

The University, State, and Market
*The Political Economy of Globalization
in the Americas*

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CHAPTER THREE

The University in the 21st Century:**Toward a Democratic and Emancipatory University Reform¹***Boaventura de Sousa Santos*

More than a decade ago, I published a brief essay about the university, its crises, and the challenges that it faced at the end of the 20th century (Santos 1994). The essay was titled "From the Idea of the University to the University of Ideas," and it was published in my book *Pela Mão de Alice: O Social e o Político na Pós-Modernidade*. In this essay I identified three crises facing the university. First, the crisis of hegemony was the result of contradictions between the traditional functions of the university and those that had come to be attributed to it throughout the 20th century. On the one hand, the production of high culture, critical thinking, and exemplary scientific and humanistic knowledge, necessary for the training of elites, had been the concern of the university since the European Middle Ages. On the other hand, the production of average cultural standards and instrumental knowledge was seen as useful for training the qualified labor force demanded by capitalist development. The university's inability to fully carry out contradictory functions led the state and its economic agents to look beyond it for alternative means to attain these objectives. When it stopped being the only in-

stitution of higher education and research production, the university entered a crisis of hegemony. The second crisis was a crisis of legitimacy, provoked by the fact that the university ceased to be a consensual institution in view of the contradiction between the elevation of specialized knowledge through restrictions of access and credentialing of competencies on the one hand and the social and political demands for a democratized university and equal opportunity for the children of the working class on the other hand. Finally, the institutional crisis was the result of the contradiction between the demand for autonomy in the definition of the university's values and objectives and the growing pressure to hold it to the same criteria of efficiency, productivity, and social responsibility that private enterprises face.

In that essay I analyzed in some detail each one of the three crises and the way that they were managed by the university, especially in the central countries. My analysis was centered on public universities. I showed that the university, unable to solve its crises and relying on its long institutional memory and the ambiguities of its administrative profile, tended to manage crises formulaically to avoid their growing out of control. This pattern of action depended on external pressures (it was reactive), incorporated more or less acritically external social and institutional logics (it was dependent), and was blind to medium- or long-range perspectives (it was immediatist).

What has happened in the past decade? How can we characterize the situation in which we find ourselves? What are possible responses to the problems that the university faces today? In this chapter I try to provide answers to these three questions. In the first part I undertake an analysis of recent transformations in the system of higher education and their impact on the public university. In the second part I identify and justify the basic principles of democratic and emancipatory reform of the public university, that is, a reform that allows the public university to respond creatively and efficiently to the challenges it faces at the outset of the 21st century.

Part 1: Recent Transformations

THE LAST DECADE

The predictions I made more than a decade ago have come to pass, beyond my expectations. Despite the fact that the three crises were intimately con-

nected and could only be confronted jointly and by means of vast reform programs generated both inside and outside the university, I predicted (and feared) that the institutional crisis would come to monopolize reformist agendas and proposals. This is in fact what has happened. I also predicted that concentrating on the institutional crisis would lead to the false resolution of the two other crises, a resolution by default: the crisis of hegemony, by the university's increasing loss of specificity; and the crisis of legitimacy, by the growing segmentation of the university system and the growing devaluation of university diplomas, in general. This has also happened.

Concentrating on the institutional crisis was fatal for the university and was due to a number of factors, some already evident at the beginning of the 1990s and others gaining enormous weight as the decade advanced. The institutional crisis is and has been, for at least two centuries, the weakest link of the public university, because the scientific and pedagogical autonomy of the university is based on its financial dependency on the state. Although the university and its services were an unequivocal public good that was up to the state to ensure, this dependency was not problematic, any more than that of the judicial system, for example, in which the independence of the courts is not lessened by the fact they are being financed by the state. However, contrary to the judicial system, the moment the state decided to reduce its political commitment to the universities and to education in general, converting education into a collective good that, however public, does not have to be exclusively supported by the state, an institutional crisis of the public university automatically followed. If it already existed, it deepened. It can be said that for the last 30 years the university's institutional crisis in many countries was provoked or induced by the loss of priority of the university as a public good and by the consequent financial drought and disinvestment in public universities. The causes and their sequence vary from country to country. In countries that lived under dictatorships for the previous four decades, there were two reasons for the onset of the institutional crisis: (1) to reduce the university's autonomy to the level necessary for the elimination of the free production and diffusion of critical knowledge and (2) to put the university at the service of modernizing authoritarian projects, opening the production of the university-as-public-good to the private sector and forcing the public university to compete under conditions of unfair competition in the emerging market for university services.

In the democratic countries the onset of the crisis was related to this second reason, especially beginning in the 1980s, when neoliberalism was imposed as the global model of capitalism. In countries that made the transition from dictatorship to democracy in this period, the elimination of the first reason (political control of autonomy) was frequently invoked to justify the goodness of the second reason (creation of a market for university services). In these countries the affirmation of the universities' autonomy was on a par with the privatization of higher education and the deepening of the public universities' financial crisis. It was a precarious and deceiving autonomy because it forced the universities to seek new dependencies that were much more burdensome than dependence on the state and because the concession of autonomy was subject to remote controls finely calibrated by the Ministries of Finance and Education. Consequently, in the passage from dictatorship to democracy, unsuspected continuities ran beneath the evident ruptures.

The onset of the institutional crisis by way of the financial crisis, accentuated in the last 20 years, is a structural phenomenon accompanying the public university's loss of priority among the public goods produced by the state. The fact that the financial crisis was the immediate impetus for the institutional crisis does not mean that the causes of the institutional crisis can be reduced to the financial crisis. The analysis of the structural causes will reveal that the prevalence of the institutional crisis was the result of the effects of the two other unsolved crises, the crises of hegemony and of legitimacy. And in this domain there have been new developments in relation to the picture I described at the beginning of the 1990s.

The public university's loss of priority in the state's public policies was, first of all, the result of the general loss of priority of social policies (education, health, social security) induced by the model of economic development known as neoliberalism or neoliberal globalization, which was internationally imposed beginning in the 1980s. In the public university it meant that the university's identified institutional weaknesses—and they were many—instead of serving as justification for a vast politico-pedagogical reform program, were declared insurmountable and were used to justify the generalized opening of the university-as-public-good to commercial exploitation. Despite political declarations to the contrary and some reformist gestures, underlying this first collision of the university with neoliberalism are the ideas

that the public university is not reformable (any more than the state is) and that the true alternative lies in the creation of the university market. The savage and deregulated way in which this market emerged and was developed is proof that there was a deep option in its favor. And the same option explained the disinvestment in the public university and massive transferences of human resources that, at times, looked like a "primitive accumulation" on the part of the private university sector at the cost of the public sector.

I identify two phases in the process of mercantilization of the public university. In the first phase, which began in the early 1980s and ended in the mid 1990s, the national university market expanded and consolidated. In the second phase, along with the national market, the transnational market of higher and university education emerged with great vitality, so much so that, by the end of the 1990s, it was transformed by the World Bank and the World Trade Organization into a global solution for the problems of education. In other words, the neoliberal globalization of the university was under way. This transformation of the university is a new phenomenon. Certainly, the transnationalization of university exchanges is an ancient process, dating back to the medieval European universities (not to mention the early Islamic universities in Africa). After World War II, transnationalization was translated into the training, at the postgraduate level, of students from peripheral or semiperipheral countries in the universities of the central countries and into partnerships between universities from different countries. In recent years, however, such transnational relations have advanced to a new level. The new transnationalization is much vaster than the former one, and its logic is, unlike its predecessor's, exclusively mercantile.

The two defining processes of the decade—the state's disinvestment in the public university and the mercantile globalization of the university—are two sides of the same coin. They are the two pillars of a huge global project of university politics destined to profoundly change the way the university-as-public-good has been produced, transforming it into a vast and vastly profitable ground for educational capitalism. This middle- to long-range project includes different levels and forms of the mercantilization of the university. I deal with the forms later. As for the levels, it is possible to distinguish two. The primary level consists of inducing the public university to overcome the financial crisis by generating its own resources, namely, through partnerships with industrial capital. On this level the public univer-

sity maintains its autonomy and its institutional specificity, privatizing part of the services it renders. The second level consists of the biased elimination of the distinction between public and private universities, transforming the university as a whole into a business, an entity that not only produces for the market but which is itself produced as a market—a market of university services as diverse as administration, teaching programs and materials, certification of degrees, teacher training, and teacher and student evaluation. Whether or not it will still make sense to speak of the university as a public good when this second level is attained is a rhetorical question.

THE DISINVESTMENT OF THE PUBLIC UNIVERSITY

The crisis of the public university as a consequence of disinvestment is a global phenomenon, although its consequences are significantly different at the core, the periphery, and the semiperiphery of the world system. In the central countries the situation is differentiated. In Europe where, with the exception of England, the university system is almost totally public, the public university has had the power to reduce the extent of disinvestment while developing the ability to generate its own income through the market. The success of this strategy depends in good measure on the power of the public university and its political allies to block the significant emergence of the private university market. For instance, in Spain this strategy has so far been more successful than in Portugal. However, it is important to bear in mind that, throughout the 1990s, a private, nonuniversity sector, aimed at the professional job market, emerged in almost every European country. This fact led the universities to respond by structurally modifying their programs and by increasing their variety. In the United States, where private universities occupy the top of the hierarchy, public universities were motivated to seek alternative funding from foundations, in the market, and by raising tuition fees. Today, in some North American public universities, state funding is less than 20 percent of the total budget.

On the periphery, where the search for alternative income in the market is virtually impossible, the crisis attains catastrophic proportions. Obviously, the ills are long-standing, but they have been seriously aggravated in the past decade by the state's financial crisis and the structural adjustment programs. A UNESCO report from 1997 about African universities drew a dramatic

picture of all sorts of shortages: the collapse of infrastructures; an almost total lack of equipment; miserably remunerated, unmotivated, and easily corruptible teaching personnel; and little or no research investment. The World Bank diagnosed the situation in a similar way and, characteristically, declared it irreparable. Unable to include in its calculations the importance of the university in the building of national projects and the creation of long-term critical thinking, the World Bank concluded that African universities do not generate sufficient "return" on their investment. As a consequence, the African countries were asked to stop investing in universities and to concentrate their few resources on primary and secondary education, thus allowing the global market of higher education to resolve the problem of the university for them. This decision had a devastating effect on the universities of the African countries.

The Brazilian case is representative of the attempt to apply the same logic in the semiperiphery (see Chauí 2003). The World Bank's 2002 report on higher education assumes that Brazil is not going to (i.e., it should not) increase the university's public resources and that therefore the solution is in the expansion of the university market combined with the reduction of the cost per student (which, among other things, serves to maintain the pressure on teachers' salaries) and the elimination of free public instruction, as is now beginning to happen in Portugal.

This marketization (or "commercialization") is a global process, and it is on this scale that it should be analyzed. The development of university instruction in the central countries, in the 30 or 40 years after World War II, was based, on the one hand, on the successes of the social struggles for the right to education, which translated into the demand for more democratic access to the university; on the other hand, the development of university instruction was based on the imperatives of an economy that required a more highly qualified workforce in key industrial sectors. The situation changed significantly with the economic crisis that peaked in the mid 1970s. Since then, there has been a growing contradiction between the reduction of public investment in higher education and the intensification of the international economic competition based on the search for technological innovation and hence on the technological and scientific knowledge that makes it possible, as well as on the training of a highly qualified workforce.

As for the demand for a qualified workforce, the 1990s revealed another

contradiction: The growth of the qualified workforce required by an economy based on knowledge coexisted with the explosive growth of very low skilled jobs. The neoliberal globalization of the economy has deepened the segmentation of the labor markets between countries and within countries. At the same time it has allowed both the qualified worker and the unqualified worker *pools* to be recruited globally—the qualified workers predominantly through *brain drain* and *outsourcing* of technically advanced services and the unqualified workers predominantly through businesses delocalizing across the globe and (often clandestine) immigration. The global availability of skilled labor permits the central countries to lower the priority of their investment in public universities, making funding more dependent on market needs. Actually, there is another contradiction in this domain between the rigidity of university training and the volatility of the qualifications required by the market. This contradiction was shaped, on the one hand, by the creation of modular nonuniversity tertiary training systems and, on the other hand, by shortening the periods of university training and making it more flexible. Despite ad hoc solutions, these contradictions became enormously acute in the 1990s and had a disconcerting effect on higher education: The university was gradually transformed from a generator of conditions for competition and success in the market into an object of competition, that is, into a market of university services.

THE TRANSNATIONALIZATION OF THE UNIVERSITY MARKET

The other pillar of the neoliberal project for the university is the transnationalization of the market for university services. As I said, this project is linked but not limited to the reduction in public financing. Other equally decisive factors are the deregulation of commercial exchanges in general, the imposition of the mercantile solution by multilateral financial agencies, and the revolution in information and communication technologies, especially the enormous growth of the Internet, even if a crushing percentage of the electronic flows are concentrated in the North. Because it is a global development, it affects the university-as-public-good in the North as much as in the South, but with different consequences. The inequalities between universities in the North and those in the South are thus enormously exacerbated.

World expenditure on education has grown to \$2 trillion, more than double the world market for automobiles. It is therefore an alluring area with great potential for capital and new areas of valorization. Since the beginning of the 1990s, financial analysts have called attention to education as potentially one of the hottest markets of the 21st century. Merrill Lynch analysts think that the educational sector possesses characteristics similar to those displayed by the health field in the 1970s: a gigantic market, fragmented and unproductive, looking to improve its low technological level, with a tremendous deficiency of professional administration and a low rate of capitalization. The growth of educational capital has been exponential and the rates of return are very high: £1,000 invested in 1996 was worth £3,405 in 2000, a gain of 240 percent, vastly superior to the general growth rate of the London stock market, the FTSE: 65 percent (Hirtt 2003, p. 20). In 2002 the USA-OECD Forum concluded that the global market for education was being transformed into a significant part of the world services market.

With the growing dominance of neoliberal globalization in mind, the following ideas are likely to guide the future expansion of the educational market:

1. We live in an information society. The administration, quality, and speed of information are essential to economic competition. Information and communication technologies, which depend on a qualified workforce, share the characteristic of not only contributing to increased productivity but also serving as incubators of new services, particularly in the field of education.
2. The economy based on knowledge demands more human capital as a condition for informational creativity and the efficient growth of the service economy. The higher the skills level of human capital employed, the greater the ability to transfer cognitive capacities and aptitudes in the constant processes of recycling and innovation expected by the new economy.
3. To survive, universities have to be at the service of these two master ideas: information society and knowledge-based economy. For that, they must undergo internal transformation, by means of information and communication technologies and the new kinds of institutional

- management and by means of relations among knowledge workers and between suppliers and users or consumers of technological knowledge.
4. None of this is possible if the present institutional and politico-pedagogical paradigm dominating public universities remains in place. This paradigm does not allow for relations between the relevant publics to be mercantile relations; for efficiency, quality, and educational responsibility to be defined in terms of the market; for technological mediation (based on the production and consumption of material and immaterial objects) to become commonplace in professor-student relations; for the university to be open and vulnerable to pressure from its "clients"; for competition between "instructional operators" to be the stimulus for flexibility and adaptability to the expectations of employers; or for selectivity in the search for niches of consumption (i.e., student recruitment) to be the highest return on the capital invested.
 5. To confront this, the university's current institutional paradigm must be replaced by an entrepreneurial paradigm to which both public and private universities would be subjected, and the educational market in which they are involved must be designed globally to maximize profitability. The favoritism bestowed on the private universities stems from their being able to adapt much more easily to the new conditions and imperatives.

The preceding items are the ideas that govern the educational reforms proposed by the World Bank and, more recently, the idea of its conversion into a knowledge bank (Mehta 2001). They are also the ideas that structure the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) in the area of education currently under negotiation in the World Trade Organization, which I will discuss later. The World Bank's position in the area of education is perhaps one of the most ideological that it has assumed in the last decade (and there have been many), because, being an area in which nonmercantile interactions are still dominant, investments cannot be based merely on technical language, as can those imposed by structural adjustment. Ideological inculcation is served by analyses that are systematically twisted against public education to demonstrate that education is potentially a commodity like any other and that its conversion into an educational commodity is evidence

of the superiority of capitalism as an organizer of social relations and of the superiority of neoliberal economic principles as the driving force of capitalism through mercantilization, privatization, deregulation, liberalization, and globalization.

The reformist zeal of the World Bank reverberates wherever it identifies the weaknesses of the public university, the power held by the faculty being one of its main targets. Academic freedom is seen as an obstacle to the responsibility of the entrepreneurial university vis-à-vis firms that wish to enlist its services. The power of the university must be wrested from the faculty and given to administrators trained to promote partnerships with private agents. What is more, the World Bank foresees that the power of the faculty and the centrality of the classroom will inexorably decline as the use of pedagogical technologies *online* becomes more prevalent. In accordance with this, the peripheral and semiperipheral countries can count on World Bank financial aid directed toward private higher education, provided that they reduce public investment in the university and create legal frameworks that facilitate the expansion of private higher education as an essential complement of public higher education. For example, in Brazil, during the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the Ministry of Education, through the Program for the Recuperation and Expansion of the Physical Infrastructures of Institutions of Higher Instruction and in partnership with the National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES), established a line of credit of about R\$750 million (US\$250 million) for institutions of higher learning, with resources originating from a World Bank loan. These resources were in large part channeled to private universities. Since 1999 the BNDES has loaned R\$310 million (US\$103 million) to private universities and only R\$33 million (US\$11 million) to public universities.

The transformation of higher education into an educational commodity is a long-term goal, and this horizon is essential for understanding the intensification of transnationalization currently under way in this market. Since 2000 the university's neoliberal transnationalization has been under the aegis of the World Trade Organization and GATS (Knight 2003). Education is one of the 12 services covered by this agreement, the goal of which is to promote the liberalization of commercial services through the progressive and systematic elimination of commercial barriers. Recently, GATS has become one of the most controversial topics in higher education, involving

politicians, professors, and entrepreneurs. Its defenders see it as an opportunity for broadening and diversifying the educational supply in such a way that combining economic gain with greater access to the university becomes possible. This opportunity is based on the following conditions: the strong growth of the educational market in recent years, a growth only obstructed by national frontiers; the diffusion of electronic means of teaching and learning; needs for a qualified workforce that are not being met; the growing mobility of students, professors, and programs; and the financial inability of governments to meet the growing need for higher education. This is the market potential that GATS hopes to achieve through the elimination of trade barriers in this area.

GATS distinguishes four major ways of offering the transnational mercantilization of educational services: transborder offerings, foreign consumption, commercial presence, and presence of natural persons.

Transborder offerings are represented by transnational provisions of service without the need for physical movement on the consumers' part. Included are distance learning, online learning, and "virtual" universities. It is still a small market but one with strong growth potential. One-fourth of the foreign students who are taking courses offered by Australian universities do so through the Internet. Three great North American universities (Columbia, Stanford, and Chicago) and one in the United Kingdom (London School of Economics) formed a consortium to create Cardean University, which offers Internet courses to the world at large.

Foreign consumption consists of the provision of services through the transnational movement of the consumer. This is currently the big slice of the university's mercantile transnationalization. A recent study by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) calculates that this commerce was worth US\$30 billion in 1999. At the beginning of 2000, 514,000 foreigners were studying in the United States, more than 54 percent of them from Asia. India alone contributed 42,000 students. By contrast, during the 1998–1999 academic year, only 707 US students were studying in India. This area, like so many others, demonstrates the North-South (as well as West-East) asymmetries.

The third area has to do with commercial presence and consists of private producers of higher education establishing branches in foreign countries to sell their services. These are usually local branches or satellite campuses of

large global universities or local institutions operating under franchise contracts with such universities. It is an area of great potential and the one most directly on a collision course with national educational policies, because it implies that local centers or satellite campuses submit to international rules agreed on by foreign investors.

Finally, the presence of natural persons is represented by the temporary dislocation of suppliers of services, professors, or researchers, established in one country and offering service to another (foreign) country. This is an area that appears to have great development potential, given the growing mobility of professional people.

South Africa should be cited in this context because it effectively illustrates the risks of GATS. South Africa has come to assume a position of total reserve in relation to GATS. It refuses to subscribe to international commercial commitments in the area of education and incites other countries to do the same. This is a significant position, given the fact that South Africa exports educational services to the rest of Africa. However, it does so through bilateral agreements and within a framework of mutual benefit for the countries involved in and outside the regime of international trade policies. This conditionality of mutual benefit and mutual respect is absent from the logic of GATS. South Africa's rejection of GATS is based on the experience of foreign offerings of higher education providers and of World Bank financial aid that supports them, which, according to those responsible for South African education, has had devastating effects on higher education in Africa. The refusal of GATS is based on the idea that any noncommercial considerations are strange to it and that this invalidates any national educational policy that considers education a public good and a major component of the national project. An example given by the then South African minister of education, Kader Asmal, in a March 4, 2004, communiqué to the South African Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry illustrates this point. It is known that, with the end of apartheid, South Africa launched an enormous program to combat racism in educational institutions that had, among its principal targets, the so-called historically white universities; it was a program involving a multiplicity of actions—among them, affirmative action regarding access. The antiracist struggle is thus a central part of the national project underlying educational policies. It is against this backdrop that the minister of education gives as an example of unacceptable conduct the fact

that a foreign institution intended to operate in South Africa by selectively recruiting students from the upper classes and, in particular, white students. The minister commented: "As you can imagine, the impact of these agendas on our efforts to construct a non-racist higher education in South Africa can be very profound" (Asmal 2003, p. 51).

FROM UNIVERSITY KNOWLEDGE TO PLURIVERSITY KNOWLEDGE

The developments of the past decade presented the university, especially the public university, with demanding challenges. The situation is near collapse in many countries on the periphery, and it is difficult in the semiperipheral countries. Although the expansion and transnationalization of the market for university services has contributed decisively to this situation in recent years, they are not the only cause. Something more profound occurred, and only this occurrence explains why the university, although still the institution par excellence of scientific knowledge, has lost its hegemony and has been transformed into an easy target for social criticism. I think that in the past decade the relations between knowledge and society began to change significantly, and these alterations promised to be profound to the point of transforming the way we conceive of knowledge and of society. As I said, the commercialization of scientific knowledge is the most visible side of these alterations. However, and despite their enormity, they are the tip of the iceberg, and the transformations now in progress have contradictory meanings and multiple implications, some of them epistemological.

University knowledge—that is, the scientific knowledge produced in universities or institutions separate from the universities but that retains a similar university ethos—was, for the entire 20th century, a predominantly disciplinary knowledge whose autonomy imposed a relatively decontextualized process of production in relation to the day-to-day pressures of the societies. According to the logic of this process, the researchers are the ones who determine what scientific problems to solve, define their relevance, and establish the methodologies and rhythms of research. It is a homogeneous and hierarchically organized knowledge insofar as the agents who participate in its production share the same goals of producing knowledge, have the same training and the same scientific culture, and do what they do according to well-defined organizational hierarchies. It is a knowledge based on the dis-

inction between scientific research and technological development, and the autonomy of the researcher is translated as a kind of social irresponsibility as far as the results of the application of knowledge are concerned. Moreover, in the logic of this process of the production of university knowledge, the distinction between scientific knowledge and other kinds of knowledge is absolute, as is the relation between science and society. The university produces knowledge that the society does or does not apply, an alternative that, although socially relevant, is indifferent or irrelevant to the knowledge produced.

The university's organization and ethos were created by this kind of knowledge. It happens that, throughout the past decade, there were alterations that destabilized this model of knowledge and pointed to the emergence of another model. I designate this transition, which Gibbons et al. (1994) described as a transition from "type 1 knowledge" to "type 2 knowledge," as the passage from *university knowledge* to *pluriversity knowledge*.

Contrary to the university knowledge described in the preceding paragraph, pluriversity knowledge is a contextual knowledge insofar as the organizing principle of its construction is its application. Because this application is extramural, the initiative for formulating the problems to be solved and the determination of their criteria of relevance are the result of sharing among researchers and users. It is a transdisciplinary knowledge that, by its very contextualization, demands a dialogue or confrontation with other kinds of knowledge. Thus pluriversity knowledge is more heterogeneous internally and is more adequately produced in less perennial and more open systems that are organized less rigidly and hierarchically. All the distinctions on which university knowledge is based are put in question by pluriversity knowledge, but, most basically, it is the relation between science and society that is in question. Society ceases to be an object of scientific questioning and becomes itself a subject that questions science.

The tension between these two models of knowledge highlights the extremes of two ideal types. In reality, the kinds of knowledge produced occupy different places along the *continuum* between the two poles, some closer to the university model and others closer to the pluriversity model. This heterogeneity not only destabilizes the current institutional specificity of the university but also questions its hegemony and legitimacy in such a way as to force it to evaluate itself by self-contradictory criteria.

Pluriversity knowledge has had its most consistent realization in university-industry partnerships in the form of mercantile knowledge. But, especially in the central and semiperipheral countries, the context of application has been nonmercantile as well—cooperative and dependent on the solidarity created by partnerships between researchers on the one hand and labor unions, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), social movements, particularly vulnerable social groups (women, illegal immigrants, the unemployed, people with chronic illnesses, senior citizens, those afflicted with HIV/AIDS, etc.), working-class communities, and groups of critical and active citizens on the other. There is a growing sector of civil society developing a new and more intense relationship with science and technology, demanding greater participation in their production and in the evaluation of their impact. In multiethnic and multinational countries, pluriversity knowledge begins to emerge from inside the university itself when incoming students from ethnic and other minority groups understand that their inclusion is a form of exclusion. They are confronted with the tabula rasa that is made of their cultures and of the traditional knowledge of their communities. All of this leads scientific knowledge to confront other kinds of knowledge and demands a higher level of social responsibility from the institutions that produce it and, consequently, from the universities. As science becomes more ingrained in the society, the society becomes more a part of science. The university was created according to a model of unilateral relations with society, and it is this model that underlies its current institutionalism. Pluriversity knowledge supplants this unilateral notion with interactivity and interdependence, processes enormously invigorated by the technological revolution of information and communication.

In light of these transformations, we can conclude that the university finds itself in the presence of opposing demands, which have the convergent effect of destabilizing its current institutionalism. On the one hand, the ultraprivate pressure to commodify knowledge displaces the social responsibility of the university with a focus on producing economically useful and commercially viable knowledge. On the other hand, an ultrapublic social pressure shatters the restricted public sphere of the university in the name of a much broader public sphere traversed by much more heterogeneous confrontations and by much more demanding concepts of social responsibility. This contrast between ultraprivate and ultrapublic pressures has not only

begun to destabilize the university's institutionalism but also has created a profound fracture in the university's social and cultural identity, a fracture translated as disorientation and defensive tactics and, above all, as a kind of paralysis covered up by a defensive attitude, resistant to change in the name of university autonomy and academic freedom. The instability caused by the effects of these contrasting pressures creates impasses in which it becomes evident that demands for larger changes often accompany equally large forms of resistance to change.

THE END OF THE COUNTRY PROJECT?

The passage from university knowledge to pluriversity knowledge is thus a much more ample process than the commodification of the university and of the knowledge it produces. It is a process most visible today in the central countries, although it is also present in semiperipheral and peripheral countries. But in both semiperipheral and peripheral countries another transformation has been occurring for the last two decades, one that is linked to neoliberal globalization and that is not limited to economic dimensions or reducible to the commodification of the university. It is, moreover, an eminently political transformation. In these countries, the public university—and the educational system as a whole—was always tied to the construction of a national project. This was as evident in Latin American universities in the 19th century or, in Brazil's case, in the 20th century as it was in African and various Asian countries, as was the case of India after it became independent in the mid 20th century. I am referring to projects of national development or modernization led by the state and aimed at generating and consolidating the country's coherence and cohesion as an economically, socially, and culturally well-defined geopolitical territory for which it was frequently necessary to wage border-defining wars. The study of liberal arts and social sciences (and frequently of the natural sciences as well) was aimed at lending consistency to the national project, creating knowledge and shaping the personnel necessary for its realization. In the best of times, academic freedom and university autonomy were an integral part of such projects, even when they criticized them severely. This involvement was so profound that in many cases it became the second nature of the university: To question the national political project was to question the public university. The

reactive defensiveness that has dominated the university, namely, in its responses to the financial crisis, derives from the fact that the university—endowed with reflexive and critical capacity like no other social institution—is lucidly coming to the conclusion that it is no longer tied to a national project and that, without one, there can be no public university.

In the last 20 years, neoliberal globalization has launched a devastating attack on the idea of national projects, which are conceived as obstacles to the expansion of global capitalism. From the standpoint of neoliberal capitalism, national projects legitimize logics of national social production and reproduction that are embedded in heterogeneous national spaces and geared to intensifying such heterogeneity. Moreover, the operation of these logics is guaranteed by a political entity that is endowed with sovereign power over the territory, the nation-state, whose submission to global economic impositions is problematic from the start with regard to its own interests and those of the national capitalism on which it has been politically dependent.

The neoliberal attack has as its special target the nation-state and particularly the economic and social policies in which education has played a major role. In the case of the public university the effects of this attack are not limited to the financial crisis. They have direct or indirect repercussions on the definition of research and training priorities, not only in the areas of social science and liberal arts but also in the natural sciences, especially in those areas most closely connected to technological development projects. The political disempowerment of the state and of the national project was reflected in the quasi-epistemological disempowerment of the university and its consequent disorientation as far as its social functions were concerned. University policies of administrative autonomy and decentralization, when adopted, have had the effect of dislocating the fulcrum of these national project functions toward local and regional problems. The identity crisis affected the university's critical thinking itself and, more broadly, the university's public sphere. The university was faced with two equally self-destructive options: an isolationist nationalism from which it has always distanced itself and that has now become totally anachronistic, or a hegemonic globalization that reduces nationally based critical thinking and the public sphere to the condition of a defenseless or indefensible local idiosyncrasy in the path of an unstoppable global flood.

This lack of a country project does not know how to affirm itself except

through uneasiness, defensiveness, and paralysis. Meanwhile, I think that the university will not escape from the tunnel between the past and the future in which it finds itself, so long as the country project is not reconstructed. Actually, this is exactly what is happening in the central countries. The global universities of the United States, Australia, and New Zealand act within national scenarios that have the world as their playing field. Otherwise, it is difficult to justify the support that the diplomacy of these countries gives to such projects. We are foreseeing a third-generation colonialism that has the colonies of second-generation colonialism as its protagonists. From the perspective of the peripheral and semiperipheral countries the new global context demands a total reinvention of the national project without which there can be no reinvention of the university. There is nothing nationalistic about this demand. There is only the need to invent a critical cosmopolitanism in a context of aggressive and exclusive globalization.

Part 2: Democratic and Emancipatory Reform

WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

Here, I try to identify some of the master ideas that should preside over a creative, democratic, and emancipatory reform of the public university. Perhaps the first step is to identify the subjects of the actions that need to be undertaken efficiently to confront the challenges that face the public university. In the meantime, to identify the subjects, it is first necessary to define the political meaning of the response to such challenges. In light of the precedent, it becomes clear that, despite the multiple and sometimes long-standing causes of the university crisis, the subjects are currently being reconfigured by neoliberal globalization, and the way they affect today's university reflects that project's intentions. As I have suggested for other areas of social life (Santos 2000, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2003), I think that the only efficient and emancipatory way to confront neoliberal globalization is to oppose it with an alternative, counterhegemonic globalization. Counterhegemonic globalization of the university-as-public-good means that the national reforms of the public university must reflect a country project that is centered on policy choices that take into account the country's insertion into increasingly

transnational contexts of knowledge production and distribution. These policy choices will become increasingly polarized between two contradictory processes of globalization: neoliberal globalization and counterhegemonic globalization. This country project has to be the result of a broad political and social pact consisting of different sectoral pacts, among them an educational pact in which the public university is conceived of as a collective good. The reform must be focused on responding positively to the social demands for the radical democratizing of the university, putting an end to the history of exclusion of social groups and their knowledge for which the university has been responsible for a long time, starting well before the current phase of capitalist globalization. From now on, the national and transnational scales of the reform interpenetrate. Without global articulation a national solution is impossible.

The current global context is strongly dominated by neoliberal globalization but is not reduced to it. There is space for national and global articulations based on reciprocity and on the mutual benefit that, in the case of the university, will reconstitute and broaden long-lasting forms of internationalism. Such articulations should be cooperative, even when they contain mercantile components; that is, they should be constructed outside the regimes of international trade policy. This alternative transnationalization is made possible by new information and communication technologies and is based on the establishment of national and global networks, within which new pedagogies, new processes of construction and diffusion of scientific and other knowledge, and new social (local, national, and global) commitments circulate. The goal is to resituate the role of the public university in the collective definition and resolution of social problems, which are now insoluble unless considered globally. The new university pact starts from the premise that the university has a crucial role in the construction of its country's place in a world polarized by contradictory globalizations.

Neoliberal globalization is based on the systematic destruction of national projects and, because these projects were often designed with the active collaboration of university professors and students, the public university will be targeted for destruction until it is fine-tuned to neoliberal objectives. This does not mean that the public university should be isolated from the pressures of neoliberal globalization, which, apart from being impossible, might give the false impression that the university has been relatively pro-

tected from such pressures. Actually, it could be said that part of the university's crisis is the result of its passive incorporation of and co-optation by the forces of hegemonic globalization. What is called for is an active response to this co-optation, in the name of a counterhegemonic globalization.

The counterhegemonic globalization of the university-as-public-good that I am proposing here maintains the idea of a national project but conceives it in a nonnationalistic way. In the 21st century nations exist only to the extent that their national projects are qualified for a relatively autonomous insertion into the global society. For peripheral and semiperipheral countries the only way to qualify is to resist neoliberal globalization with strategies for another kind of globalization. The difficulty and, often, the drama of university reform in many countries reside in the fact that reform involves revisiting and reexamining the idea of the national project, something that the politicians of the last 20 years have hoped to avoid, either because they see such an idea as throwing sand in the gears of their surrender to neoliberalism or because they truly believe nationhood is outmoded as an instrument of resistance. The public university knows that, without a national project, there are only global contexts, and these are too powerful to be seriously confronted by the university's resistance. The university's excess lucidity allows it to declare that the emperor has no clothes, and for this reason university reform will always be different from the rest.

The counterhegemonic globalization of the university-as-public-good is thus a demanding political project that, to be credible, must overcome two contradictory but equally rooted prejudices: that the university can be reformed only by the university community and that the university will never reform itself. These are powerful prejudices. A brief examination of the social forces potentially committed to confront them is in place. The first social force is the public university community itself, that is, those within it interested in an alternative globalization of the university. The public university today is a fractured social field within which contradictory sectors and interests fight each other. In many countries, especially peripheral and semiperipheral ones, such contradictions are still latent. Defensive positions that maintain the status quo and reject globalization, whether neoliberal or alternative, predominate. This is a conservative position, not just because it advocates hewing to the status quo but mainly because, deprived of realistic alternatives, it will sooner or later surrender to plans for the neoliberal glob-

alization of the university. University personnel who denounce this conservative position while rejecting the idea that there is no alternative to neoliberal globalization will be the protagonists of the progressive reform that I am proposing.

The second social force of such reform is the state itself, whenever it is successfully pressed to opt for the university's alternative globalization. Without this option the national state ends up adopting more or less unconditionally or succumbing more or less reluctantly to the pressures of neoliberal globalization and, in either case, transforming itself into the enemy of the public university, regardless of any proclamation to the contrary. Given the close love-hate relationship that the state carried on with the university for the whole of the 20th century, the options tend to be dramatized.

Finally, the third social force to carry out the reform are citizens who are collectively organized in social groups, labor unions, social movements, nongovernmental organizations and their networks, and local progressive governments interested in forming cooperative relationships between the university and the social interests they represent. In contrast to the state, this third social force has had a historically distant and, at times, even hostile relationship with the university, precisely because of the university's elitism and the distance it cultivated for a long time in relation to the so-called uncultured sectors of society. This is a social force that has to be won through a response to the question of legitimacy, that is, by means of nonclassist, nonracist, nonsexist, and nonethnocentric access to the university and by a whole set of initiatives that deepen the university's social responsibility in line with the pluriversity knowledge mentioned earlier (more on this later).

Beyond these three social forces there is, in the semiperipheral and peripheral countries, a fourth entity that may be loosely called national capitalism. Certainly, the most dynamic sectors of national capital are transnationalized, and consequently they become part of the neoliberal globalization that is hostile to the emancipatory reform of the university. However, in peripheral and semiperipheral countries the process of transnational integration of these sectors is filled with tensions. Under certain conditions such tensions may lead these sectors to see an interest in defending the project of the public university as a public good, especially when there are no realistic alternatives to the public university for the production of the kind of technological knowledge needed to strengthen their insertion into the global economy.

With the preceding in mind, I identify key principles that should guide the emancipatory reform of the public university.

Confront the New with the New

The transformations of the past decade were profound and, despite having been dominated by the mercantilization of higher education, they were not reduced to only mercantile interests. There were also transformations in the processes and social contexts of knowledge production and diffusion, and the changes are irreversible. Under such conditions the new cannot be viewed as the problem and the old as the solution. Besides, what existed before was not a golden age and, if it was, it was just for the university and not for the rest of society, and, within the bosom of the university itself, it was for some and not for others.

Resistance has to involve the promotion of alternatives that address the specific contribution of the university-as-public-good to the collective definition and solution of new national and global social problems.

Fight for the Definition of the Crisis

To abandon its defensive position, the university has to be sure that the reform is not designed against it. The idea of an educational pact is crucial here because there can be no pact when there are nonnegotiable impositions and resistances. The question is, Under what conditions and why should the university abandon its defensive position? To answer this question, it is necessary to review the concepts of the crises of hegemony and of legitimacy.

The attack against the university on the part of the states that have yielded to neoliberalism was so massive that it is now difficult to define the terms of the crisis in any but neoliberal terms. This is the first manifestation of the university's loss of hegemony. The university lost the capacity to define the crisis in a hegemonic way, autonomously but in a way that society could identify. Herein lies the preponderance of defensive positions. However difficult, it is crucial (now more than ever) to define and sustain a counterhegemonic definition of the crisis.

For the last 20 years the university has suffered a seemingly irreparable erosion of its hegemony, originating in part in the current transition from conventional university knowledge to pluriversity knowledge, that is, to transdisciplinary, contextualized, interactively produced and distributed

knowledge. Thanks to the new communication and information technologies, this pluriversity knowledge has altered the relations among knowledge, information, and citizenship. The university has been unable, until now, to take full advantage of these transformations.

Fight for the Definition of the University

There is a question of hegemony that, although seemingly residual, is central to enabling the university to fight successfully for its legitimacy. This is the question of the definition of the university. The big problem of the university in this domain has been the fact that what easily passes for a university is anything but. This problem was made possible because of the indiscriminate accumulation of functions attributed to the university throughout the 20th century. Because the functions were added without logical articulation, the market for higher instruction was able to self-designate its product as a university without having to assume all the functions of a university, concentrating only on those functions that made it profitable.

Reform should start from the assumption that a university must have graduate and postgraduate training, research, and socially responsible extension. Without any one of these, what you have is higher instruction, not a university. In terms of this definition, in many countries the overwhelming majority of private universities and even some of the public ones are not universities at all.

Thus reform must distinguish more clearly than it has up until now between university and tertiary education. With respect to public universities that are really not universities, the problem ought to be solved by creating a public university network (proposed later) so that universities without autonomous research or postgraduate courses can offer them in partnership with other universities in national or even transnational networks. A university system in which postgraduate programs and research are concentrated in a small number of universities cannot guarantee the sustainability of a national educational project in a cultural and political context pulled apart by contradictory forms of globalization.

As far as private universities are concerned—in case they wish to maintain the status and designation of universities—their licensing ought to be subject to the existence of postgraduate, research, and socially responsible extension programs that are subjected to frequent and demanding reviews.

As with public universities, if private universities cannot autonomously sustain such programs, they must do so through partnerships, either with other private universities or with public ones.

The definition of what constitutes a university is crucial to protect the university from predatory competition and society from fraudulent consumer practices. A successful struggle for the definition will allow the public university a minimal playing field in which to conduct the most encompassing and demanding struggle, the struggle for legitimacy.

Reclaim Legitimacy

In a situation in which hegemony is irremediably affected, legitimacy is simultaneously more urgent and more difficult. Thus the battle for legitimacy is going to be ever more demanding, and university reform must be centered on it. There are five areas of action in this domain: access, extension, action-research, ecology of knowledge, and university/public school partnerships. The first two are the most conventional, but they will have to be profoundly revised; the third has been practiced in some Latin American and African universities during periods of greater social responsibility on the part of the university; the fourth constitutes a decisive innovation in the construction of a postcolonial university; the fifth is an area of action that had a great presence in the past but that now has to be totally reinvented.

Access. In the area of access the greatest frustration of the past two decades was that the goal of democratic access was not attained. In most countries, factors of discrimination, whether of class, race, gender, or ethnicity, continued to make access a mixture of merit and privilege. Instead of democratization, there was "massification," and afterward, in the alleged postmassification period, a strong segmentation of higher education involving practices of authentic "social dumping" of diplomas and degree recipients. The most elitist universities took few initiatives, other than defending their access criteria, invoking the fact, often true, that the most persistent discrimination occurs on the way to the university, in primary and secondary education. It is foreseeable that the transnationalization of higher education services will aggravate the segmentation phenomenon by transnationalizing it. Some foreign providers direct their offers to the best students coming from the best (often, most elitist) secondary schools or having graduated from the best na-

tional universities. In a transnationalized system the best universities, occupying the top national rungs in peripheral and semiperipheral countries, will become the bottom rungs of the global ladder. Of the four kinds of transnationalized services, foreign consumption is one of those most responsible for the new brain drain, particularly evident in India but also present in some African countries, such as Kenya and Ghana.

Among the master ideas that should guide the matter of access, I discern the following four. First, in countries where discrimination of university access is largely based on blockages at the primary and secondary instructional levels, progressive university reform, in contrast to the World Bank's recipes, must give incentives to the university to promote active partnerships with public schools in the areas of science and technology.

Second, the public university must be made accessible for students from subaltern classes through scholarships rather than loans. If it is not controlled, the indebtedness of university students will become a time bomb: A population encumbered by the certainty of a debt that can take 20 years to repay is being thrown into an increasingly uncertain labor market. Scholarships that include the possibility of student jobs in university activities both on and off campus should be granted to students—a rare practice especially in peripheral and semiperipheral countries. For example, undergraduate and graduate students could volunteer some hours each week as tutors in public schools, helping pupils and, if necessary, teachers.

Third, in multinational and multicultural societies racial and ethnic discrimination should be confronted with programs of affirmative action focused both on access and retention, especially during the first years when attrition rates are often high. Needless to say, racial and ethnic discrimination occurs in conjunction with class discrimination but cannot be reduced to the latter; it must be the object of specific measures. In India caste discrimination is the object of affirmative action, despite acting in conjunction with class and gender discrimination. In South Africa racial discrimination is the object of affirmative action, despite acting in conjunction with class discrimination. As happens in these two countries, antidiscrimination action in the university must be carried out in conjunction with antidiscrimination measures in other spheres, such as access to public employment and to the labor market in general. In this way the university will be linked to a progressive national project and bear witness to it.²

Fourth, the critical evaluation of access and its obstacles—like the rest of the discussion on the areas of extension and ecology of knowledge—must explicitly confront the colonial character of the modern university. In the past the university not only participated in the social exclusion of so-called inferior races and ethnicities but also theorized about their inferiority, an inferiority extended to the knowledge produced by the excluded groups in the name of the epistemological priority conferred on science. The task to democratize access is thus particularly demanding because it questions the university as a whole, not just who attends it but what kind of knowledge is transmitted to those who attend it.

Extension. The area of extension is going to have a special meaning in the near future. At a moment when global capitalism intends to functionalize the university and, in fact, transform it into a vast extension agency at its service, an emancipatory reform of the public university must confer a new centrality to the activities of extension and conceive of them as an alternative to global capitalism. Universities must become active participants in the construction of social cohesion, the deepening of the democracy, the struggle against social exclusion and environmental degradation, and the defense of cultural diversity. The extension involves a vast area of service provision for a variety of recipients: working-class social groups and organizations, social movements, local or regional communities, local governments, the public sector, and the private sector. Apart from providing services to well-defined recipients, an entirely different area of service provision has the society in general as its recipient: the promotion of scientific and technical culture and the study of the arts and literature as tools to empower citizenship and deepen democracy.

For extension to fulfill this role, it must avoid being directed toward moneymaking activities for the sole purpose of gathering nonstate resources. In this case we are faced with a discrete (or not so discrete) privatization of the public university. On the contrary, the extension activities I have in mind are designed to address the problems of social exclusion and discrimination in such a way as to give voice to the excluded and discriminated social groups.

Action-Research. Action-research and the ecology of knowledge are areas of university legitimacy that transcend extension because they act both at the

level of extension and at the level of research and training. Action-research consists of the participative definition and execution of research projects involving working-class and, in general, subaltern communities and social organizations who are grappling with problems and who can benefit from the results of the research, that is, the solution to the problem. The social interests are tied to the scientific interests of the researchers, and so the production of scientific knowledge is directly linked to the satisfaction of the needs of social groups who lack the resources to have access to specialized technical knowledge through the market. Action-research has a long tradition in Latin America, but it has never been a university priority. Just as with extension activities, the new centrality of action-research is due to the fact that the neoliberal transnationalization of higher education is transforming the university into a global institution of action-research at the service of global capitalism. Here, too, the battle against this functionalism is made possible only by constructing a social alternative that focuses on the university's social utility and defines it in a counterhegemonic way.

Ecology of Knowledge. The ecology of knowledge is a more advanced form of action-research. It implies an epistemological revolution in the ways that research and training have been conventionally carried out at the university.³ The ecology of knowledge is a kind of counterextension or extension in reverse, that is, from outside to inside the university. It consists of the promotion of dialogues between, on the one hand, scientific and humanistic knowledge produced by the university and, on the other hand, the lay or popular knowledge that circulates in society and that is produced by common people, both in urban and rural settings, originating in Western and non-Western cultures (indigenous, African, Asian, etc.). Along with the technological euphoria, today there is also a lack of epistemological confidence in science that derives from the growing visibility of the perverse consequences of some kinds of scientific progress and the fact that many of modern science's social promises have not been fulfilled. It is beginning to be socially perceptible that the university, by specializing in scientific knowledge and considering it the only kind of valid knowledge, has actively contributed to the disqualification and destruction of much potentially invaluable nonscientific knowledge; thus social groups to whom these kinds of knowledge are the only ones available are marginalized and, more generally, human experience and diversity become impoverished. Hence social injustice contains cog-

nitive injustice at its core. This is particularly obvious on the global scale, where peripheral countries, rich in nonscientific wisdom but poor in scientific knowledge, have seen scientific knowledge, in the form of economic science, destroy their ways of sociability, their economies, their indigenous and rural communities, and their environments.

University and Public School. Here, I want to stress the relevance of "pedagogical knowledge," which comprises three subthemes: production and diffusion of pedagogical knowledge, educational research, and the training of public school teachers. It is a theme of growing importance, avidly coveted by the educational market. The public university once performed a hegemonic role in this area, but it has withdrawn or been pushed aside from it in recent decades. This fact is now responsible for the university distancing itself from the public school—the separation between the academic world and the world of the school—a distancing that, if maintained, will destroy any serious effort to relegitimize the public university as a collective good.

Under the aegis of neoliberal globalization, international agencies, non-governmental organizations, and a number of foundations and private institutes have taken over some of the public university's functions in the development of public education, especially in the field of applied educational research. This change in functional entitlement reflects on the content of its practice. The change is manifest in the primacy of quantitative methodologies, in the emphasis on evaluative and diagnostic studies informed by an economic rationality, which is based on narrowly conceived cost-benefit analyses, and, finally, in an obsessive concern with measuring the results of learning through the periodic application of standardized tests. Themes such as efficiency, competition, performance, choice, and accountability have become central to the educational agenda. The studies produced outside the universities, sponsored and financed by international organizations and private foundations, have had enormous influence on public educational policy, determining issues as diverse as the curriculum and the selection of public school system directors. The university—excluded from the debate and frequently accused of defending the status quo of corporate public instruction—has retreated to the role of questioning the dominant discourse about the public school crisis and has not bothered to formulate alternatives. Not surprisingly, educators and school administrators committed to pro-

gressive and counterhegemonic projects often complain about the public university's lack of involvement and support.

The university's marginalization goes along with the demand for tertiary qualification of teachers at all instructional levels, resulting in the progressive privatization of teacher training. The "training and empowerment of teachers" has become one of the most prosperous segments of the emerging educational market, confirmed by the proliferation of private institutions offering teacher-empowerment courses for school systems.

The wide gap between the public university and pedagogical knowledge is prejudicial both for the public school and the public university. The public university's resistance to the new educational prescriptions cannot be reduced to a critique, especially because criticism, in the context of the university's crisis of legitimacy, ends up increasing the social isolation of the public university. The critique produced in the schools of education has reinforced the perception that the university is completely obsessed with the defense of the status quo. Doing away with this perception ought to be one of the main goals of a progressive and democratic university reform. The principle to be affirmed is the university's commitment to the public school. Among other directives, the reform defended here proposes (1) valuing the initial training and linking it to programs of ongoing training, (2) restructuring degree-awarding courses to ensure curricular integration between professional and academic training, (3) collaboration between university researchers and public school teachers in the production and diffusion of pedagogical knowledge through the recognition and stimulation of action-research, and (4) creation of regional and national networks of public universities for the development of programs of ongoing training in partnership with the public instructional systems.

Rethink University and Industry Connections

As we have seen, the industrial sector is growing rapidly as a producer of educational and university services. I mention it here in a consumer role. The current popularity of the concepts of a knowledge society and a knowledge-based economy, especially in the central countries, is indicative of the pressure that has been put on the university to produce the kind of knowledge needed to increase business productivity and competitiveness. The entrepreneurial pressure is so strong that it goes far beyond the sphere of

extension, trying to define according to its own image and interests what counts as relevant research. This redefinition does away with both the distinction between extension and research and the distinction between fundamental and applied research. In the central states, especially the United States, the relation between state and university has begun to be dominated by the central imperative in this domain: the university's contribution to economic competitiveness and to military supremacy. Research policies have been directed to privilege studies in areas of interest to businesses and to the commercialization of research results. Cuts in the public funding of universities are seen as "incentives" for universities to procure private investments, enter into partnerships with industry, patent their results, and develop commercial activities, including the commercialization of their own brand names.

The response to this pressure becomes quite dramatic, and it raises the most serious challenges to the survival of the public university as we know it. There are four main reasons for this: (1) This is the area in which there is the biggest disconnection between the university's traditional institutional model and the new model that is implicit in the performances demanded; (2) this is the area in which the university enters into direct competition with other institutions and actors that emerged from the new demands; (3) it is here that the university's models of public administration are most directly exposed and negatively compared with the prevalent models of private management; and (4) more than in any other area, it becomes evident here that the university's legitimacy and responsibility in relation to dominant interests and social groups can signify its illegitimacy and irresponsibility in relation to subaltern interests and social groups.

In this area the progressive reform of the university as a public good should be oriented by the following ideas. First, it is crucial that the scientific community and the social groups it chooses to associate itself with not lose control of the scientific research agenda. For this to happen, it is necessary to prevent the financial asphyxia from compelling the public university to privatize its functions to compensate for budget cuts. It is crucial that "opening to the outside" not be limited to opening to the market. On the contrary, the university must develop spaces of intervention that somehow balance the multiple, often contradictory, and at times conflicting interests that circulate in the society and that are endowed with the power to summon and interrogate the university. Even in the United States, where the knowledge business

is most advanced, the country's technological leadership is based on a kind of equilibrium in the universities between the basic research undertaken, without direct commercial interest, and applied research, which is subject to entrepreneurial rhythms and risk.

Second, the public research-funding agencies should act on behalf of emergent research topics considered socially relevant but without any foreseeable commercial value. The growing appeal of competition for so-called targeted research must be moderated by general competition in which the younger scientific community has a chance to creatively and freely develop new areas of research that, for the time being, do not arouse the interest of capital.

The usefulness to the university of interacting with the entrepreneurial milieu to identify new themes for research, develop applied technology, and carry out impact analyses cannot be ignored. Indeed, it is important that the university be granted the ability to explore this potential and, in so doing, not be placed in a dependent position, especially on the level of survival, with regard to commercial contracts.

The most polemic theme in this area is the patenting of knowledge. In the central countries the fight for patents, especially in the most commercially attractive areas, such as biotechnology, is completely transforming the processes of research and relations within the scientific community and is threatening the collegiality of research processes and free and open discussion of findings. According to many, patenting puts the advance of science at risk and provokes a fatal distortion of research priorities. The patent problem is one of those that best reveals the global segmentation of knowledge production. It is relevant only in the few countries where there is a great capacity for commercial absorption of the knowledge produced.

TOWARD A NEW INSTITUTIONALISM

The institutional domain is a key area of the public university's democratic and emancipatory reform. I previously noted that the virulence and salience of the institutional crisis reside in its being a condensation of the deepening crises of hegemony and legitimacy. This is why I have focused up to now on these two crises. It is my opinion that university reform must be centered on the matter of legitimacy. In fact, the loss of hegemony seems irremediable,

not only because of the emergence of many alternative institutions but also because of the growing internal segmentation in the university network, both at the national and the global levels. The university today is not the unique organization it was, and its heterogeneity makes it even more difficult to identify the uniqueness of its character. The processes of globalization make this heterogeneity more visible and intensify it. What remains of the university's hegemony is the existence of a public space where the debate and the criticism of society can, in the long run, happen with fewer restrictions than in the rest of society. This core of hegemony is too irrelevant in today's capitalist societies to sustain the university's legitimacy. This is why institutional reform has to be centered on the crisis of legitimacy.

The institutional reform I propose here intends to strengthen the public university's legitimacy in the context of the neoliberal globalization of education and envisions supporting the possibility of an alternative globalization. Its principal areas can be summed up in the following ideas: networking, internal and external democratizing, and participative evaluation.

Networking

The first idea is that of a national network of public universities on which a global network can be developed. In almost every country there are university associations, but such associations do not come close to constituting a network. In most cases they are merely pressure groups collectively demanding benefits that are appropriated individually. In another direction entirely, I propose that the university's public good begin to be produced in networks, meaning that none of the nodes in the network can ensure by itself all the functions into which this public good is translated, be it knowledge production, undergraduate and graduate training, extension, action-research, or the ecology of knowledge. This implies an institutional revolution. Universities were institutionally designed to function as autonomous and self-sufficient entities. The culture of university autonomy and of academic freedom, although defended publicly in the name of the university against outside forces, has been frequently used inside the university system to pit university against university. Competition for ranking exacerbates separation, and, because it takes place without any compensatory measures, it deepens the existing inequalities, making the slope of the pyramid even

steeper and the overall segmentation and heterogeneity more profound. Building a public network implies the sharing of resources and equipment, the internal mobility of teachers and students, and minimal standardization of course plans, of school year organization, of systems of evaluation. None of this has to eliminate the specificities of each university's response to the local or regional context in which it is located. On the contrary, maintaining such specificity gives each individual university more value within the network.⁴ The network, while creating more polyvalence and decentralization, strengthens the public university network as a whole. It is not about making excellent universities share their resources in such a way that their excellence would be put at risk. Rather, it is about multiplying the number of excellent universities, offering each the possibility of developing its niche potential with the help of the rest.

Once the network is created, its development is subject to three basic action principles: Make it dense, make it democratic, and qualify it. Network theory provides precious organizational leads. They can be multilevel and multiscale; they should stimulate the formation of clusters and promote the growth of multiconnectivity among universities, research and extension centers, and programs that deal with publicizing and publishing knowledge. I think it is useful to keep the example of the European Union in mind when building a network. European university policy envisions the creation of a university network that will prepare European universities for the globalization of higher education. Although I do not agree with the excessive emphasis on the mercantile aspects, I think the strategy is correct in acknowledging that, until recently, relations among European universities were characterized by institutional heterogeneity, enormous segmentation, and reciprocal isolation—that is, a set of features that weakened the opportunities for inclusion of the European universities in the global context of higher education. What the European Union is trying to do at an international level, among its member countries, is certainly more difficult to achieve than at the national level. And if a central region of the world system concludes that it is vulnerable in this domain on the global scale and decides to prepare itself to remedy this through the creation of a European-wide university network, then it appears that with better reasons the same should be done through associations among semiperipheral and peripheral countries.

The organization of universities within the network must be directed toward promoting internal articulation in the four areas of legitimacy: access, extension, action-research, and ecology of knowledge.

Internal and External Democratizing

Apart from the creation of the network, the new institutionalism must work toward the deepening of the university's internal and external democracy. When we discuss university democratization, we are usually thinking about ending forms of discrimination that limit access. But there are other dimensions. Recently, the university's external democratization has become a highly debated theme. The idea of external democratization gets conflated with the idea of the university's social responsibility, because what is being discussed is the creation of an organic political link between the university and society that ends the isolation that has demonized the university in recent years as a corporative manifestation of elitism, an ivory tower, and so forth. The appeal for external democracy is ambiguous because it is made by social groups with contradictory interests. On the one hand, the call comes from an educational market that invokes the university's democratic deficit to justify the market's need for greater access to it, something that is possible only if the university is privatized. External democratization implies the university's new relation with the world of business and its ultimate transformation into a business. On the other hand, the call for external democratization comes from progressive social forces that are behind the transformations occurring in the passage from the university model to the pluriversity model; it comes especially from the allies of historically excluded groups that today demand that the public university become responsive to their long-neglected interests. The pluriversity model, in assuming the contextualization of knowledge and the participation of citizens or communities as users or even coproducers of knowledge, requires that such contextualization and participation be subject to rules that will guarantee the transparency of the relations between the university and its social environment and will legitimize the decisions made in the ambit of such relations.

This second appeal for external democracy aims to neutralize the first, the call for privatizing the university. The appeal for privatization has had an enormous impact on the universities of many countries in the last decade, to the point where university researchers have lost much of the control they had

over research agendas. The most obvious case is the way research priorities are defined today in the field of health, where diseases that affect the majority of the world's population (e.g., malaria, tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS) are not given research priority. From the moment the regulatory mechanisms of the scientific community begin to be dependent on the centers of economic power, only external bottom-up democratic pressure can ensure that matters with little commercial interest but great social impact make their way into research agendas.

The need for a new institutionalism of external democracy—a new university-society public sphere—is fundamental to making the social pressures on university functions transparent, measurable, and susceptible to reasonable regulation. This is one of the paths of participative democracy that lead to a new platform of public university legitimacy.

Internal democracy is to be articulated with external democracy. This is a theme that acquired great visibility in the central countries during the 1960s; all the countries that went through periods of dictatorship during the second half of the 20th century introduced forms of democratic university governance as soon as the dictatorship was toppled. The entrepreneurial pressure on the university has launched a systematic attack on this internal democracy. The reason is obvious: Putting the university at the service of capital entails the proletarianization of professors and researchers, and this cannot occur while the mechanisms of internal democracy are in place, precisely because they sustain the academic freedom that bars the way to proletarianization. Proletarianization can be attained only when an entrepreneurial model of administration and organization is established, professionalizing university functions and maintaining a strict separation between administration, and faculty and researchers.

The external democracy proposed by capital is thus strongly hostile to internal democracy. The same is not true of community and solidarity-based external democracy that can stimulate internal democracy and vice versa. Therefore the reform of the public university as a collective good must defend internal democracy for its own sake and also avoid external democracy being reduced to university-industry relations. External democracy can be made concrete through socially and culturally diverse social councils, with participation based on social relevance rather than on financial contributions, defined on local or regional, class, racial, and gender bases. The participa-

tion in internally democratic organs will thus be informed by the principles of affirmative action, bringing social groups and interests to the councils that are now quite distanced from the university. It is important that the councils be more than a mere façade so that, apart from their consultative functions, they can participate in the internal processes of the university's participative democracy.

Participative Evaluation

Finally, the new institutionalism entails a new system of evaluation that includes each of the universities and the university network as a whole. Mechanisms of self-evaluation and hetero-evaluation should be adopted for both cases. Evaluation criteria should be congruent with the aforementioned goals of the reform and should be applied through technodemocratic or participative tools rather than through technocratic tools. Today technocratic tools are strongly recommended by transnational educational capital. They entail quantitative external evaluations, both of teaching and research, and leave out the fulfillment of any other functions, namely, extension and, of course, action-research and ecology of knowledge. In research, evaluation is focused on what is most easily accounted for by bibliometric techniques that differentiate publication types and locations and measure the impact of the publications by the number of citations. Little evaluation has been done of the less easily quantifiable areas of extension, and, when it occurs, it tends to privilege university-industry relations and to center on quantitative criteria, such as the number of patents.

The fixation of criteria through mechanisms of internal and external democracy is fundamental because these criteria define the social value of the different university activities. The university should not promote single models of professorial activity but rather differentiated models that value the specific competencies of different groups of professors. This allows the university to increase its social returns and to introduce internal incentives for new activities that serve as a shield against the unilateral pressure of the mercantile incentives. The participative evaluation models facilitate the emergence of sufficiently robust internal evaluation criteria to measure up to the external criteria. The principles of self-management, self-regulation, and self-discipline allow the evaluative processes to serve as processes of political apprenticeship. These principles are the only guarantee that participative

self-evaluation will not turn into narcissistic self-contemplation or an exchange of evaluative favors.

Conclusion

The university in the 21st century will certainly be less hegemonic but no less necessary than it was in previous centuries. Its specificity as a public good resides in its being the institution that links the present to the medium and long term through the kinds of knowledge and training it produces and through the privileged public space it establishes, dedicated to open and critical discussion. For these two reasons the university is a collective good without strong allies. Many people are not interested in the long term, and others have sufficient power to be wary of those who dare to suspect them or criticize their interests.

The public university is thus a permanently threatened public good, which is not to say that the threat comes only from the outside; it comes from the inside as well. It is possible that in this chapter I have emphasized the external threat more than the internal one. But in my previous work about the university—"From the Idea of the University to the University of Ideas," published in my book *Pela Mão de Alice: O Social e o Político na Pós-Modernidade* (Santos 1994)—I paid more attention to the internal threat. The reason for this change of emphasis is that, today, the factors of the internal threat are stimulated by a perverse interaction, unknown to many, with factors of the external threat. I am more than ever aware that a university that is socially ostracized for its elitism and corporate tendencies and paralyzed by the inability to question itself in the same way it questions society is easy prey for the proselytes of neoliberal globalization. This is why the emergence of a university market—first, a national market and now a global one—by making the public university's vulnerabilities more evident, constitutes such a profound threat to the public good it produces or ought to produce.

The conjunction between factors of internal threat and factors of external threat is quite obvious in evaluating the university's capacity for long-term thinking, perhaps its most distinctive characteristic. Those who work in today's university know that university tasks are predominantly short

term, dictated by budget emergencies, interdepartmental competition, professorial tenure, and so forth. The management of such emergencies allows for the flourishing of types of professionals and conduct that would have little merit or relevance were it possible and urgent to focus on long-term questions. This emergency-ridden state of affairs, which is surely due to several factors, must also be seen as a sign that powerful outside social actors are influencing the university. What is the social return on long-term thinking, on using the public spaces for critical thinking, or even on the production of knowledge apart from what the market demands? In the World Bank's way of thinking, the answer is obvious: None. If long-term thinking existed, it would be dangerous and, if not dangerous, unsustainable in semiperipheral and peripheral countries, because it would have to compete with the central countries that have supposedly unequivocal comparative advantages in this domain. If this global and external logic did not find such fertile ground for local and internal appropriation, it would certainly not be so dangerous. The proposal I have presented in this chapter is antipodal to this global and external logic and seeks to create conditions to prevent it from finding a welcoming plot for its local and internal appropriation.

The university is a public good intimately connected to the country's project. The political and cultural meaning of this project and its viability depend on a nation's ability to negotiate, in a qualified way, its universities' insertion into the new transnational fields. For the university, and education in general, this qualification is the condition necessary for not making the negotiation an act of surrender and thus marking the end of the university as we know it. The only way to avoid surrender is to create conditions for a cooperative university in solidarity with its own global role.

Notes

1. This chapter has been translated by Peter Lownds of the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). The first version of this text was presented in Brasilia, on April 5, 2004, in the context of the official calendar of debates about university reform organized by Dr. Tarso Genro, the minister of education.

2. In Brazil today, affirmative action politics are playing a leading role and merit special mention. In response to growing pressure from social movements for democratic access to higher learning, especially from the black movement, Lula's govern-

ment launched the University for All program (PROUNI) in the first semester of 2004. The program proclaims affirmative action based on racial and socioeconomic criteria and is based on two main measures. The first measure provides access and full scholarships to low-income students to attend private universities in exchange for the fiscal and social security exemptions granted them by the state. The institutions that adhere to the program earmark at least 10 percent of their seats for low-income students and public school basic education teachers. The second measure requires that the public federal universities earmark at least 50 percent of the enrollment for students coming from public schools (in Brazil the best secondary schools are private and the best universities are public). These vacancies will be distributed so that they reflect the ethnic composition of each state of Brazil, leaving it up to the universities to fix the percentages of vacancies to be filled by low-income students and racial or ethnic groups underrepresented in higher education. This program is a worthwhile effort that goes against the traditional social elitism of the public university, and it has met with much resistance. The debate has touched on the conventional theme of the contradiction between democratic access and meritocracy and also on some new themes, such as the difficulty of applying racial or ethnic criteria in a highly miscegenated society.

3. I have analyzed this epistemological revolution in greater detail in my other writings (Santos 1995, 2000).

4. For example, in Brazil, I have become aware of extremely rich experiences in the extension services of northern and northeastern universities that are totally unknown or undervalued in the central and southern universities. And I am certain that the reverse happens too.

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