese colonialism, the moment of Prospero, the moment of the white man’s mission civilisatrice vis-à-vis the African now portrayed as the savage, whose passage to civilization is the white man’s burden.

In his first report, Ennes sets the “sacred heirloom” idealism aside and, adopting a pragmatic style with no few affinities with British colonialism, draws an objective plan capable of taking advantage of the real potentialities of the colony and allowing for the corresponding, desirable benefits for the metropole.

The two main pillars of the hegemonic colonialism of the time, forced labor and racism, are central to Ennes political proposal. Inveighing against the liberal legislation which applied freedom of labor to the natives of the
colonies, he asks retorically: “When will we learn that the laws drawn for the Metropole are almost always inadequate for Africa?” (Moçambique 73). António Ennes is the best metaphor for a Portugal that struggles with the need to prove its legitimacy as well as its capacity as a colonizing European power.

It did not take long for Ennes to realize that the conditions he encountered both in Mozambique and in the metropole made it impossible to carry out his plan and proposals. To begin with, there was no coherent and efficient colonial administration in Mozambique. Anarchy, arbitrariness, and corruption were the other side of an excessive centralization at the level of the Portuguese State, as he pointed out later on in his final report about Mozambique:

On principle, it behooves the Terreiro do Paço to rule the entire Portuguese world, but since the Terreiro do Paço cannot even handle the mere bureaucracy of so much glory, it delegates arbitrarily on the arbitrariness of the provincial authorities […] The first article of an Overseas Administrative Code [Código Administrativo para o Ultramar] is to choose the governors well; the second one, to support them or to dismiss them. (241)

In this report, António Ennes also highlighted the crucial role of financial investment and human resources. As to the latter, he was fiercely against the centuries-old practice of sending convicted criminals to the colonies. Ennes defended that these poor elements only serve to stain the black man’s image of the white man, undermining the image of elements of civilization and progress that the Portuguese should assume while representatives of the colonizing metropole. As to economic investment, and being aware of the country’s limitations, Ennes advocated promoting the presence of foreigners capable of putting the wealth of the colony to its best use:

This is why I say again and again: the colonial administration and public opinion both must stop fearing and being envious of foreigners when they need to deliberate on Mozambique. At the most, one must be careful to see that foreigners of every race and nationality whatsoever, and not one only, settle in the province. Up until now, this balanced mixture of elements has been spontaneously accomplished. (63)
Having defined, during his initial stay in Mozambique, the main lines of a successful colonial enterprise in the region, António Ennes sailed back to Mozambique in December of 1894, this time charged with broader political and administrative responsibilities in his capacity as Royal Commissioner. At that time there were almost no Portuguese troops in Mozambique to defend the sovereignty that Portugal claimed before her European adversaries. Aware of this situation, the people of southern Mozambique, in alliance with the Gaza Empire—who in fact had never considered themselves vassals of the Portuguese—engaged in an offensive of such consequence that it almost reached Lourenço Marques, the main bastion that Portugal held in the coastal area of southern Mozambique. The village was forced to resort to its inhabitants to defend itself. In view of the seriousness of the situation, Portugal decided to send a contingent of military forces to occupy the region, thus justifying the Portuguese jurisdiction upon that area of the colony (Liesegang, Ngungunyane). The suspicion that the destabilizing hand of England was to be blamed—since England was actively engaged in negotiations with the Gaza Empire—cropped up frequently in the press. In the review *Occidente* of 11 October 1894, one read:

> The news was really alarming for it stated that the savages were ready to attack the city, where panic was rampant.

> This gesture of the savages indicates, with good reason, that it is the result of instigations of people interested in upsetting the order in Lourenço Marques, compromising Portuguese authority and sovereignty in that colony, all the more so because it coincides with the arrival in town of Cecil Rhodes who, as is well known, is committed to banish Portuguese sovereignty from that part of Africa.

But if England is the enemy whenever she puts Portuguese colonial rights at stake, she is the model to be followed whenever the issue is to consolidate colonial domination. Aires de Ornellas, then officer of the Portuguese army that joined António Ennes and Mouzinho de Albuquerque, wrote upon his arrival in Mozambique:

> The blacks only dominate by force and since it is weak, we have to start at the beginning. First, we would have to force the blacks in the city and outskirts to what is convenient for us, without chaining or enslaving them, resorting merely
to the means used by our next-door neighbors the English, showing them the strength of our muscles and the superiority of our race. (12)

The time had come to rationalize the African savannas (sertões africanos), to occupy and rule them, proving beyond a shred of a doubt that the claimed territories were “effectively” Portuguese, and not independent, sovereign realms outside of Portugal’s control. This is how the first colonial war started, then called “pacification campaigns” (“campanhas de pacificação”) (Santos and Meneses, Identidades, Colonizadores e Colonizados). Submission through war and forced labor are sustained ideologically by racism. The greater the foreseen resistance, the more vicious the racist ideology. Of the Nguni people, whose leader was Ngungunyane (also the leader of the Gaza Empire), Ennes wrote:

There is a people in particular, the vátua [then the Portuguese nomenclature for the nguni], that civilization will have to treat as irredeemable enemy, for they render infertile the soil they tread. They are the noblemen of savagery. For them work is dishonor, murder glory, and pillage law. (Moçambique 23)

The submission of Ngungunyane in successive battles during 1895 is seen as the ransom for Portuguese colonialism and Portugal’s stand in Europe. Africa becomes again the way to Europe. Euphoric by the victories obtained by his troops, Ennes wrote:

We know how to fight and are capable of fighting in Africa, today as in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and we will preserve intact the dominion earned with so much effort by our ancestors. (A Guerra de África 93)

The review Occidente of 25 November 1895 clearly shows the Portuguese Prospero’s concern to impress Europe, proving that he is a totally legitimate Prospero:

We therefore proudly underscore this feat of arms that has so much impressed Europe, particularly those countries that know by their own experience how much it has cost them to maintain campaigns on African soil.
The military victories allowed for comparisons with the English colonial norm. It was thus no longer important to invoke the specificities of Portuguese colonialism, which before were invoked positively as proof of moral victory. The idea of a reluctant Prospero is evident in the following passage published in the review *Occidente* on 11 March 1891, where the Portuguese colonial vocation (“a vocação colonial portuguesa”) is contrasted with British colonialism:

> Compare this English civilization with the civilization that Portugal has been spreading in her colonies, and you will easily find an explanation for the aversion of the indigenous peoples to the English, in eloquent contrast with their respect and spontaneous affection for the Portuguese.

António Ennes’s plan came to symbolize the moment of the European Prospero, not a reluctant Prospero, but rather an arrogant Prospero, according to whom imperial violence—physical and epistemological imperial violence—against the “other,” now turned into a savage native, was fully legitimized by history and ethics. In his writings, Ennes reaffirmed the imposition of metropolitan Portugal’s sovereignty on the colonial space as a lever to dominate the “indigenous element,” which must be educated and forced to convert to Western values. At the same time, this colonial imposition was meaningful to Ennes as a moment of Portugal’s integration in the imperial European space. The colonialist racism he defended caused a profound change in the chaotic identity negotiations that until then had prevailed among the Portuguese, the natives, and other foreigners in the territory. The complex heterogeneity of identifications was suddenly reduced to two main homogeneous and antagonistic categories: white as colonizer and black/indigenous as the colonized. For some purposes, the categories were three: the white settlers, the natives, and the assimilated, i.e. those who had given proof of having assimilated Portuguese, European values.

However, António Ennes soon came to realize that the pacification campaigns, no matter how successful, did not manage to overcome the structural problems resulting from the Portuguese presence in that part of the colonial Empire. In Ennes opinion, beyond the glaring administrative deficiencies and the central government’s incompetence, any colonizing action would be impossible if the white race could not prove its superiority and impose its effective presence, now that race had been introduced as a determinant fac-
tor in the definition of Portuguese citizenship. In 1896, while Royal Commissioner, he stated about Mozambique:

At a stone's throw from the capital, the country is the same as two or two hundred kilometers away: it is a savage country, perhaps with the only difference that its inhabitants know more Portuguese vices and words. (*A Guerra de África* 42)

The negative reactions of the rather small local white bourgeoisie to his performance and the obtuseness of the government in Lisbon (which expected resounding results from minute investments) provoked in him a deep disenchantment and led him to the conclusion that a Portuguese colonial state, similar to the one that Cecil Rhodes was building in the nearing close-by countries (almost as “private” colonies, similar to the Belgium Congo), was not viable. On 27 June 1895, he wrote to his daughter:

Once I manage to get off, I will pronounce my public life finished. I do not want to be anything else in this decaying country!... It’s all rotten! [...] You can’t rule with such people. You can’t make anything out of them. (Caetano 104)

In a way, the same would happen with another high-ranking colonial administrator, Mouzinho de Albuquerque, the most violent version of the Portuguese Prospero. In Ennes’s wake, though competing with him, Mouzinho de Albuquerque, the “jailer of the Lion of Gaza,” fully meant to accomplish the moment of the colonialist Prospero. After a sojourn in India, Mouzinho became a fervent admirer of British colonialism. Like Ennes, Mouzinho aimed to decentralize the colonial administration, which until then was under the direct control of the *Terreiro do Paço*, as mentioned earlier. He was supportive of “indirect rule” that facilitated the relations between the metropole and the colonies, as can be seen in the quote below:

Let us compare these administrations—with so little bureaucracy—these countries—so little dependent on officialdom—with any Portuguese colony, shackled by numberless laws, decrees, regulations, and commands sent off randomly from a metropole worn out by a plethora of public officials, in general badly paid and worse chosen in Lisbon, made busy by writing minutes, copying, and sending off numberless memos, duplicates, triplicates, circulars, etc., most of them totally dispensable! (*Moçambique* 68)
When Mouzinho arrived in Mozambique in September of 1890 to take the position of general governor of the Lourenço Marques district, he was shocked by the absence of any effective occupation. Later on, in his report of the campaign against the namarrais in northern Mozambique, he wrote:

Our ignorance of the territory where we were to intervene was unbelievable. The instability, lack of zeal and aptitude, and particularly the complete indifference of the general governors resulted in that the vast majority of the military commands had no idea of the ground a kilometer away from the seats of command. (*A campanha contra os Namarrais* 5)

In the same way as António Ennes, Mouzinho despaired at the depressing state of the district administration and was outraged at the liberal idea of the equality of every citizen, including the natives. According to him, this idea was “utterly absurd.” Later, while appraising the first segregationist administration of the indigenous populations, Eduardo da Costa, another participant of the *campanhas*, wrote that Mouzinho thought that such a law represented “the main step towards an administrative system adequate to the stage of civilization of the indigenous peoples” (Costa 598).

Mouzinho represents the most violent, racist and nationalist version of Prospero’s colonialism. Whereas António Ennes, about to leave Mozambique, thought that Ngungunyane was politically neutralized after the pacification campaigns carried out under his supervision, Mouzinho insisted on pushing the defeat of the Gaza Empire to the bitter end and, moreover, humiliated Ngungunyane in front of the settlers and the natives themselves. Against Ennes’s advice, he apprehended the *nguni* leader in Chaimite, a move that, in the aftermath of the Ultimatum, transformed Mouzinho into a national hero. The extreme degradation to which Mouzinho subjected Ngungunyane was explicitly designed to be the symbol of the complete submission of the savages to the civilized. For him, the savages were a homogeneous category, with no allowance for the past identity differences and heterogeneities. Having commanded Ngungunyane to sit down on the floor, at the latter’s refusal to do so because the floor was dirty, Mouzinho shouted: “you are no longer a ‘régulo’ of the mangonis, you are a matonga like any other” (*Mouzinho de Albuquerque Livro das Campanhas* 26), thus striping Ngungunyane not only of his leadership role but also his ethnic identity.
At the zenith of his prestige, Mouzinho was appointed Governor General of the colony, replacing Ennes. He set out to accomplish the effective occupation of the territory, forcing to suppress all the *régulos*—local leaderships—so as to eliminate any idea of political autonomy. His vision concerning the native populations was guided exclusively by the interests of the colonizer. For example, the consumption of wine, which stirred so much criticism in the evolving press of the assimilated, was welcomed by Mouzinho for contributing to the “nationalization” of commerce:

> The wine for consumption of the locals—regular white wine heavily loaded with brandy—has become quite popular in the market, and many of the natives prefer it today to sope [local brew, made of cereal alcohol with water]. From the point of view of the nationalization of commerce, and since this wine is so abundant in the country and is not sold in Europe, the use of it by the blacks is highly convenient. (Mouzinho de Albuquerque, *Moçambique* 101)

Probably influenced by British colonialism, Mouzinho extended his racist and xenophobic attitudes to the black Muslims and other Asians present in Mozambique, now classified as inferior races of Moors and Indians (Santos and Meneses), advancing severe measures to have them replaced by white Portuguese.

But again the attempt to fulfill the European Prospero mission in Africa led to disappointment. His government soon became controversial, whether because of the violence he used in subordinating the indigenous peoples or, above all, because of his demands of autonomy from the Lisbon government, following the nearby example of Cecil Rhodes. Faced with the central government’s refusal to grant him a large loan to develop the colony, Mouzinho resigned in 1898. In a long letter addressed to his subordinates, he inveighed against the evils of the direct administration of the colonies by the central government. The King, who always admired him, charged him with the education of Prince Luís Filipe. In 1900-1901, in a letter addressed to the prince, Mouzinho bitterly vented his frustration:

> Everything is small in this Portugal of ours nowadays! The sea is no longer the corral of our ships, but rather pasture for foreign battleships; more than three parts of the overseas Empire are gone and God knows what painful surprises the future harvests for us. (*Carta*)
Misunderstood in his defense of a military dictatorship capable of crushing the rising Republican threat, and perhaps for other unknown reasons, Mouzinho committed suicide on 8 January 1902. This is what Raul Brandão wrote about the suicide in his memoirs:

[Mouzinho] brought from Africa the inordinate dream of a greater Portugal and believed he would find in the Paço and the King the necessary support to fulfill it. He clashed with the Court and the politicians, with the stubborn force of mediocrity and inertia. [...] Mouzinho’s death is explained by this collapse of a creator of misunderstood and discarded heroism. (145)

The failures of António Ennes and Mouzinho de Albuquerque in putting into practice the colonial project in Mozambique cannot be explained by the idiosyncrasies of their political personalities. We have to go deeper than that. First, their not being understood reveals the absence of a national project for incorporation in the European colonialist project of this period. Conceived in Lisbon, the incorporation was always reactive, focused more on the past (based on historical rights) than the future, and setting as a goal the continuation of the sporadic, immediatist, and adventurist exploitation of the colonies. Unlike England, Portugal had no bourgeoisie interested in or capable of putting the colonies at the service of her development in the European zone. Ennes and Mouzinho were no more than two self-appointed Prosperos for a nonexistent, impossible mission. Portugal’s semiperipheral position in the European zone precluded a new centrality in the colonial zone. The Lusitanian Prospero, besides incompetent, was in this period a reluctant Prospero as well. Once assured of his independence, no matter how precarious and formal, what was meant by the national project was fulfilled. Antero de Quental identified the fragility of this stance with crystal-clear lucidity. A few days after the Ultimatum, he wrote in *A Província*:

Either Portugal will reform itself politically, intellectually, and morally or she will cease to exist. But reform, to be fecund, must start from deeply within our own collective being: it must be, above all, a reform of sentiments and manners. (*Política* 220)

In a different context, he adds sorrowfully:
There is a whole humanity in dissolution from which a living, wholesome, believing and beautiful humanity must be drawn [...] However, who speaks and knows nowadays in Europe is not Portugal or Lisbon, it is Paris, London, Berlin. (Prosas 330-31)

Prospero’s reluctance is due to one more reason, also important to understand the failures of these two self-appointed Prosperos. Focusing exclusively on the future of Portugal and the inclusion of the colonies in this future, they made *tabula rasa* of the complex social, political, and cultural interactions that the Portuguese had been engaged in, not only with the local populations but also with all those who arrived in these places for shorter or longer stays. Without a colonial state or an empire to support them, the Portuguese were, under different circumstances, lords and vassals, “wives” of African kings, merchants in war and peace trading with the many peoples circulating in these regions, cafrealized Portuguese in the African savannas (*sertões africanos*), forgetful of their culture of origin and living comfortably according to the local customs. The multisecular presence of these Portuguese was crossed by the presence of the Swahili societies in northern Mozambique, with the Makhwa people, among many, as well as the Asiatic peoples from the Indian subcontinent. All these crossings resulted in a complex and labyrinthic constellation of inter-identity. It was not to be expected that the *tabula rasa* politics could easily eliminate and reduce it to the racist colonial classification of white/colonizer and black/colonized. This was a colonial zone in which colonialism coexisted with noncolonialism, in which relations of colonial nature were intermixed with relations of different natures (Prestholdt; Santos and Meneses). Moreover, the liberal ideology of equality had created roots among the native populations that claimed the right to be Portuguese and watched resentfully as culture was being replaced by race, particularly when the race said to be superior was witnessing daily its own cultural inferiority.

**The European Neocolonial Moment (1974-)**

The European neocolonial moment is the great moment of acceptance of Portugal in developed Europe. Again, it is a moment of great social and political turmoil for, once again, Portugal sees her position in the European zone tied to her position in the colonial zone. At the moment of rejection, at the end of the nineteenth century, the affirmation of a central position in the
European zone required an effective colonization in the colonial zone. At the moment of acceptance, the peripheral position inside the European zone is taken as transitory, the promotion to the center implying, among other things, an effective decolonization, which, in the hegemonic logic of the European zone, meant the effective creation of a neocolonial zone. If the moment of rejection confirmed that Portugal had lost the train of the second European Modernity, the moment of acceptance raises the question of whether Portugal may now catch the train of the period following the second Modernity.

The twenty-year period between May 1968 and the Fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 marks really the end of the second European Modernity and the beginning of a long paradigmatic transition to a third Modernity, or a transmodernity, or a postmodernity—the name is of little importance here. At this moment of acceptance, does the fact that Portugal had a peripheral place in the second Modernity determine her performance in the center of the European zone in a period of paradigmatic transition?

In the period that marked the end of the second European Modernity—1968-1989—three mega-events occurred in Portugal: the Revolution of the 25th of April; the end of the colonial empire and, in a relatively brief period in 1975, the arrival of more than half a million Portuguese citizens mainly born in the colonies (the “retornados”) returning from the former African colonies; and, finally, Portugal joining the European Union. The meaning of these events is open, but it would not be far-fetched to think that, through them, Portugal tried to solve the debit-credit of her first Modernity. She did it in the same period that developed Europe was closing down its accounts of the second Modernity and opening up the time for a new modernity, albeit uncertain. Therefore, in Portugal and Europe, the transitions coincided, but they were certainly from different realities and toward new realities that only most willfully could be imagined as converging in the short term. This asynchrony has a long duration but is not subject to any iron determinism. Indeed, the convergence policies of the European Union, and the structural and cohesion funds were imagined as a generous and efficacious political-economic device to allow Portugal a short circuit: to fulfill, in a few decades, her second Modernity to the full, something that had taken the developed European countries two centuries to accomplish. Thus, Portugal would coincide, with only a slight delay, with the rest of Europe in the tasks of transition toward the new modernity, transmodernity or postmodernity.
The fact that this has not happened and probably won't happen in the short term does not affect the crucial importance of the changes in this latter period at all. Through these changes, Portugal became the only European country that has had the opportunity to ground its identity anew in the course of its historical trajectory, and indeed embrace a new founding myth. The myth of expansion is followed by the myth of Europe, a century after the refoundation proposed by Antero de Quental. For a long time, the first myth will prevail, while the second will be merely emergent, but the trans-mythification movement seems to be apparent. In socio-cultural terms—not to mention economic and political dimensions—this is a particularly complex process. At the great moment of rejection, the myth of expansion provided an imaginary that allowed Portugal to “do without” Europe because she had her colonies. At the great moment of acceptance, the myth of Europe provides an imaginary that allows Portugal to “do without” the colonies because she is Europe.

What is at stake may be easily illustrated. While the colonial zone granted the independence of Portugal in an emergent Westfalian Europe but did not permit her to have a national project of development for lack of a national bourgeoisie, the European Union confirms the independence, reshaping it in a post-westfalian context, and replaced the absence of a national project with the national incorporation in a transnational project. The independence that expansion made possible was structurally precarious, from the Treaty of Metween (1703) to the French invasions (1807-1810) and the British Ultimatum (1890). It is beyond one’s imagination to have the capital of the Empire transferred to the main colony (Brazil) for survival’s sake. In the European Union, the precariousness of independence took another form, subjected to a more genuine pact.

As to the national development project, apparently the European Union released Portugal of a historical burden: under the new conditions created by the European Union, Portugal, where there never was a bourgeois revolution, needed no longer to worry about the negative consequences of such a lack. The 25th of April, which in a way created the political conditions for a national bourgeoisie to flourish, occurred at a moment when the time for national bourgeoisies, as political actors, had gone. The Portuguese bourgeoisie that did support the 25th of April was the internationalized bourgeoisie and had no power to stop the nationalizations. When it reconstructed itself, it was even more internationalized and only waiting for the European
Union. In the European Union, Portugal has and will always have businessmen and workers, capital and labor, but she does not have nor will ever have a national bourgeoisie as a coherent, credible and efficacious political actor. This bourgeoisie is torn between a fully internationalized sector, for which the Portuguese state is too small to do more than facilitate the large investments and mitigate taxing and social benefits expenses; and a national sector for which the Portuguese state is too large to be politically manipulated, no other means of manipulation remaining but small and medium corruption and fiscal evasion.\textsuperscript{60}

The signs of ongoing changes point to some disturbing parallelisms to what happened at the great moment of rejection. I highlight two of them. In both, the incorporation of Portugal in a transnational project of capitalist development is at stake. At the moment of rejection, it was the European colonial project; at the moment of acceptance, it was the project of European integration, which presupposes the elimination of the colonial zone and, hence, neocolonialism. In both moments, the successful integration in the transnational presupposes the existence of a national project of incorporation and the economic and political capacity to carry it out. As we saw, that did not exist at the moment of rejection, and António Ennes lived that lack more painfully than anybody else. As a consequence, Portugal was unable to colonize her colonies efficiently and take from there the profit anticipated by colonialist Europe. Likewise, at the moment of acceptance, Portugal did not decolonize in the European way (that is, the British way), meaning that the independence of the Portuguese colonies occurred in a political context that did not allow for the continuation of the neocolonial tutelage. At any rate, Portugal lacked the economic resources to carry out any effective neocolonial policy. Given her incapacity to manage the continuation of the colonial relation with her former colonies, Portugal decided to forget that she had had colonies. The myth switching I spoke of above—from the myth of expansion to the myth of Europe—is the symbolic mark of this process of concealment. It is significant that the two principal moments or processes of independence in the Portuguese imperial cycle occurred alongside profound political changes in the Portuguese society: the liberal revolution, in the case of Brazil, and the revolution of the 25th of April, in the case of the African colonies and East Timor. East Timor is actually the country that most dramatically illustrates the Portuguese helplessness at the European neocolonial moment. Portugal was unable to prevent both the unilateral declaration of indepen-
dence by FRETILIN and the subsequent invasion of the country by Indonesia, in spite of being still, according to international law, the administering power. More shockingly, when compared to Africa, Portugal literally fled from Timor.

Following the 25th of April 1974, Portugal turned to Europe as if ashamed of her colonial past and looked suspiciously upon the continuation of any kind of significant relations with the newly independent countries. The positions defending such a continuation—whether neocolonial or post-colonial—were pejoratively considered third-world-like positions. This accounts for two intriguing phenomena. On the one hand, in the process of joining the European Union—and unlike what had happened with France and England—the Portuguese negotiators omitted any mention of the historical responsibility vis-à-vis the new African countries liberated from Portuguese colonialism ten years before. On the other hand, in a few years, Portugal lost her expertise in tropical science and does not have today the critical mass of scholars on African topics, even though she managed to accomplish precisely that as far as European subjects go.

At the time of colonial expansion, Portugal set in motion a process whose movement she could not keep up with, as was demonstrated at the great moment of rejection. Five centuries later, while refounding her Modernity, Portugal enters an ongoing project that has its own course. If neocolonial decolonization was not possible, neither does it seem possible, at least in short- or medium-term, to accomplish the full integration of Portugal in the European Union—meaning the promotion of Portugal from a semiperipheral position to the center of the world system. The ancestral absence of a project for national development, which made Portugal miss the train of the second Modernity and squander the moment of effective colonization, is now reflected in the absence of a national project for integration in the transnational project of the European Union.

Apparently, the European Union represents the end of the multisecular absence of a project. At long last, Portugal is part of a real project that in many respects transcends her present, and has clear objectives and a plan with methods and strategies to attain them. Besides, it is a hegemonic project, that is, a project that stirs up the widest consensus in Portuguese society. The conditions seem therefore to be created for Portugal in a broad sense to stop worrying about Portugal in a restricted sense. I believe, however, that the European project, at least so far, is one more version of the
absence of project. To be sure, joining the European Union changed Portuguese society profoundly, and more often than not, the change was for the better. It seems to me, however, that up until now these changes have been assumed less as part of a project judiciously adopted than as the fortunate result of new routines imposed from the outside. Portugal, it seems, is in the European project, but is not yet a European project. Similarly, Portugal was in the colonies without being an effective colonizer. Now, as then, Portugal is in a place, but outside the hegemonic norm of being there. I do not mean this is a deficit alone. Portugal is not yet the European project perhaps because she welcomes experiences, sociabilities, and cultures that transcend the European project. What is less than Europe may well be more than Europe. Likewise, the fact that she was not an effective colonizer also meant the possibility of weaving noncolonial relations inside the colonial zone. Being short of the colonizer also meant to be beyond the colonizer. This is a way of being that is as intense as it is furtive.

This continuity is clearly expressed in the adventurism that characterizes the way in which the structural and cohesion funds were utilized, in many respects mirroring the adventurism that characterized the way in which the colonies were explored. In the colonies, the Portuguese were almost always adventurers and few times settlers. They explored avidly and greedily the easy and easily available wealth, but rarely did they settle down to value the local natural resources with labor and technology and multiply them in projects of sustainable development, as we would say today. In this regard, some differences between the two Iberian colonizers must be registered. Whereas in Spanish America twenty-three universities were founded between the sixteenth and the nineteenth centuries, the Portuguese colonies had to wait for the nineteenth century, or even for the second half of the twentieth century (as was the case of Mozambique and Angola) to inaugurate their universities, to which only a very small percentage of African students had access.

Concerning the structural and cohesion funds, they were allowed to become easily prey to impune corruption, burying them in cement and concrete rather putting them at the service of the educational, scientific and technological turn that would allow Portugal to take possession of the European project as its own. As a result, Portugal is in the European project more as a guest than as a host. Entrance in the European Union is, to date, one more version of the absence-of-project-turned-into-its-own-project.
For this reason, the absence-of-project-turned-into-its-own-project is what best characterizes the present in-between time, a time of adjustment among palimpsests of historical and symbolic sedimentations. Such absence is made of enormous plasticity that allows for its transfiguration both in stasis and in change. Its two, apparently opposite transfigurations are “routine as realism” and “quixotism.” “Routine as realism” consists of renouncing the changing reality given the impossibility of changing it in a consistent and planned way. The consistent and planned change of reality requires a project; without a project, routine is the best insurance against the uncertain future. It is astonishing how, in the last thirty years, so many ancestral routines have been kept and others have been swiftly created, only cosmetically distinct from the ones that preceded them—in the parliament and newspapers, in the universities and factories, in public office and in the government, in the family and in the streets. Against the project, method, rigor and accountability, the routine is the government of what is known for its own sake, facile letting go. Uncertain routine is a form of accountability hardly distinguishable from unaccountability and impunity.

This kind of pedestrian realism is one of the longest durations of Lusitanian collective existence. It is largely portrayed in the reports of António Ennes and Mouzinho de Albuquerque as well as in all of those people that shared with them the project of the European colonial Prospero. Pedestrian realism, however, does not exist without that other manifestation of the absence of project turned project of itself: quixotism. Quixotism resides in fulgurations, casual interruptions of routines, almost always translated into unbalanced measures or interventions. The process that led to joining the European Union is full of quixotisms: no transition processes were negotiated that might allow for safeguarding the conditions of the Portuguese economy to compete in a much larger market; the specificity of small-holding agriculture was not defended, in spite of its traditional importance in Portugal. More recently at the beginning of the new millennium, there were other eloquent manifestations of quixotism. One of them consisted in the obsession to control the budgetary deficit. Given the weakness of the Portuguese economy, such policy was a quixotic affirmation of exaggerated and unfocused loyalty to the European project, a kind of loyalty that would be rather laughable if the Portuguese economy was host rather than guest of the European project. The result was economic recession and retrogression as regards convergence with the European average. Another manifestation of
quixotism was the enthusiastic support of the then Prime Minister Durão Barroso to the invasion of Iraq against the position of the hard-core European Union, the France-Germany axis. In this case, loyalty fell short but, paradoxically, it revealed the same outsidedness vis-à-vis the European project. A small country with convergence problems, were she to take the European project seriously and make it her own, should have interest in aligning herself with Europe’s hard-core, especially when supported by public opinion. However, the opposite happened. Unable to reconcile herself with her mediocrity, Portugal decided to ride a vaster project than the European Union, the Atlantic Union. As if to take revenge on Europe for being too big for the Portugal dos Pequenitos (kindergarten Portugal), Portugal wanted to show that she is too big for the Europa dos Pequenitos (kindergarten Europe). Too weak for such a grandiose ride, Portugal ended up on the margins of both unions, metaphorically in the Azorean archipelago. Perhaps the performances of António Ennes and Mouzinho de Albuquerque, which were disengaged from a consistent colonial project, prove themselves to be manifestations of quixotism.

In Portugal, swift social change seems to occur under the aegis of structural immobilism, that is to say, under conditions that do not allow for qualitative upgrading—full convergence with the measure of European development. The rhythm of change is determined by external factors: in the eighteenth century, the discovery of mines in Brazil; in the nineteenth century, the independence of Brazil and the Ultimatum; in the last decades, the independence of the African colonies and East Timor and the European structural and cohesion funds.

**Conclusion**

Having emerged as a modern society at the intersection of the European zone and the colonial zone, excelling in circulating symbolically inside and outside each one of them, building throughout the centuries a complex palimpsest of temporalities and inter-identities, the Portuguese society is not easily grasped by conventional analyses. Apparently exposed to less demanding eyes, the Portuguese society is indeed a furtive object of analysis. It offers itself without resistance to very disparate and even contradictory readings, readings that are all plausible to a certain extent. Thus, a reading that is to a certain extent plausible may actually be as arbitrary and as another reading, considered to be implausible. An example might help. One of the most popular readings of
the Portuguese society in recent times is José Gil’s *Portugal, Hoje: o Medo de Existir* [Portugal, Today: the Fear of Existing]. Gil defines Portugal as the country of non-inscription, the country in which nothing happens that may inscribe a mark on history or individual existence, in social life or in the realm of art (15). One of his first examples is the way in which the Revolution of 25 April 1974 dealt with the Estado Novo dictatorship, by contrasting it with what happened in Germany with Nazism. Says Gil:

[…] the 25th of April refused, in a completely different way [than the Germans] to inscribe in the real the forty-eight years of Salazarist authoritarianism. Neither the Pides nor members of the old regime were ever brought to trial. On the contrary, an ample pardon concealed as under a veil the repressive, castrating, humiliating reality whence we came […] Thus were obliterated from consciousnesses the crimes, the culture of fear and mediocre littleness engendered by Salazarism.

(16)

Setting aside the problematic nature of the comparison and the analytical apparatus used to carry it out (psychoanalysis), Gil is clearly right in what he asserts. But does even an endless accumulation of such examples prove that the Portuguese society is a society of non-inscription? I do not think so. First of all, Gil grounds his analysis on a synchronic, nonsystematic comparison with other European countries, as well as a diachronic comparison with Salazar’s Portugal. Now, it has not been demonstrated that the European inscription norm (if such a thing exists) is the only one. Could there be other, more furtive ways of inscription? On the other hand, Gil focuses on Portugal in a restricted sense, the country at the corner of Iberia peninsula, and does not go further back than fascism in his history. This means not only that Portugal in a broad sense is absent from his analysis, but that all the inscription work made by the Portuguese throughout the centuries in the most remote places of the world is absent as well. Or could it be that there was no inscription in the colonial zone?

If we start from the two ideas I identified above, the furtive nature of the multisecular presence of Portuguese society, both in the European and the colonial zone, and the idea of the labyrinthic palimpsest of temporalities and inter-identities that constitutes it, we will feel compelled to search for the inscription in a broader and less conventional manner. Then, I suspect, our harvest will be abundant and surprising.
By way of illustration, let me give an extreme example of furtive inscription. It is remote in space and not at all conventional as to the material upon which it inscribed itself. Melville and Frances Herskovits, two well-known North American anthropologists, are considered the founders of African-American studies, that is, the study of diasporic Africa. This is partly due to the works they published on their famous expedition into the Saramaka maroon people of Suriname, in the late 1920s. The saramaka maroons are descendants of rebel slaves who escaped to the South American rain forest in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and built a vibrant African-American culture and society. The Herskovits interpret their findings as proving the African characteristics of the saramakas. Two of them concern language. The Herskovits report an African word used by the canoeists—mfundu—which they say means “deep.” They also quote a local proverb in which the word buli appears, and which they transcribe according to African phonology as gbuli. These and several other data are used by the American anthropologists to confirm the African roots of the saramakas. However, more recent and far more rigorous studies have proven that, in fact, mfundu comes from the Portuguese fundo and that the phoneme mf not even exists in the saramaka language. It has also been proven that buli comes from Portuguese bulir (to stir up), exactly the meaning it has in the said proverb, which had actually already been registered by a Moravian missionary in 1778. This means that, right in the twentieth century, one of the indicators of the African origins of a people of runaway slaves living in the most remote tropical jungle of the Americas is, after all, a mark of the Portuguese language, inscribed in the everyday life of these peoples since the seventeenth century.

What stronger form of inscription could one imagine? Evidently, this is not the kind of inscription Gil has in mind or chooses to consider relevant. But it seems to me that his option is what needs to be questioned. What prevents the capacity for inscription of the Portuguese from being tested in the everyday life of other peoples’ and not just the everyday life of the Portuguese? What prevents the appropriation (whether voluntary or forced) of the Portuguese culture or language by many other peoples from counting as inscribtion, in spite of the great impact the Portuguese and other peoples that crossed paths with them had on their life and history? And if nothing prevents this, why should the comparison of the Portuguese with other Europeans limit itself to Portugal in a restricted sense? In other words, why
doesn’t Portugal in a broad sense fit into Portugal in a restricted sense? And vice-versa?

This example also shows that, in a society marked by the excess of diagnosis, the most arbitrary reading can be the most convincing one as well. The huge success of José Gil’s book indicates as much. The verisimilitude of his narrative resides in the coincidence between the analytical scale he selects—Iberian Portugal since the Estado Novo—and the way in which Portuguese society is living, since 1974, the great moment of acceptance, the European neocolonial moment. This analytical scale, whose selection is arbitrary in itself, is congenial and obvious because it coincides with the perception of the Portuguese that, as condition of their European acceptance, they need to forget all they were (and supposedly no longer are) outside the European zone. This includes, of course, Portugal’s more long lasting and disperse contacts with more peoples and cultures than any other European country ever had. Actually, the Portugal that wishes to believe that she only exists as Portugal in a restricted sense would deem it arbitrary that Portugal in a broad sense be included in the analysis. Hence, arbitrariness turns out to be convincing. The fact that Gil’s analysis is so negative regarding the Portuguese did not interfere with the appeal it did have for them. The important and most reassuring thing about this reading is that it compares the Portuguese of today with the Europeans of today, and subjects them all, in equal terms, to the European norm of inscription. Subliminally, what José Gil says to the Portuguese contradicts what he says about the Portuguese.

It is not easy, therefore, to fully account for interactions that are so prolonged in time and so dispersed in space, between the European zone and the colonial zone, and involving such complex problems that affected all the people that took part in them. All the more difficult the task, indeed, because no hegemonic country in the world system was ever involved in these interactions and marks—Portugal was a semiperipheral country throughout this period—and so the processes and sociabilities in which they translated themselves occurred always regardless of the hegemonic norms of interacting and marking. Since modern history was written on the basis of these norms, no wonder the narratives dealing with the interactions and marks in what we designate today as the space of official Portuguese language (espaço de língua oficial portuguesa) are not adequately identified and evaluated.
A telling example of this inadequacy is the mainstream analysis of the final moment of the colonial zone in this space: decolonization. According to dominant discourse in Europe and Portugal, and actually also present in the new African countries, decolonization was a failure because Portugal did not prepare her exit from the colonies, having rather abandoned them rashly, and leaving them in the worst possible conditions for them to be able to enjoy fully what they had just conquered: independence. There is some truth in this discourse, but it does conceal the fact that, in the conditions of the European neocolonial moment, good decolonization would have to be neocolonization, that is say, a kind of decolonization that would insure the continuity of the subordination of the new independent countries. Once the continuity was interrupted, new possibilities of alternative development for these countries were created, precisely developments other than neocolonialism. It is no accident that every African country liberated from Portuguese colonialism adopted anticapitalist and socialist models of development. That is to say, the absence of a neocolonial burden created a new freedom to choose the future. The fact that these experiences failed is not relevant for my argument. What is relevant is that they took place. As a matter of fact, during this period, the second half of the 1970s, we witness one more manifestation of the complex relations and unsuspected complicities and identity exchanges between colonizer and colonized, between Prospero and Caliban, in this colonial zone. Portugal went through a period of socialist development, at the same time as her former colonies, even if for a shorter period. Its failure, as in the new African countries, was largely due to internal mistakes, but the global capitalist pressures in action to suffocate the Portuguese socialist moment were the same that suffocated the socialist experiments in Africa. The first IMF agreement with Portugal dates from 1978 and the one with Mozambique from 1984.

The furtive, transgressive (because nonhegemonic) nature of these experiences makes it difficult to identify them and even more so to interpret them adequately. How can it be argued, for example, that Portuguese colonialism was simultaneously less than colonialism and more than colonialism? That there were several colonialisms and several noncolonialisms inside the colonial zone? Is it possible to identify noncolonial sociabilities inside the colonial zone? Degrees of coloniality? What analytical, political, and cultural consequences are to be drawn from possible affirmative answers? Can mere opportunism explain the fact that so many African-born people felt
and declared themselves to be Portuguese at the time of independence and decided to establish their residence in Portugal? Once in Portugal, was their surprise at not being accepted as such not genuine?

These difficulties affect today the analysis of the different societies that were involved in this time-space, as well as the analysis of the relations among them. For instance, how does one define postcolonialism in this time-space and how can it be given a progressive content? Can it be argued, for example, that the specificities of Portuguese colonialism somehow hinder the emergence of the postcolonial moment? Current fierce discussions in Brazil about quotas and affirmative action policies seem to indicate that it took almost two centuries for Brazil to go from the independence moment to the postcolonial moment. The fact that the racism typical of Portuguese colonialism is very different from that of British colonialism—unlike the latter, it did not translate itself, in general, into segregation laws, and when it did, the laws were frequently violated or ignored—made it more difficult to acknowledge the reality of racism and to turn it into a political question.67

But, on the other hand, this time-space of official Portuguese language seems to open unsuspected possibilities for postcolonial practices. To let them bear fruit, we must have to find a different way of writing the history of this time-space. Between the two extremes that have prevailed—to follow Eurocentric hegemonic history blindly or to deny it completely—a third way is possible: to liberate history, to conceive of tradition in a non-traditional manner, in other words, to transform history in a field of realistic utopias. Three examples to illustrate the possibilities that emerge. Mozambique, a founding member of the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries (CPLP), decided a little later to join the Anglophone Commonwealth, and has just joined the Francophone community. Furthermore, Mozambique become a member of the world organization of Islamic countries, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (Organização da Conferência Islâmica). Such a manifestation of freedom of affiliation is difficult to imagine in any other postcolonial space but the lusophone one. The second example, linked to this one, is the reiterated inefficiency of the CPLP. In light of the dominant neocolonial European norm, such inoperativeness is deemed a collective failure, Portugal being the major culprit. Is this correct? The truth is that such communities were created to institutionalize neocolonialism and, in the present context, they are meaningless
without it. In the space of official Portuguese language, such an institution should have a different profile and a different kind of mission. For example, to bring the new African countries to assist Portugal in decolonizing herself, and perhaps also to assist Brazil, a country that often assumes, in the lusophone space, the historical mission of taking the place of the absent or weak colonizer. As I said, only recently has Brazil started to face her internal colonialism and her total ignorance concerning her African roots.

If postcolonialism is a political and analytical perspective that conceives of the victims of colonialism not as passive victims but as fields of resistance, as historical agents in their own right, capable of non-derivative epistemologies, cultures and identities, new politics and cultures—then the lusophone time-space offers unique opportunities.

A third, even more disconcerting example of furtive, unexpected postcolonial practices is the work on identity currently taking place in Goa. Goa, the territory that suffered the longest period of effective colonization of the modern era, was the only colony that earned independence through integration in a vaster geopolitical space, the Indian state. Today, more than four decades later, there is in Goa an important cultural and artistic movement that aims to retrieve Portuguese and European influences in order to ground, on that basis, its autonomous identity in India as a whole. It is a postcolonial affirmation that occurs outside the lusophone space but cannot be understood without it. And is it a postcolonial affirmation before the old colonizer? Or before India, through which she liberated herself from the colonial yoke? It is not possible to answer these questions with the analytical tools that mainstream, anglosaxon postcolonialism provides.

The problem of the diagnosis and the problem of the past that haunt Portugal, and probably the countries that were subjected to Portuguese colonialism, derive from the fact that the experiences of intersection of the European zone with the colonial zone, as well as the palimpsests of times and spaces that consolidated them, occurred here outside the hegemonic norms of the second, capitalist, colonial, European Modernity. As I have been proposing in other contexts (Santos, “A Critique of the Lazy Reason” and A Gramática do Tempo), only a sociology of absences would allow to make present these experiences—for what they are, and not just, as has happened so far, for what they are not, for their enabling capacity and not for their paralyzing or diminishing effect. This sociology of absences may be possible now that the second Modernity is falling apart and new pasts seem to open up to new futures.
Notes

1 A first version of this paper was presented at the American Portuguese Studies Association’s Bi-annual Conference held in Minneapolis, MN on 5-7 October 2006. Part of the research for this paper was conducted in collaboration with Maria Paula Meneses. I benefited from the precious research assistance of Margarida Gomes. Maria Irene Ramalho made many insightful comments and helped prepare the English version.

2 The possible exception here is Germany, a core country whose recent past is today still problematic to the Germans themselves and their neighbors.

3 To inquire about the postcolonial meaning implies asking to what extent, in the countries freed from colonialism, did colonialism remain in place as a form of social domination, not only in regard to relations with the old colonizing power, but also and mainly with regards to internal relations among different groups and social classes, and between citizens and the State.

4 I mean here the Western European protoganizing expansion. In its broader sense (including central and eastern Europe), the European zone had its own internal colonial zone.

5 These categories concern the dominant social representations, hence they do not account for the fact that Portugal in a broad sense included vast populations that were not Portuguese, did not want to be Portuguese or were rejected and relegated to subaltern positions, if they ever wished to take advantage of the benefits of Portuguese citizenship.

6 In the colonial context, strong presence may mean settlers’ colonialism, effective military occupation, or intense reproduction of “little Europes” in Edward Said’s sense.

7 With the independence of the former Portuguese colonies, Portuguese citizenship became quite difficult to obtain by those born in the colonies (whose parents, grandparents, or great-grandparents had not been born in Portugal) and who had not been living for more than five years in Portugal prior to 1974. Only in a few exceptional situations (e.g., veterans of the Portuguese colonial army or former civil servants in the colonial administration) could Africans apply successfully for Portuguese citizenship. This explains, in part, the explosion of “African migrants” in Portugal after 1974.

8 Estado Novo is the name by which the regime, institutionalized by the 1933 Constitution, identified itself. Even though it had similarities with the Italian fascism of Benito Mussolini (lack of fundamental freedoms, single-party, authoritarianism, repression of opposition, hypernationalism, and colonialism), the Estado Novo never considered itself a fascist state.

9 Portugal remained under political dictatorship from 1926 until 1974.

10 Founder and main ideologue of the Estado Novo, the longest dictatorship in twentieth-century western Europe. Salazar was born in Santa Comba Dão, of a poor peasant family abiding by strict Catholic tenets. He attended the seminary but soon abandoned the clerical career to enroll in the University of Coimbra’s Law School where he taught from 1917 until 1926. For a mere 13 days, he was Minister of Finance in the Cabinet resulting from the military coup of 28 May 1926, which toppled the First Republic. Back in Coimbra, Salazar resumed his teaching position, only to be summoned once again by the government to help solve the serious financial crisis affecting the country. Thus, Salazar emerged as a kind of providential savior. He accepted the job but with certain conditions. Soon he was not just controlling financial policy but all of the government’s policies. In 1932, Salazar became Prime Minister. He fiercely suppressed all forms of opposition or liberalization and never yielded to the pressure either of the movements for the liberation of the colonies or of the United Nations’s insistence that Portugal join other European countries that were putting an end to their empire. When illness disabled him in 1968, Salazar was replaced by Marcelo Caetano. Salazar died in 1970, convinced that
he was still in power. The awe he inspired prevented his ministers from telling him the news of his resignation.

11 António Cerejeira (1888-1976) best represents the Catholic Church in the Estado Novo: conservative, retrograde, obscurantist. Cerejeira attended the University of Coimbra, where he was also to teach for a while. A priest, he strongly opposed the First Republic for its lay nature. In order to fight the Republic, he reactivated the Centro Académico de Democracia Cristã, where Salazar became his closest collaborator. After Salazar established the Estado Novo, Cerejeira, as Patriarch Cardinal of Lisbon, became responsible for the alliance between the Catholic Church and Salazar’s dictatorship, which found in the Church its main instrument of ideological legitimation.

12 The International Police for State Defense (formerly PVDE) was created in 1945 to protect the regime against all opposition. The PIDE had ample means at its disposal to reach its ends, including a vast network of informants all over the country and interception of mail and phone calls. Thousands of opponents were sent to prison, often without trial. Caxias, Peniche, Tarrafal are some of those prisons, where political dissenters were subjected to all kinds of abuse and torture. The PIDE instilled a climate of fear and mistrust, which, to a certain extent, still pervades Portuguese society today.

13 In 1955, when Portugal joined the UN, the organization recommended that the Portuguese government promote the independence of its colonies. The recommendation was not accepted. To circumvent the situation, the regime declared the colonies “overseas provinces” and gave citizenship to its inhabitants. This measure was internationally reproved by the UN General Assembly.

14 Rigid control by the government of all information and means of communication. In place since 1926, preventive censorship was regulated in 1933 under the aegis of the Ministry for Internal Affairs. In 1940, the Censorship Services fell under the control of the Prime Minister and were later integrated into a vaster structure, the SNI (Secretariado Nacional de Informação, Cultura Popular e Turismo [National Secretariat of Information, Popular Culture and Tourism]), which controlled the press, books, theater, radio, cinema and later television (introduced in Portugal in 1957). Its levels of control were wide and varied, including political, social, and moral issues. It blocked socialist or communist ideas or any movement against the government, and kept the population in total ignorance of what was really going on in the country and in the world, thus preventing the formation of a minimally enlightened public opinion.

15 Political organization supporting the Estado Novo, on which it depended politically and financially. It was the only legal political party in Portugal, since the Estado Novo pronounced all other parties illegal. When he replaced Salazar, Marcelo Caetano substituted Acção Nacional Popular for União Nacional.

16 The colonial war (1961-74) was the outcome of a series of factors. Among them: immobilism of the Estado Novo vis-à-vis the colonial question (whether after World War II, or after the Bandung Conference in 1955, or particularly after the beginning of the African independences in the late 1950s); incapacity for dialogue in the face of the appeals for negotiation on the part of the liberation movements in the various colonies; international support of various provinces given to the liberation movements and the creation in the newly independent countries bordering the Portuguese colonies of rearguards to unleash a prolonged guerrilla fight. The colonial war began in Angola in 1961, spread to Guinea in 1963, and to Mozambique in 1964. The war, understood by Salazar as a “patriotic design,” was the beginning of the end of the regime. The State finances were deeply affected, undermining the Armed Forces, while Portugal became increasingly more isolated in the international political scene. On the human level, there were tragic consequences for both sides. On the Portuguese side alone: 9,000 dead, approximately 30,000 wounded, and 140,000 former combatants suf-
ferring from various types of post-combat trauma. The conflict reached resolution by political means only after 1974.

17 Saudade, characterized by a persistent melancholic and pessimist essence that is an essential trait of the Portuguese collective psyche, is considered by some Portuguese intellectuals a national myth. In spite of its many metamorphoses in the course of centuries, saudade continues to be the leitmotiv of a large part of the national artistic, philosophical, and literary production. Some consider it an apt description of the Portuguese people: meditative, more prone to meditation than to action, more the victim than maker of destiny.

18 Fate, Football [Soccer] and [Our Lady of] Fatima is the alliterative acronym defining the society’s imaginary under the dictatorship. The national song, the sport-of-sports, and the place of the miracle constitute the perfect trilogy for a fatalist, oblivious, atavic, and credulous people. It functions simultaneously as powerful factor of alienation from the actual national problems, and as an excuse for the impossibility of solving them.

19 Expression used by Salazar in one of his first addresses to the nation. The administration adopted it later as the closing phrase in all correspondence and bureaucratic documents.

20 The successor of Salazar, Marcelo Caetano (1906-1980) was responsible for the late dictatorship, which failed its own attempts to reform. A politician of ultraconservative, integrist background, Marcelo Caetano was a law professor at the University of Lisbon. From 1940 onwards, he occupied some of the highest positions in Salazar’s administration: National Commissar of the Portuguese Youth; Minister of the Colonies, and President of the Corporative Chamber. Marcelo Caetano was Portugal’s Prime Minister in 1974, when the Revolution took place. He was in exile in Brazil when he died.

21 The National Feminine Movement (MNF) was an organization founded in 1961 (symbolically on 28 April, Salazar’s birthday). It presented itself officially as “an association independent from the State, not political, just patriotic.” Its objective was to “congregate all Portuguese women interested in providing moral and material support to those fighting for the integrity of our country’s territory”—as put by its founder, Cecília Supico Pinto (wife of the then president of the Corporative Chamber). The National Feminine Movement was rather one more front of propaganda, mobilization and support for the colonial war. It promoted national fund raising and campaigns, such as the “saudade operation,” and created the famous, postage-free aerograms, which for many families were a fast and inexpensive means of communication with the deployed soldiers. It actually interfered with the military sphere by demanding more air transportation to evacuate the wounded.

Its popularity among women (more than 80,000 in 22 sections) was not due to a clear political and ideological allegiance, but rather to an instinctive sense of solidarity and humanism, which the regime knew how to exploit. The opposition, however, was quick to denounce the classist nature and the controversial altruistic sense of the ladies of the high bourgeoisie, who, after having managed to keep their sons out of the war, engaged in patronizing those who were compelled to fight in it. Besides the MNF, who had the same unspoken links to the State, there were the “War Godmothers” (see note 34) and the Portuguese Red Cross.

22 Salazar’s complete sentence is: “Country of mild manners and morigerate habits.” It is part of an image of Portugal painstakingly constructed by the dictator and reproduced by the ideological system: a rural country, sheltered from civilizational madness, humble but happy in its current aerea mediocritas, which was compensated for by past glories.

23 While the international community was promoting decolonization in Africa, Salazar insisted in his colonialist policy, isolating and dragging Portugal into cultural and economic backwardness, by waging a colonial war under the motto “Orgulhosamente sós.”

24 In 1938, the National Secretariat for Information, Popular Culture and Tourism (SNI) launched a contest to choose the most traditional Portuguese village, according to the regime’s immobile and conservative vision. António Ferro, a higher officer of SNI wrote at the time:
“These people live happily, praying and dancing and singing, giving lessons of optimism to the cities (...) Their needs are many, but with eyes full of stars and the heart full of songs, they consider themselves happy, because they feel closer to heaven than ever.” The first prize went to the village of Monsanto (Beira Baixa), where the weathercock on the Lucano Tower still marks the event.

25 Symbolic trilogy and pillar of the ideological construction enforced by Salazarism. It was the slogan and program of an intensely conservative, ruralist, nationalist, and Catholic politics. The original maxim as expressed by Salazar in 1914 included Order and Love but the trilogy became the classic formula. Authority, hierarchy, morality, social peace, and austerity completed the pattern of values of public and private life, which Salazar claimed were not imposed but rather proper of the Portuguese character.

26 A paramilitary organization of the Portuguese youth. Inspired by Hitler’s youth movements and Italian fascism, it was created by decree in 1936 (the women’s section was created two years later). Enrollment was mandatory for all “youth, whether attending school or not.” Its aim was to “encourage the overall development of the youth’s physical capacity, contribute to character formation and devotion to the Homeland, under the sense of order, appreciation of discipline and respect for military duty.”

27 An anthem created in 1961 at the onset of the colonial war in Angola. Originally destined for the Armed Forces, sent by Salazar “to Angola immediately in a show of strength,” the anthem was sung not only in military contexts, but also at various official ceremonies and institutions, such as schools, both in Portugal and in the colonies. It was also widely broadcast by all radio stations: “Angola is ours, is my cry / it is the flesh and blood of our people / to liberate, to defend, to fight until we die...”

28 The idealized image of woman under Salazarism. The regime made every effort to keep women in their traditional roles as mothers and housewives, basically submissive vis-à-vis their husbands. The law itself sanctioned the inequality on the basis of “nature and the welfare of the family.” The propaganda, in its turn, disguised the real inferiority by exalting the feminine virtues as guarantor of the purity of family morality, the basis and model for all of society.

29 Designation given to Marcelo Caetano’s regular television interventions, ostensibly to “inform the Nation” and comment on the country’s political situation. Clearly inspired by Franklin D. Roosevelt’s fireside chats.

30 One of the most famous songs worldwide, sung by some of the most popular singers in many different versions. When it was created in 1947, it referred only to Coimbra, the city of students, love and its magic, but it soon became an icon of Portugal as the country of everlasting spring. It was cleverly used by the propaganda, both for tourism and to convey an image of peace and social tranquility.

31 Title and first line of a poem by Pedro Homem de Melo, poet of folk themes, allegedly close to the regime. Focusing on the subject matter, so dear to the regime, of the Portuguese rural people, poor but with a rich soul, the poem was popularized by the fado singer, Amália Rodrigues, and became one of her most emblematic fados and one of her most successful, nationally and internationally.

32 Traditional forms of homework used in schools for language learning during the Estado Novo. Nowadays, some teachers speak of dictation and copying as signifying dictatorship and to composition as signifying democracy.

33 Age-old appellation, widely used during the Estado Novo, to designate the thousands of young women who served as domestic help in family households in exchange for a meager wage and/or accommodation. They were the victims of all kinds of arbitrariness and abuse in a society of “public virtues and private vices.” After 25 April, a union was created, the government established a minimum wage, and met the union’s demand for retirement and welfare rights. The new designation became then “domestic help.”
34 Madrinhos de Guerra ("War Godmothers") is a concept that dates from World War I. It gained prominence during the Portuguese Colonial War (1961-1974) as part of the National Feminine Movement. Its objective was to give social, economic, and particularly moral support to the soldiers in Africa. The aim was to make women participate in the war effort. Among the requirements to join this silent army were: "proper morals, a patriotic spirit, courage, capacity for sacrifice, faith in the victory and the ability to convey it."

35 The reference is to the Revolution of 25 April 1974, also known as the Carnation Revolution, which put an end to 48 years of dictatorship. The revolution was conceived, planned, and carried out by a group of officers unhappy with the regime and the military situation resulting from the colonial war. These military, mostly captains, constituted what they called the Movement of the Armed Forces (Movimento das Forças Armadas [MFA]). Very early in the morning of 25 April, they took the main strategic points of the capital. In the afternoon, Prime Minister Marcelo Caetano surrendered in the Quartel do Carmo, under siege by the tanks of captain Salgueiro Maia. The population cheered the MFA enthusiastically and endorsed its famous political program: “Decolonize, Democratize, Develop.” What started out by being a military coup quickly turned into a popular revolution, considered to be one of the most peaceful in history.

36 Zeca Afonso (1929-1987) was one of the most important singers and composers of so-called Portuguese intervention (protest) music. His songs in the 1960s and 1970s contributed to the formation of a public consciousness critical of Salazarism and encouraged the struggle against the dictatorship. Zeca Afonso was a multifaceted composer. His repertoire includes Coimbra ballads and traditional music, as well as music composed for the theater. His work combines a mobilizing, transforming appeal with high artistic quality. Truly a bard or troubadour of his time, he is a symbol of insubmission and utopia. His song "Grândola Vila Morena" was one of the passwords used by the MFA and later became an anthem of the Revolution.

37 The phrase refers to the specific educational movement that deeply changed the school system after 25 April 1974. Distancing itself from traditionalist, dirigiste, and authoritarian conceptions, the new school endorses the following principles: the right of all to education, the democratic governance of schools, a new relationship between teacher and pupil and radical change in syllabi.

38 Mário Soares (1924-) is one of the most distinguished Portuguese politicians of the twentieth century, unquestionably the best known worldwide and the only one still alive of the three politicians that deeply marked Portuguese political life following 25 April 1974 (the other two were Álvaro Cunhal and Francisco de Sá Carneiro). Mário Soares holds degrees in History and Philosophy (1951) and Law (1957) from the University of Lisbon. An opponent of the regime from a very young age, Mário Soares took part in the political campaigns of Norton de Matos and Humberto Delgado, and ran for parliament on the opposition ticket in 1961 and 1969. He was arrested by the PIDE several times and was deported to S. Tomé. As a lawyer, he defended many political opponents of the regime. In 1971, he went into exile in Paris. In 1973, he co-founded the Socialist Party and became its uncontested leader after his return to Portugal immediately after the Revolution. He was a member the first four provisional governments (1974-1978) and was Prime Minister in 1976-1978 and again in 1983-1985. In 1977 and 1985 he negotiated Portugal’s entry in the EU. He was President of the Republic for two terms (1986-1996), and was a member of the European Parliament from 1999 to 2004. He is a permanent member of the Portuguese Council of State, and the President of the Mário Soares Foundation.

39 The title of a song by Rui Veloso which had great success in the early 1980s. It marked a significant change in Portuguese urban music and became one of the first hits of so-called Portuguese Rock.
40 Maria de Lurdes Pintasilgo (1930-2004), a salient public figure after the Revolution, she was a progressive Catholic and a feminist. She was the first (and only) woman to become Prime Minister of Portugal (1979-1980) and the second of any European country. She graduated in Chemical Engineering in 1953, was President of Pax Romana (International Movement of Catholic Students, 1956-1958), and a national and international leader of Graal (a catholic lay organization). She served as Minister of Social Affairs during the second and third provisional governments, ambassador to UNESCO (1976-1979), a candidate to the presidency of the Republic (1986), and deputy to the European Parliament (1987-1989). She was a member of various international organizations devoted to the Third World, social and cultural development, civic participation, and political intervention. She also became known for defending women’s active role in promoting a culture of solidarity and peace.

41 The democratic counterpart of the Portuguese World Exposition, which took place in 1940 to celebrate the double centenary of the foundation of the country (1140) and of the “Restauração” (1640, the independence after a period under Spanish rule [1580-1640]) and was the most important political and cultural event of the Estado Novo. In 1998, the government organized the Lisbon World Exposition, a major event aimed at enhancing the democratic regime and promoting national self-esteem. The objective of the Expo, whose theme was “encounters of cultures,” was meant to symbolically put an end to the historical cycle of expansion and colonialism and initiate a new era of ecumenical openness to the world. However, the ambitious and very polemical cultural, artistic, and technological program became rather an exorcism than a real encounter with the other, in addition to an encounter of the Portuguese with themselves.

42 One the most respected and productive contemporary Portuguese architects, Siza Vieira gained international renown and acclaim through works such as the restoration of the Campo di Marte in Venice (1985) and the coordination of the Schildersveijk Zone Five Renovation Plan in the Hague (1984-1988). After the Revolution, Siza participated, along with several other well-known Portuguese architects, in the SAAL project, an important project of social architecture. In his works, Siza Vieira utilizes traditional materials in communication with the organic space itself, and resorts to light materials like glass.

43 Accommodations for tourists in renovated old family houses having architectural and artistic interest, and typical of a certain era. This alternative to mass tourism emerged in the 1980s and is being encouraged as a significant source of income. It offers guests an opportunity to revisit the cultural and gastronomical practices of rural communities as well as partake in their traditions.

44 The State’s Attorney General.

45 In this section I draw heavily on Santos and Meneses (2006).

46 The famous epic poem by the Portuguese poet Luís de Camões (1572) glorifying the Portuguese leading role in the European expansion of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

47 A dialogue published in 1590 in which Diogo de Couto (1542-1616) shows the mediocre and often corrupt practices of Portuguese colonial authorities.

48 On this subject, see also Pereira, Coxito, Martins and Doyle.

49 About specifically selling Mozambique, see Almeida.

50 Portugal was not even invited to attend an earlier conference, promoted by Belgium and Germany.

51 In a previous paper (“Between Prospero and Caliban”), I used Shakespeare’s characters in The Tempest—Prospero and Caliban—as the metaphors of the colonial encounter between the “civilized” colonizer and the “barbarian” colonized.

52 Terreiro do Paço stands as a metaphor of the colonial political and administrative center in Lisbon.
This homage did not include some of the most precious military elements during this war, the indigenous soldiers from Angola, usually referred to as “angolas.”

The campaigns were carried out throughout the country. For example, in Zambezia, in 1869, 1871-1875 and 1888; against the Namarrais, in Nampula, in 1896-1897; in Barué, in 1902 and again in 1917-1918; against Sangage, in 1912; and against the Makonde people, in 1919.

The capital of Mozambique was then on the Island of Mozambique. At the very end of the nineteenth century it was transferred to Lourenço Marques.

The Lourenço Marques district was then a small appendix of the colonial territory, separated from the closest Portuguese possession—Inhambane—by the Gaza state (then claimed by Portugal as a vassal).

“Tú já não és um régulo dos mangonis, és um matonga, como qualquer outro.”

Ngungunyane, together with some close members of the ruling elite, was sent into exile to the Azores where he died in 1906.


There are many compilacies between the two sectors, and so the strategies of the latter serve well those of the former, even though the former distances itself formally from them.

FRETILIN—Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente (“Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor”)—was a resistance movement that fought for the independence of East Timor, first from Portugal (until 1974) and then from Indonesia (between 1975 and 1998). After East Timor gained its independence from Indonesia, FRETILIN became one of several parties competing for power in a multi-party system.

These were funds designed to help less-developed countries (such as Portugal, Spain, Greece and Ireland), as they joined the European Union, to speed up their convergence toward the “European average.”

Europe is now trying to reinvent family agriculture after it was destroyed in Portugal in a decade of “common agriculture policy.”

This explains why, in this regard, the loyalty to the European project was superior to that of two founding members, France and Germany.

In this case, as with several other publications, Gil uses several quite questionable comparisons. For example, see what Hannah Arendt wrote about post-nazi Germany: “There has been much discussion of the widespread tendency in Germany to act as though the years from 1933 to 1945 never existed; as though this part of German and European and thus world history could be expunged from the textbooks; as though everything depended on forgetting the ‘negative’ aspect of the past and reducing horror to sentimentality. (The world-wide success of The Diary of Anne Frank shows clear proof that such tendencies were not confined to Germany). It was a grotesque state of affairs when German young people were not allowed to learn the facts that every school child a few miles away could not help knowing. Behind all this there was, of course, genuine perplexity. And this very incapacity to face the reality of the past might possibly have been a direct heritage of the inner emigration, as it was undoubtedly to a considerable extent, and even more directly, a consequence of the Hitler regime” (19). Is this different from what Gil claims to be the Portuguese case?

The same is true of Kiswahili, or Swahili, a language spoken in Eastern Africa. Promoted as a symbol of African identity, Kiswahili has a very strong component of Portuguese wording at its roots. For example, the piece of cloth that women wear daily—leso—is of Portuguese origin (from “lenço”).
The “Estatuto do Indigenato,” a segregation law applying to the native Africans of Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau was abolished, at least formally, in 1961.

Works Cited

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